Volume XLIII] *December, 1928* [*Number 4*

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

REFLECTIONS ON FARM RELIEF

THE problem of farm relief presents sharply defined short and long-run phases. Both are legitimate fields for governmental research and legislative intervention. That is to say, something can be done. But whatever is done about either ought to be thought of not only in itself but with reference to the other. The problems are distinct, but their solutions would necessarily have mutual significance.

The long-run problem is that of reorganizing the industry, raising its technical efficiency, reducing its costs, conserving the social interest in the land—generally enabling the industry to stand on its own feet among our other more typical ones. Other businesses are required to direct their efforts toward reducing their costs and prices. Farmers are now in the embarrassing position of resenting cost-reducing technical advice and running to the government for help in increasing their prices. This would not be tolerated in any other occupation, and, in the long run, it ought not to be permissible for agriculture. It will not be necessary ultimately, however, if the technical services of the Department of Agriculture, of schools and experimental farms, are kept at their present effective level, and if some means of coöperative effort develops gradually out of its promising beginnings. The one will increase technical proficiency; the other will make farming a large-scale bargaining—if not producing—industry.

The short-run problem is that of forgetting, for the moment, all this long, serious, fundamental reorganizing effort, and of liquidating a present bankruptcy; to give price-relief without

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thinking of reduced costs and prices. We have to think of it as increasing farmers' incomes at the expense, if necessary, of losses to the consumers of their goods. It ought not to be said that this process will not involve a social cost. It will; but not so much, perhaps, as its opponents would have us think. Nevertheless there will be a cost and the question is whether it will be worth the sacrifice.

The controversies of recent years have rather tended to obscure the distinctions between these two problems. Emergency relief, especially, has been erected into a consumers' bogey-man of inflated proportions, assumed to be a permanent burden, and the work of those agencies which would strengthen the industry for the long pull has been deliberately ridiculed by those who overemphasized the significance of surpluses. As a result the emergent legislative plans—the McNary-Haugen Bills—have not been entirely satisfactory from either point of view. As long-run measures, they ignored the necessity for technical reorganization and the reduction of costs, assuming, apparently, that at no price would consumers use more farm products, and that surpluses are to be gauged by the amounts of unsold products at present prices. Furthermore, in establishing profitable prices, they presented no definite—or, at least, enforceable—means for keeping down recurrent surpluses of increasing size. The difficulties attending the effort to market more and more goods at high prices are obvious. As short-run measures, even, there were objectionable features—such, for instance, as dependence upon a non-existent universal coöperative organization amongst farmers themselves, as the basic member-units of the system.

Another difficulty, which seems very real indeed, is that the program, as it came to be framed in legislation, appealed only to a limited number of farmers themselves: those whose products go heavily into export—mostly cotton, wheat and tobacco growers. A farmer in the East or Middle West, with a rounded mixed farming routine, can see little gain from a plan which depends for its success upon the manipulation of exports. Many farm products have an almost wholly domestic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sale. Consequently, dairying, fruit-growing, vegetable-gardening, stock-raising, or even corn or hog-producing farmers are not enthusiastic believers in McNary-Haugenism.

Division in farmers' councils has been apparent from the first. And they never have succeeded in establishing agreement among themselves. The legislation as it emerged represented the dominant ideas of wheat and cotton growers rather than others; but it lost much of its appeal from lack of enthusiasm among large groups with other dominant producing interests. Not only this. Also contributing to the division has been the fact that the long-drawn-out depression affected certain regions more than others. One measure of this situation is changes in land values. For the prices paid for land are a most constant and burdensome obligation. Mortgages have to be met and interest, meantime, has to paid. Land acquired at a relatively low price made, for many Eastern farmers, a relatively easy recovery from the depression years. The low prices they received were far from acceptable; but fewer of them were actually unable to meet their obligations. In states such as Kansas or Iowa, where land-speculation raised the values of land to impossible earning levels, the depression had more disastrous consequences. As a result the farmers in those regions have been most clamorous for Federal relief.

Yet there are few farmers in the whole country who do not carry an intense grievance, a feeling of having been unjustly treated. As Mr. Bliven remarked in 1922, they have followed all the copy-book maxims, have been hard-working, honest, persistent, but nevertheless, social forces beyond their control have constantly threatened them—and sometimes they have been swamped. Specifically they know that theirs is a business which, on the whole, has no money in it. Their estimated losses last year, allowing each proprietor a wage of fifteen hundred dollars, would be not much less than six billion dollars. And they are finding out all these facts. They want something done. But most of them are still unconvinced that the right scheme has been advanced. No general assent to any program has as yet been gained.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Economists have a generally accepted rule that an increase in the supply of staple goods—such as farm products are—will cause prices to fall in a degree entirely disproportionate to the size of the increase. The stimulations of war noticeably increased our farm production; but the war-time markets shrunk as soon as European farm activity was resumed, and when credits began to falter under continued inflation. The American market was suddenly required to absorb the unusual amounts which had been flowing out as exports. But this primary cause for the crisis of 1920 was made worse—deliberately, farm leaders say—by the forced deflation of credits which began at the height of the marketing season.

Farm products could only be sold at a ruinous disadvantage; nevertheless they had to go for what they would bring, for there were pressing obligations to meet. In the regions of conspicuous land speculation the total receipts for several years were not large enough even to pay interest on mortgages. But foreclosure was unsatisfactory even for creditors. The land simply could not earn enough in any hands to meet the charges upon it. Frozen credits, chronic bankruptcy, lasting for years, followed the *débâcle*. Liquidation is just now being completed. And just now the purchasing power of farm products has reached the pre-war level. A burnt child fears the fire, however, and farmers now, though their present ills are less, fear another disastrous turn of the wheel. Furthermore, they are no longer satisfied with pre-war conditions. Their complaints have by now become more organized, leaders have appeared, and there is voting strength in the bloc to be reckoned with. They are disposed to seek a settlement now, while their political bargaining strength is unimpaired.

Eight years of gradually liquidating depression have incalculably injured the nation's agricultural plant. Fertility has been depleted, equipment has run down, man-power has deteriorated. Not only farmers themselves, but all thoughtful social observers are seriously concerned that some ingenuity and some public action should be enlisted and at once. At best farming suffers needless handicaps. Back to 1913 is not good enough.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For, strictly speaking, what happened between 1920 and 1928 is nothing new in our history. Indeed a more or less organized agrarian revolt is nothing new. If we were to look backward we should see that each of those phenomena we call the business cycle and which, in Europe, they call the economic rhythm, has had similar consequences for rural folks. The characteristic course of the general price level through one of these cyclical movements can be idealized in this fashion:



But if, from the general price indexes, those of agricultural and non-agricultural goods were abstracted and super-imposed, there would be found to be regularly recurring differences in behavior:



Agricultural price behavior is here represented by a broken line. It shows how, when prices move upward, those of agriculture gradually gain on others and finally show an advantage, which, however, is rapidly lost when the turn comes. The dis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

advantage of farmers is measured roughly by the fact that they lose more in depression than they gain in prosperity, and that this continues to be true, with a periodical exploitation of those engaged in this activity for the benefit of those engaged in other pursuits.

This, perhaps, gives us the best key we can get to the immediate problem of farm-relief. Using the same illustrative means, it might be said that the real problem which must be faced by those who would do something genuine and immediate for farmers is to insure a price-relationship between agricultural and non-agricultural products which will be constant:



The McNary-Haugen idea was that this price disparity, recurrently so disastrous, might be traced to the economic rule that small surpluses have disproportionate effects on prices and that this situation might be relieved by the segregation of this small percentage which has such great consequences. It might then be disposed of safely in either of two ways: storage or export. Coöperative storage, assisted by government financing, might enable farmers to wait for favorable markets. At least marketing could be spread throughout the year. Dumping abroad, with proper management of import duties, could be done at any price, provided the elimination of the surplus was complete; for then domestic prices could be kept at a level which would yield a profit on the whole of any crop. This device, it was argued, would at last admit farmers to the American protective system on an equality with other industries.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A stabilization fund would be set up by the government; equalization fees, assessed against the products to be marketed, would prevent its dissipation and locate the costs of operation where they belonged. All this was not to function as individual help to farmers; they were supposed first to set up local and regional coöperative associations with power to do business for their members. Government financial aid was to be extended for assistance in organizing these bodies as well as for insuring against loss of profits in marketing.

All this was objected to by Mr. Coolidge as unconstitutional and as administratively impossible. There is doubt as to constitutionality, but it is only doubt; and that decision belongs to the courts. As to the complexity of administration, this is a charge which might be brought against almost any governmental device. Simplicity is desirable, but lack of it ought not to prevent the adoption of a desirable policy. Besides, the scheme, if complex, was necessarily so. It may be better to do something difficult than to do nothing at all. His real objection was a stubborn determination to do nothing. New England minds revolt against any economic proposal which is more socially oriented than Vermont shop-keeping. But the veto stood.

The scheme seemed workable enough, and administratively possible, provided only that foreign governments made no retaliatory moves to protect their own farmers, and that the surpluses in question did not grow so big, with profit insurance, as to prove unwieldy. But obviously it applied mostly to exportable (or easily stored) products; and, quite as obviously it depended upon a huge coöperative organization among farmers of which only the barest beginnings were to be discerned.

President Harding seems to have been considerably shaken when, in 1921, he ran onto the fact that making goods does not always involve making money, especially in agricultural occupations. In his message to Congress he stated the problem:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> It is rather shocking to be told, and to have the statement strongly supported, that nine million bales of cotton, raised on American plantations in a given year, will actually be worth more to the producers than thirteen million bales would have been. Equally shocking is the statement that seven hundred million bushels of wheat, raised by American farmers, would bring them more money than a billion bushels. Yet these are not exaggerated statements. In a world where there are tens of millions who need food and clothing which they cannot get, such a condition is sure to indict a social system which makes it possible.

In strict logic, this last sentence may seem something of a *non sequitur*. Yet, in a way, it does follow that something is wrong in a social system whose mechanisms discourage productivity when there are those who are in need of food and clothing. The Agricultural Conference which was called to solve this problem helped very little. No one there wanted to do anything drastic; and no one had any ideas. The question, why, when there are people in need, will they pay only as much for a small crop as they will for a large one, goes pretty deep. The answer to it does constitute an indictment of our arrangements. But the defenders of those arrangements have managed, so far, to fight off any corrective surgery. It became progressively more difficult to do so, however, as continued discussion clarified the facts and sharpened the issues. We came within an inch of stringent change this last year. And if the camel's nose once gets under the tent, institutions of many another industry may find themselves let in for an overhauling.

Mr. Coolidge inherited the puzzle of farmers penalized for productivity. But puzzles do not worry him. Besides he held it certain that prosperity would recur in his time to justify inaction. The obstinate persistence of the farm leaders in pointing out the remarkable duration of the depression and the certainty of its recurrence has annoyed him, but not unbearably. His last McNary-Haugen veto lacked something of aplomb; it was even sharp. But it may be doubted whether it satisfied everyone that the economics of New England shopkeeping is adequate to the solution of the difficulty.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Meantime we have been achieving a much better notion of why it is that large crops carry penalties, and something of an idea concerning a remedy. For now it seems that President Harding, though he touched a distressing fact, did not explore it far enough. The addition to be made is this: though there may be cold and hungry people in the world, they may not be able to pay as much for cotton or for wheat as is required to meet the cost of production in Mississippi or in Oregon. The number of those who both desire to buy and possess the wherewithal may be limited to the number who will absorb nine millions of bales of cotton and seven hundred million bushels of wheat. This ought, of course, to condemn any social system. Yet we cannot quite set out to solve the American crop-surplus problem by raising the buying power of all the world's people. Urban poverty is a social disease which cannot legitimately find its cure in an alternative poverty for rural folk.

If we are mainly interested in relief for American farmers, our problem is far simpler than that. It is, in fact, the problem of producing only as much as consumers can afford to buy at a price somewhat above the cost of production. Anything more than this is the surplus about which we hear so much, and which, whatever else we may say of it, indubitably possesses a disproportionate power to smash prices. Given a twenty-five per cent surplus, farmers with pressing obligations will find themselves forced to sell far below their actual costs. They have done it year after year.

It is true that, if we consider ourselves obligated to consumers as well as to producers, we shall not be content with a program of restricted production. For more could undoubtedly be sold at lower prices; and lower prices could still be profitable if costs could be reduced. The long-run problem is this: to increase efficiency, lower costs, reduce prices, widen markets, and feed and clothe more people at less expense. But the reorganization of agriculture cannot start there. For such a program requires immense research and extensive capital outlay. Capital will not flow into an unprofitable industry. It will not even stay there, such of it as can be got out by its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

owners. The first step is to make farming profitable. And for this it is necessary to adjust production to the amount which will be consumed at prices which are higher than present (not future) costs.

The problem of immediate farm relief is, then, that of limiting production, not to the nation's or the world's needs, but to the buying capacity of the farmers' market. Do this to begin with and other desirable results may follow.

But how shall we limit production? This is difficult to say; and every proposal seems to have difficulties. If they are not administrative or fiscal, they are constitutional. The simplest scheme would seem to be one which would contain the following elements:

(1) A survey of the amounts necessary to meet normal needs and which will command a profitable price.

(2) Notice of limitation of planting, on a basis of ten-year averages, by local (probably county) agents of a Farm Board.

(3) Enforcement through denial of the use of railways and warehouses to produce grown on unauthorized acreage.

The steel manufacturers or the milk distributors of the country could not carry out such a scheme for themselves, much less enlist governmental assistance. What excuse is there for either permitting farmers to do it or assisting in the venture? Merely that this is genuinely the kind of thing which the Supreme Court before now has recognized as a "controlling emergency". Our agricultural plant is deteriorating; it not only makes no progress but rapidly wastes away. We must save it by heroic means; and if we must break all our precedents, why not go straight to what we know is the root of the matter, limit production, make the industry profitable, then watch it develop once more as an independent art?

There has been too little attention paid to the somewhat curious changes in price relationships in recent years. As a matter of fact consumers pay relatively as much for food products and buy relatively as many as they did in 1913. If farmers were well off then, one would say, they ought to be prosperous now. The difficulty is that, though consumers pay

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as much, farmers do not receive as much. An unusual—and apparently growing—amount is absorbed somewhere between farmer and consumer.

Then, of course, farmers were not well off in 1913. They had grounds for complaint even then. But the situation has been made worse by stealing from their incomes by middlemen. It is sometimes argued that this is the whole trouble: that there is not a surplus, and that surplus-control legislation is therefore not needed. The answer to this is that surpluses existed even before the war; but then contrasts in living standards were less tormenting. The surplus is not greater now, but it is more important. Farmers, years ago, went to the store for fewer goods, and did not feel the need of so many of them. The surplus and low prices therefore meant less in their lives. What they provided for themselves was not affected. But low cash prices mean more and more all the time. Money must be had; farmers are, therefore, more at the mercy of middlemen —both in buying and in selling. And it is more important that surpluses should be controlled than it used to be. It is more important because it equalizes the farmers' monopoly situation with that of those with whom he must deal. It might, or so it seems to some farm leaders, do something needful in an economic way which he cannot possibly do for himself.

Much objection to surplus-control legislation has centered about the equalization fee. It is difficult to see why. If the government is to do anything in the way of assisting in agricultural control, it seems a simple and just conception that administrative costs and possible losses in disposal ought to be assessed against the product, so becoming a part of its direct costs rather than a government subsidy. Dissension over this feature of recent legislation is really ill-considered. Take away the fee and the whole cost must fall on the government to be paid for out of general tax funds. The real question, which needs much more exploration than it is getting, is whether the six billion dollars of annual loss to farmers ought to be taken from some other class and given to them. For this would be the intent of surplus-control legislation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Opponents of farm relief talk as though a rise in farmers' incomes must necessarily come out of consumers' pockets. They arrive at this by admitting first that the exploitation of farmers helps to reduce urban living costs. Regardless of the justice of such an arrangement, a further exploration of the general economic situation into which a program of farm relief has to be injected, reveals a number of social costs in this which, if they were applied to the urban-rural balance sheet, might considerably reduce the advantages to urban consumers assumed to flow from farm depression.

Suppose, for the moment, that some governmental administrative device should succeed in raising the general farm income to a profitable level. This income will be spent. Its spending, either for capital goods or consumption goods, will enlarge factory production, provide more employment, probably reduce the per-unit costs of goods and possibly reduce prices. More employment and reduced prices are strictly equivalent to increased wages. Some unmeasured deduction from the supposed cost of farm relief must certainly be allowed for this series of events which would be consequent upon it.

The gross income of a nation cannot, of course, be increased by fiat. The assumption that factory production and urban employment will be increased by a shift of income from urban to rural folk rests on the further assumption that more is to be gained, at present, by the farmer's spending than by the spending of those who now receive income which is rightfully his. The low level of living and the inefficient methods of working in farm employments give distinct promise of this. There is, in other words, a more fertile field for the employment of higher incomes in rural life than in urban life. To a certain extent, therefore, deduction has to be made from the apparent cost of farm relief for the increase in the general income which might result from the employment of it in rural activities rather than in urban ones.

It ought also to be remembered that our present policy which involves a loss to farmers of, roughly, six billions a year, involves meeting the losses in some way or other. One way of meeting them is by land mining; another is by not depreci-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ating equipment—barns, fences, machinery, stock; still another is by living on a restricted family budget—sacrificing health, education, morale. No person of sense would argue that these policies do not involve progressively higher costs for goods produced under the conditions they fix; and, ultimately, higher prices to their consumers. The temporary advantage of urban over rural folk may well turn out to be a costly one in the long run.

But if means were taken to correct this disadvantage a whole series of alternative events would be engendered. Increased farm profits would mean more capital equipment, better health and education, increased fertility, higher morale. These are the conditions under which the long-awaited technical reorganization of the industry might take place, with reduced costs of production and with lower prices to consumers.

Simple and arbitrary raising of farm prices will not produce these results. Limitation of production must be undertaken at the same time. Otherwise production will be extended to poor lands, operators will be encouraged in inefficiency, and we will be no better off than we are now. Many of the larger industries at the present time are so articulated as to be able to effect a limitation of their own production to profitable amounts. Farmers must buy their goods. But the nature of agriculture is such that no similar coördination is possible for farmers. The use of governmental machinery for such a purpose is not usual with us, but there would seem to be a quite reasonable excuse for it on these grounds.

One other feature of this cost problem is interesting. Regardless of whether we happen to feel that farmers' incomes ought to be made larger, they *will* be made larger, at least, temporarily. For in every complete cyclical movement there is a period within which the advantage lies with farmers, when the index of farm prices rises above the price index of other commodities. Proposals for stabilization of the price relationship may sound slightly less horrific if this fact is kept prominent in the discussion. This period is shorter, less extreme, and therefore less profitable to farmers than the period during

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which their losses cumulate. But it nevertheless recurs. If it is argued that to raise farmers' incomes would upset the normal course of affairs, if it seems arbitrary and unjust to consumers of their products, these aspects of the situation are mitigated by remembering that, without intervention, all these things will, in time, occur. The plea is, in fact, more for order and regularity than for subsidy. And it may be germane to remark that this period of advantage for farmers seems to be a favorable one all round. They have gained most in prosperous times, with rising prices and widespread industrial activity. Their very inability, then, to change the supply of their products at less than a year's notice (more for many things: fruits, dairy products) is then a favorable circumstance, and their prices rise faster than those of other goods whose supplies are more readily enlarged. This cannot be expanded into a claim that increased farm prices result in prosperity. But it does throw some light on the question whether farm relief would necessarily be ruinous to other classes.

The ordinary "hard-boiled" type of person is fond of saying that if the farm problem is let alone the inefficient farmers will ruin themselves and those who can make money will eventually come to dominate the industry. There seems, however, to be considerable doubt as to whether the selection works this way. There are those who say that the efficient get out and the poor, because their shiftless standards content them, remain. And that, in consequence, the power of the industry to save itself is diminishing. In answer to citations of the undoubted fact that there are now, in every community, prosperous farmers, they say that these individual successes are only comparative, that they exist because the general technological level is so low, and that these examples cannot be cited as evidence of a probable salvation of the whole occupation from within.

It is true that successful farmers are to be found. But it is also true that they are prosperous because they produce a greater product with a given outlay of effort and capital. They can, because their costs are lower, accept prices which keep

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their more inefficient neighbors hopefully in business. But if efficiency should become the rule, as things are, the product of the farms would be increased enormously, and if there is anything in the surplus idea, prices might again tend to fall below costs of production. Efficiency would dig its own grave. This is because nothing would have happened to strengthen the farmer's general position as an economic unit among the others of our system. To supply this deficiency, coöperative marketing is suggested. Even President Coolidge approves this movement. It is conceived of as being the agricultural correlative of the corporation and the trade association in other businesses. And, actually, it has been given freer scope for development.

There is nothing wrong with this notion except that it does not seem to work very well. These possibilities have always existed; but the state of the industry at present is sufficient indication of their regenerative influence. Their failure to materialize is precisely the source of the reasoning which asks for governmental intervention, and which leads to the serious belief of many students that the industry must first of all be made prosperous. By this first step, and by a secondary regularization and limitation of activity the period of infancy may be shortened.

Limitation of production need not necessarily involve less food-products for the nation, or the wastage of land resources through abandonment. It may have quite opposite results. Staples, it is true, have a relatively inexpansible demand; but not all agricultural goods have, by any means, reached the limits of possible use. It is more true of those whose producers are now in most trouble; but limitation here would have general beneficial effects. We raise too much wheat for any purpose, probably; but the possible expansion of the use of dairy products—with lower prices—is very great, and this is true of numerous other products. Limitation of cotton, corn, wheat, and tobacco production would serve to stimulate others, enriching the whole economy. For not only would consumers be given wider and better choices, but farm practice would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

doubtless be improved by less emphasis upon a few crops and the expansion of others.

It is not generally remembered, in discussing farm relief, that we are now on the verge, probably, of a vast technological reconstruction of the industry. Ancient axioms, which have seemed almost native to the soil, are being called in question. The corn crop, for instance, the king of all American farm products, may very well disappear. Its cultivation contributes to erosion; it is costly to raise; it has new but formidable enemies, such as the borer. Alfalfa may take its place. The whole theory of rotation is under attack. It is rotation which offers the most formidable resistance to economical machine operation. These indicate a few of the many possible changes. Up to now agricultural experts have preached variety and mixed farming in season and out. One-crop cultivation has been anathema. But because it lends itself to large-scale operations, and because land restoration no longer depends necessarily on animal humus, the one-crop system may very well increase rather than diminish.

So soon as we can see at all clearly what some of these new trends are likely to be, it will be a social duty to encourage them. A program of limitation entered on for temporary purposes now might later serve this purpose also. The long and short-run programs may interpenetrate one another. A general policy of limitation might involve expansion as well as repression. If the wheat crop were cut down, the alfalfa crop might be increased. In such a case both temporary and permanent gains would ensue. Then too we all must have read with wonder the new promises of the chemists. They think of the land and its vegetation as a sun-trap which now is mostly unused. They talk of billions of tons of unused raw stuffs and of a new alliance between agriculture and industry. Who shall say that nothing may come of it? And why might not the government supplement its program for agricultural planting with experimental manufacture, at least, of some of the things already made in laboratories from the waste products of the farms: rayon, wall-board, fire-proof tiles, synthetic lumber, insulators, and the like?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No program of limitation would dare eliminate the possibility of surplus. The most troublesome surpluses indeed arise from the vagaries of nature. It would be necessary to provide machinery for protection against these risks. But here the McNary-Haugenites are correct. These risks are insurable. And only the government can undertake to spread the risks. The equalization fee is a device for doing it. It might be more pleasing, constitutionally, to lay an excise tax on each unit to be insured, but the effect would be the same.

Given some assurance that insured profits would not yield an ever-increasing surplus from year to year, and there can be none but administrative objections to the McNary-Haugen Bill. The Bill of 1928 contained a half-effective answer to those who said that surpluses would increase. It was vaguely said that the Farm Board would advise farmers concerning planting programs, and that if the advice were not heeded the recalcitrant ones would be shut out from the benefits of profit-insurance. This may be as far as we can go with limitation. It may be far enough. I should like to have seen it tried as a beginning. Indeed the more I study the Bill of 1928 the deeper my admiration becomes. As a piece of social legislation it surpasses anything an American Congress ever framed. The remaining troublesome consideration is its dependence on a non-existent coöperative structure. Perhaps, however, ways around this difficulty may be found.

R. G. TUGWELL

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GERMAN GOVERNMENTAL INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, 1871–1915

THE problem of governmental influence on foreign investments first came prominently to the attention of the American public in 1922, when the United States government requested that all loans to foreign governments be submitted to the State Department for approval. In subsequent years the government has continued to exercise a partial supervision over the export of capital. This fact has evoked vigorous comment from time to time, and the demand for a well-defined policy, either of strict control or of complete *laissez-faire*, has become insistent within the last year.[1]

The problem is a new one to us, arising out of the sudden appearance of the United States as a creditor nation, and it is difficult to forecast with accuracy, from our own experience, the probable results of governmental control. In the absence of first-hand experience, therefore, it is of importance to realize that this problem has confronted European governments for years, and that their experiments in the control of foreign investments, seen in the perspective of later events, offer concrete material for our guidance. Unfortunately, since the relation of governments to international financial operations is often extremely subtle, and almost always shrouded in secrecy, it is difficult to secure anything like a complete story of a government's policy. An effort has been made here—probably for the first time—to collect all that is known of the German policy.

The scope of this inquiry is limited to a search for specific cases in which the German government prior to 1915 attempted in any way to influence the investment of German capital in particular foreign loans. Loans to so-called "backward"

[1] The Academy of Political Science in November, 1927, and the Norman Wait Harris Institute (Chicago) in 1928 had special meetings to discuss the problem of foreign investments. Both gave considerable time to a discussion of government control of investments.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries, such as China, Persia and Morocco, and other loans which were secondary to concession-hunting have been omitted because they constitute a distinctly separate problem. The cases are presented in chronological order, so that the progressive development of a policy may be observed.

The Setting of the German Problem

We must first have in mind the various means of control available to the German government. We may distinguish between legal, or formal, and extra-legal, or informal, influence.

There appear to have been only two legal regulatory provisions which could be invoked for this purpose: (a) a law governing the Reichsbank, and (b) a law establishing supervision of the stock exchange.

The purpose of the Reichsbank was to regulate the circulation of money throughout the Empire, to facilitate payments between banks, and to provide for the mobilization of capital in all forms.[1] Established as a private bank, provision was yet made for governmental supervision. The directorate was composed of the Chancellor and four members, one of whom was appointed by the Emperor, the other three by the Bundesrat, and the Chancellor was given directive powers. The Reichsbank as thus constituted permitted of at least two very definite ways of influencing the export of capital: (1) the discount rate could be shifted in such a manner as to check the exodus of capital; (2) the fact that not all foreign securities had to be accepted as collateral in the Reichsbank's discount business opened the way to some discrimination in accordance with foreign policy.

The second form of influence was afforded by the Stock Exchange Law.[2] With respect to the monetary exchanges, its aim was to protect the public against fraudulent securities, both domestic and foreign. But the law also provided that such securities as endangered a public interest (*ein erhebliches allgemeines Interesse*) might be excluded. This opened the way for restrictions for political reasons.

[1] National Monetary Commission, *German Bank Inquiry*, p. 44.

[2] *Cf.* A. Nussbaum, *Kommentar zum Boersengesetz* (München, 1910).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The control over each exchange in Germany was left to the state within which it was situated, state governments being represented on the exchange commission by a commissar. His duty to see that the laws were enforced included the power to see that no securities were admitted which might endanger a public interest.

Federal unity was given to the exchange regulation by a provision that no security might be admitted to the exchange which had been excluded from another exchange anywhere in the Reich, unless the reason for exclusion had been a purely local one. It is here that we find the greatest opportunity for the national government to influence the export of capital in other than an informal manner. For the Chancellor of Germany was also prime minister of Prussia, and could direct the affairs of Prussia in accordance with his foreign policy. The commissar of the Prussian exchanges, being subordinate to the prime minister of Prussia, was therefore brought into line with the national policy of the German government.

The possibilities of informal government control or influence are so numerous and well known that they need not be enumerated here. Familiar examples are inspired press articles or conversations between bankers and government officials. The type of influence a government uses depends upon the peculiar circumstances of each case.

Lombard Verbot, 1887

On November 10, 1887, the President of the Reichsbank, on the order of the Chancellor, Bismarck, issued the following order to the Reichsbank and all its branches: "From date of receipt of this order, no Lombard[1] loans may be issued against Russian securities."[2] No reason was given for the action, but Bismarck instructed the Reichsbank to tell customers that the Russian credit was not secure, and that therefore the Reichsbank did not wish to accept the Russian securities as collateral.[3]

[1] A Lombard loan is a short-time loan issued against securities as collateral.—J. Conrad, *Grundriss der Politischen Oekonomie*, p. 245.

[2] *Grosse Politik*, vol. V, # 1142 and *ante*.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 332.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It will be recalled that the outstanding problems of Russo-German relations during the years 1886–87 were the renewal of the *Dreikaiserbund* and the negotiation of a commercial treaty.[1] Both of these were the cause of heated propaganda in the press of each country. Added bad feeling was created by a ukase which "ordered alien landowners outside the towns on the western frontier to sell their property within three years, unless inherited in the direct line or by the survivor of a married couple if the heir was in Russia before the issue of the ukase"[2] and which provided that no foreigner might be an administrator of land in Poland. This was issued March 14, 1887, and was clearly directed against the Germans since they were the chief landowners and administrators.

The Russian ukase provoked a strong agitation in Germany against Russian credit. This propaganda, though apparently not instigated by the government, was not checked, and was probably supported by it.[3] In fact, the Auswaertiges Amt was clearly satisfied with the depression which it believed it noticed in Russian securities and with the entire anti-Russian agitation.

Meantime, in November, 1887, forged letters, supposedly of Prince Ferdinand to the Countess of Flanders, appeared, alleging German designs upon the Bulgarian throne.[4] Although they were generally discredited, Bismarck was not sure but that Russia might believe them sufficiently to plan a military attack, and his action in closing German money sources to Russia has been interpreted as an attempt to forestall such a move.

It is extremely difficult to estimate the results of this action by the government. Some claim that about three billion marks of Russian securities flowed out of German into French hands,[5] and that the Germans then took up the Italian *rente* in place of the Russian, since the Italians offered just the right type of investment for the small German investor. This is

[1] A. Viallate, *Economic Imperialism and International Relations*, p. 59.

[2] Gooch, *Modern Europe*, p. 137.

[3] *Grosse Politik*, vol. V, # 1140 and p. 331.

[4] Gooch, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

[5] *Berliner Boersen Courier*, Nov. 10, 1891.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

somewhat substantiated by Caprivi's memorandum[1] to the Kaiser in connection with the repeal of the *Verbot* in 1894. Certainly it is true that the *Verbot* aided France in becoming the creditor of Russia.

Russian Loan of 1891

In consequence of the official German action in 1887, the Russians had turned to Paris for subsequent help and had been successful there in many loan negotiations. In August, 1890, Russia was making extensive plans for government control of of all her railways and for the extension of some of them in strategic directions. For this she needed funds.

Conditions for a Russian loan in Paris were apparently most favorable, and Rothschild and Company had the terms drafted, when suddenly a break came about, due to two chief reasons: first, the financial catastrophe of the Société de Dépôts and Baring Brothers made the market in Paris and London so weak as to cause fear of a failure of the loan if it were launched on the market;[2] second, the continued and intensified Jewish persecutions in Russia made a bad impression in Parisian financial circles.[3] It was rumored that Jews outside Paris had sent Rothschild a petition to refuse the Russian loan. With this break in the negotiations at Paris, an opportunity was opened to Berlin to reënter the field of Russian foreign loans. The question was: What would be the attitude of the German capital market, and how would the German government look upon a possible participation—would it maintain the old prohibition of 1887? Would the government express itself at all, and would the bankers heed the advice? Would the government be affected by the Jewish persecutions? If the government and the bank were of different opinions, here was a chance to test their respective strengths.

On September 25, 1891, it became known that a German bank was planning to take part in the Russian loan and to

[1] *Grosse Politik*, vol. V, # 1143, Oct. 24, 1894.

[2] *Frankfurter Zeitung*, May 13, 1891.

[3] *Ibid.*, May 13, 1891, and *Grosse Politik*, vol. VII, # 1566; Gooch, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bring it out on the German market. It was the same loan that had been launched in Paris. As was to be expected, this action of Mendelssohn and Company and the Robert Warschauer Company caused surprised comment throughout the financial and general press, for this meant not only a complete change in the policy of German banks, but if permitted, also a change in that of the government. Immediately it was rumored that the plan must be the result of a close coöperation with the government, that the government had considered the moment propitious for a friendly approach to Russia, in view of the inability of other markets to satisfy her needs.[1] The government, it was surmised, wanted to ease the international political situation, and especially to show that it did not take too seriously the Kronstadt conversations between France and Russia.

The following day, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, generally recognized as the government organ, came out with the following statement:

> In the last days conjectures have been found in the daily press as to the policy of the government in matters of international finance. It has been rumored, too, that the government has been planning to change its policy with respect to the Lombard *Verbot*. We are in a position to say that the government has no such plans at the present moment.

This would seem to be a reiteration of the position of 1887 and a discouragement of German participation in the loan. But for some reason the financial press in general regarded it as a veiled indication of neutrality on the part of the government.[2] As a result the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* published the following statement on September 28, 1891:

> The press seems to think the government has to take a position in regard to every foreign loan and to notify the public of the position. This is the only way to explain the criticisms of the

[1] *Berliner Boersen Courier*, September 26, 1891.

[2] See, e. g., current numbers of *Berliner Boersen Courier* and *Frankfurter Zeitung*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"neutral" position which the government has taken in the present Russian loan. This criticism seems unfounded, and its very foundation is untenable. We admit that the interested parties will want to know the government's position in relation to a loan, and that when a new situation exists the government may be moved for political reasons to express itself for or against. It is valuable for the business world to know this, so as to be sure of backing by the government, and the direct wish of the government to have the loan issued may greatly enhance its success on the market. But it seems unjustifiable to require a government to answer on every loan when the result may be an estrangement or antagonism with that power if it opposes the loan—or to urge German participation and thereby assume a responsibility for the loan itself.

The suggestion that the government choose between these alternatives seems inadvisable due to the consequences, and especially so if the subject matter has been long discussed and the government's attitude is known. Therefore we feel that at the present time the government should not express itself further, nor can we criticise it for its neutrality. It is advisable that the public learn to decide these questions for itself.

This statement, though recognized as emanating from the government, had little effect on the public mind. For political reasons, the public remained hostile, and the press predicted war, despite Caprivi's speech of reassurance. The loan failed. It was rumored that it had been withdrawn by Russia on account of the German opposition; others said Mendelssohn and Company declined to issue it in the face of the public protest.

The official expressions referred to thus far are those of the year in which the case arose. Since that time, the subsequently published documents of the Foreign Office have added something to the information available. A memorandum written by Marschall, then secretary of the Foreign Office, on November 25, 1891, records his opinion that the German banks withdrew from the proposed loan to Russia because of the pressure of public opinion. Marschall says that the government's position in regard to the loan was one of strict neutrality.[1]

[1] *Grosse Politik*, vol. XII, # 1515, and footnote at p. 229.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Furthermore, a memorandum on a statement of Holstein to the Russian ambassador says that Germany could not urge her nationals to put capital into Russia because Russian finances were not entirely secure, because the social conditions in Russia were too unstable, and because Russian policy did not promise any compensation for the German financial assistance, if such were given. Finally, he told the ambassador that Russo-German commercial relations were not yet satisfactorily arranged.[1]

The question which presents itself at the end of this recital of the facts is: Why was the government's second statement of September 28th so very evasive? The possibility exists that Caprivi hoped to get back onto somewhat better terms with Russia; for, the antagonism of the last few years, including Germany's refusal to renew the Reinsurance Treaty in 1890, had played directly into the hands of France. On the other hand, for the following reasons Caprivi may have wanted the loan to fail: (1) the strained relations in connection with the negotiation of a commercial treaty;[2] (2) the continued anti-Russian propaganda in the German press;[3] (3) the fact that the proceeds of the loan were to be used in part for strategic railways along Germany's eastern border.[4]

Whatever his real attitude was, Caprivi had good reasons for not making his views public: (1) England was opposed to Russia and to this loan[5] because Russia was supporting France in her demand for an evacuation of Egypt; (2) an open expression might have influenced unfavorably the commercial treaty negotiations between Russia and Germany; (3) the failure of the loan in France had raised the question of the advisability of granting funds to a country which persecuted Jews, and Caprivi could not afford to become involved in this ques-

[1] *Ibid.*, vol. VII, # 1634, November 30, 1891.

[2] See *Tariff Relations between Russia and Germany 1890*, Dept. Comm., Tariff Series # 38, pp. 5-6, and U. S. Tariff Commission, *Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties* (1919), pp. 44, 47, 457, 477.

[3] *Cf.* documents in *Grosse Politik*, vol. V, relating to the *Verbot*.

[4] *Berliner Boersen Courier*, Sept. 25, 1891, and other papers of that date.

[5] *Economist* (London), Feb. 6, 1892.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion; (4) in Germany Caprivi faced a strong agrarian opposition aroused by his favors to industry, and he could not afford to intensify this antagonism.[1]

The case is significant, because it shows how the formal *Verbot* of 1887 gave rise to the uncertainties with respect to the 1891 loan, and because the statement of September 28 presents a distinct clarification in the policy of the government. There it is indicated that although the government may at times require the financial groups to follow foreign policy, as in 1887, this does not imply that the government will judge the security or discuss the political implications of all loans which may come to the German market. It reserves for itself the right not only of expression, but of silence as well.

Russian Loan of 1902

In March, 1902, a four per cent loan of 393,000,000 marks was granted to Russia by a group of German banks including Bleichroeder, the Disconto Gesellschaft, the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, and the Robert Warschauer Company, under the leadership of Mendelssohn and Company. The loan was admitted to the Berlin Exchange with the approval of the Prussian government on March 25, 1902.[2]

The story connected with this loan is brief but interesting. On March 15, 1902, the German ambassador in Russia sent a special despatch to the Foreign Office, calling to the attention of his government the fact that the Russian government was negotiating a loan of some 300,000,000 marks with Mendelssohn and Company. He urged Berlin to use Russia's need of money as a means of getting certain tariff concessions in the commercial treaty to be negotiated in 1904.[3]

Upon this report, von Buelow commented in the following words: "We must see to it that the Jews (Mendelssohn, etc.) consider not merely their own purse, but also the interests of the State."[4] In a later memorandum of March 17, he ex-

[1] Wilhelm II, *Ereignisse und Gestalten*, p. 45.

[2] *Vierteljahrshefte zur Statistik des deutschen Reichs*, vol. XII; *Grosse Politik*, vol. XVIII, # 5407.

[3] *Grosse Politik*, vol. XVIII, # 5404. Alvensleben to Foreign Office.

[4] *Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pressed his fear that Mendelssohn and Company might become tools in the hands of the free-traders, who were looking for trouble, economically and politically, between Germany and Russia. Reporting on a conversation on this matter which he had had with the Kaiser, he said: "His Majesty is very willing to use moral and other pressure on Mendelssohn to attain the desired end, and he insists that he will have to be reckoned with if Mendelssohn tries to thwart our foreign policy."

Buelow's and the Kaiser's plans, however, were thwarted by another consideration, for, after discussing the problem with the financial circles in Germany, Buelow found out that if Germany did not grant the loan, or made too severe terms, Witte would turn to France, where terms less onerous to Russia could be obtained.[1] Hereupon, Buelow notified Ambassador Alvensleben that he should be careful in presenting his demands to Witte. Germany might be left with bad relations with Russia and no loan made. It would be better to get the loan through.

After the loan had succeeded and had been admitted to the exchange, Germany found out that Witte had wanted the loan from Germany in order to show France that he was not dependent upon her for funds. To this the Kaiser said that he was glad, for political reasons, to have permitted the placing of the loan in Germany. To the Russian naval attaché he said that it was only his friendship for the Tsar which caused him to permit the listing of the loan on the exchange.[2]

This case shows very explicitly the belief on the part of the government at that time that financial interests should be made secondary to the major questions of foreign policy, regardless of the economic questions involved in the loan. But it also shows that though the government might wish to use its position as a creditor nation to attain political goals, it could be sure of success only when Germany was the only creditor. For as soon as Germany heard that France might make the loan without German aid if Witte turned to her, the Foreign

[1] *Cf.* Brandenburg, *From Bismarck to the World War*, pp. 182-85, and *Grosse Politik*, vol. XVIII, # 5406: Buelow to Alvensleben.

[2] *Ibid.*, # 5408-5409.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Office was compelled to retreat from its outspoken position to one of conciliation and regard for Russian wishes. The case also shows the belief on the part of the Kaiser that the listing of foreign securities on the German exchanges was dependent upon his wish. It is, further, a unique example in that the government did not resort to any covering reasons, but openly admitted political motives.

Russian Loan of 1906

On April 16, 1906, the Russian government signed a loan contract in Paris with English, French and Austrian bankers for 225,000,000 francs.[1] No German banking group participated in the flotation or underwriting of the loan within Germany because the German government opposed the loan.[2]

At the time, no official statement was made as to why the government had prevented German participation in the loan, but in the documents of the Foreign Office we find the statement of von Buelow that the German government had opposed the loan only out of consideration for internal economic conditions, and that the German bankers had held back only for this reason.[3] Writers on this question have disagreed as to the reason, the majority believing that political reasons were dominant,[4] while a minority has asserted that the condition of the money market caused the precautionary step by the government, as asserted by von Buelow.[5] A third suggestion was that Germany wished to exert pressure on Russia in order to get better commercial treaty terms.[6]

In examining his statement, we find inconsistencies which suggest that von Buelow's statement was intended to cover the

[1] *Witte, My Memoirs,* chap. ii, pp. 304-06.

[2] *Frankfurter Zeitung,* April 17, 1906.

[3] *Grosse Politik,* vol. XXI, # 7154.

[4] Witte, *op. cit.,* chap. ii; *Frankfurter Zeitung,* April 17, 1906; *Berliner Tageblatt,* March, 1906; Schultess, *Europäischer Geschichtskalender,* 1906, p. 91; *Berliner Boersen Zeitung,* March 30, 1906.

[5] Sartorius von Walthershausen, *Das Volkswirtschaftliche System der Kapitalanlage im Auslande* (1907), p. 314.

[6] Grundherr, *Wirtschaftliche und Politische Bedeutung der Kapitalsanlagen im Auslande* (Greifswald, 1914), p. 103.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

real reason. In the first place, as late as March 31, 1906, Benckendorf, Russian ambassador to London, had said to the German ambassador at the same place that Russia was badly in need of funds, but was unable to get them on any of the exchanges of the world. On the document reporting this to Berlin, the Kaiser made the following marginal notation: "*Sehr erfreulich! Von uns sollen sie keinen Pfenning kriegen.*"[1] The tone in which this declaration is made, as well as the content of the surrounding documents which show the dislike of the Kaiser for the Russian foreign policy, leave little doubt that he was not worrying about the strength of the market, but was moved by major political motives.

Secondly, the latter part of von Buelow's statement does not bear close examination; i. e. that the bankers held back for economic reasons. For the memoirs of Count Witte[2] give us a letter from Mendelssohn in which the latter expresses to Witte his utter dissatisfaction with the foreign policy of the German government, and in which the banker promises to subscribe to the Russian loan on other than German exchanges, since he wants the loan to succeed.

There is another reason for doubting the truth of the official statement. In the case of the 1902 Russian loan we saw that the government expected the banks to make their interests secondary to those of the State. The Tsar was in 1906 in a very precarious position, and needed aid from all those who supported the monarchical principle of government, and it is not likely that William II would have forsaken him at this moment for the sake of the economic market in Germany, unless there had been some major political differences between the two potentates. The fact that the liberal element in Russia looked askance upon the underwriters of this loan[3] would have been reason enough for the Kaiser to show the great friendship which he professes to have shown in 1902. And further, if he

[1] *Grosse Politik*, vol. XXV, # 8503.

[2] Witte, *op. cit.*, chap. iv.

[3] Paléologue, *Memoirs of an Ambassador*, vol. I, p. 224, relates how the liberal group in the Duma failed to cheer for the French for prolonging the life of Tsarism through financial assistance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was so much worried over the internal market, why did he permit no less than 392,900,000 marks of foreign securities to be admitted[1] to the German exchanges in the same year, besides a large number of private issues?

Major political considerations appear to have influenced the government's action. The factors in Russian foreign policy which were unsatisfactory to Germany were: (1) Russian friendship for France at the Algeciras Conference, and (2) the refusal of Russia to confirm the Bjoerkoe agreement made by the Kaiser and Tsar, the failure of which confirmed German fears of a secret Franco-Russian agreement,[2] and apparently shattered the Kaiser's hopes for leadership in Continental politics.[3] Both of these factors were of such great importance to Germany that there seems little doubt that they lay at the bottom of the government's action. The belief that political motives were the chief ones underlying this action, is supported by the fact that after 1905 no Russian government securities were admitted to the German exchanges.[4]

The case is of immediate interest in that again the government gave an economic reason instead of the true political one which caused the interference. It is also interesting because it presents an advance in the type of control exercised. In 1887 legal control was used. In 1906 the suggestion was made for a similar *Verbot*,[5] but the government hesitated to use this again and resorted to an informal notice to the banks involved. Finally, the case is valuable for it shows how the bankers by evading the government's prohibition rendered the control ineffective.

Turkish Loan of 1910

The government of Turkey had tried in 1910 to get funds from France and England, but had failed because of political and economic reasons.[6] Hereupon the Turks approached a

[1] *Statistisches Jahrbuch des Deutschen Reichs,* vol. XXVI, p. 28.

[2] Gooch, *op. cit.,* pp. 385-88.

[3] *Ibid.* and Brandenburg, *op. cit.,* chap. ix.

[4] *Statistisches Jahrbuch des Deutschen Reichs,* vol. XXVII, p. 30.

[5] Schulthess, *Europäischer Geschichtskalender,* 1906, p. 91.

[6] The French Government excluded the proposed loan from the Paris Bourse

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

group of German banks. These were reluctant to take part in a flotation, considering the weakness of the German market.[1] Thereupon, the German government, through the Foreign Office, informed the banks that the government, for political reasons, would be glad to see the loan taken over by them.[2]

Djavid Bey, Turkish Finance Minister, went to Paris first before coming to Berlin because the Turks, since the revolution of 1908, had been on more intimate terms with the French than with the Germans. The Turks regarded the French and English as better friends because they were more democratic than Germany. Germany was to them the hereditary friend of the old Sultan's régime.

When Djavid Bey turned to Berlin, the situation for the German government seemed perfectly clear. German influence in Turkey could be now built up by showing Turkey friendship when the others had rebuffed her. Due to the fact that the German market was admittedly weak, the German banks were willing, at best, to give a temporary loan.[3] But the government was advised by its ambassador in Constantinople that the importance of the granting of this loan by Germans could not be overestimated. Supported by the government at Berlin, therefore, the ambassador prevailed upon Helfferich, of the Deutsche Bank, to give Turkey a promise for the complete loan along with the temporary loan.

because: (1) Turkey refused France an advisership in the Turk finance ministry; (2) guaranteed orders for French industries were lacking in the loan contract; (3) friendship for Russia suggested the inadvisability of strengthening Turkey; (4) probably the Ottoman Bank influenced the government against this loan of the Crédit Mobilier.

The English government appears to have objected to the loan on the ground that the capital was going into a non-English enterprise (Bagdad Railway) but friendship for France also played a part. See Grundherr, *op. cit.*, p. 113; *Grosse Politik*, vol. XXVII, p. 285; Siebert, *Diplomatische Aktenstuecke*, pp. 297 *et seq.*; and E. M. Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway*, p. 225.

[1] Grundherr, *op. cit.*, p. 113; Arndt, "Wesen u. Zweck der Kapitalanlagen im Auslande", *Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, 1912, p. 187.

[2] Grundherr, *loc. cit.*; Arndt, *loc. cit.*; *Grosse Politik*, vol. XXVII, # 10039/68.

[3] *Grosse Politik*, vol. XXVII, chap. ccxvi.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The importance which the German government attached to the granting of this loan is shown by the following comment of the Kaiser on September 26, 1910: "We must absolutely, with the aid of Austria, aid Turkey financially, so that she will not permanently come under the Franco-English yoke. Speak to Gwinner about this!"[1] (Gwinner was Director of the Deutsche Bank.) At the Potsdam Conference of November, 1910, the German government stated to the Russians that Germany had given this loan to Turkey only because of economic reasons, to prevent France from getting a monopoly of industrial orders.[2] It is apparent, however, that this is in itself a political argument. In his dispatch of October 29, 1910, Marschall, German ambassador at Constantinople, said: "Despite the fact that I recognize the objection to the loan based upon the present condition of the market, I still must deem it a political necessity that the loan agreement with Turkey be immediately completed. We cannot under any circumstances be exposed to the results of a failure of the negotiations."[3] Again, Secretary of State Delbrueck, in the Reichstag, February 11, 1911, took occasion, probably referring to this case, to say: "Considerations of high policy might make investments of capital abroad necessary, even with conditions under which we might, from an economic standpoint, prefer to keep the money at home."

The case is similar to the 1902 case in that the government was urging German citizens to grant a loan to a foreign power for political reasons. It differs in the fact that in 1902 the bank was already planning to grant the loan and the government merely desired special conditions to be attached to it, while in 1910 the government was pushing the banks into something which from the business standpoint they did not wish to go into at all. It seems to show, therefore, an increased government control over investments.

[1] *Ibid.*, vol. XXVII, # 10049.

[2] *Ibid.*, # 10155.

[3] *Ibid.*, # 10058.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American Railway Bonds, 1911

In the early spring of 1911, the government of Prussia prevented the listing of the bonds of the Chicago-Milwaukee-St. Paul Railroad on the Berlin Exchange. The bonds were being handled by the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft. The reason given by the government for its opposition was that the German market was not in a condition to absorb any more foreign loans.[1] It was specifically stated that the security of the bonds was not questioned in the least.[2] Contemporary opinions do not agree with the assertion that the market was weak at the time.[3] Moreover, many other foreign securities were granted admission to the exchanges.[4]

There are other possible explanations for the government's action which may be examined. The bankers had just discouraged the government from issuing a government loan because of the alleged weakness of the market.[5] The exclusion of the American bonds might indicate, therefore, merely the government's effort to strengthen the market, or it might even be regarded as a gesture of retaliation against the bankers who declined to coöperate with the government. Again, it may have been due to the influence of the agrarians, who consistently opposed all export of capital.[6]

These reasons, however, do not explain the fact that the American railway bonds were the only ones excluded at this time. If we turn to the diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany during this period, we find that from January, 1910, to May, 1911, the correspondence of the two nations was concerned chiefly with the settlement of the potash controversy. It was in January, 1911, that the relations became most strained between the two countries over this ques-

[1] *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, Jan. 30, 1911.

[2] *Berliner Tageblatt*, June 11, 1911.

[3] A. Lansburgh, *Die Bank*, vol. I, p. 105 *et seq.*

[4] *Statistisches Jahrbuch, Vierteljahrshefte*, 1911, *et seq.*

[5] Paul Jacobs, *Die Zulassung von Wertpapieren zum Boersenhandel* (Berlin, 1914).

Reichstag proceedings (*Stenographische Berichte*), Feb. 2, 1911.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion and a final settlement was not reached until June, 1911, in Hamburg.[1]

There is no proof that the Prussian minister was acting upon instructions from the Chancellor in excluding these bonds, but the possibility exists that the federal government was taking advantage of its peculiar control under the Stock Exchange Law. The effectiveness of the gesture, if such it was, cannot be estimated, for other markets were doubtless open to the railroad and German banks could subscribe funds on foreign exchanges. At best, the government's displeasure at the stand of the United States Government could only be shown indirectly by this action.

Bulgarian Loan of 1911

During the fall of 1909 the Bulgarian government had tried to secure a loan on the Paris market, but had failed in consequence of political opposition on the part of the French government. Thereupon the Bulgarians applied at Vienna and successfully negotiated with the Wiener Bankverein. The German government advised the Deutsche Bank, which was connected with the Wiener Bankverein, not to take up the loan.[2] The government gave two reasons for its opposition to the loan: first, that it lacked sufficient security and, second, that return orders were lacking for German industries.[3] It was known that part of the money was to be used for the building of railroads, and Germans were anxious that their capital should be used to benefit German industries.[4] Other factors may have entered into the decision of the government: (1) the German government was planning to issue a loan of its own at this time and may have wanted as little competition as possible on the market;[5] (2) Bulgaria had just signed a secret treaty with Russia the terms of which were apparently directed against

[1] See *Foreign Relations of the U. S.*, 1911.

[2] *Berliner Boersen Courier*, Dec. 11, 1909.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Grosse Politik*, vol. XXVII, pp. 183 and 486.

[5] *Die Bank*, 1910, vol. I, p. 192.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Germany,[1] while part of this loan was intended for repayment of a Bulgarian debt to Russia;[2] (3) Germany was having difficulty in getting certain concessions from Bulgaria in the new commercial treaty then being negotiated.[3]

Meanwhile, the Hamburg firm of Schroeder Gebrueder decided to take over the loan under the conditions offered by Bulgaria, but it was not immediately listed on the Hamburg Exchange. Whether the Prussian government now tried to influence the Hamburg Exchange to exclude the loan is not known. Certain it is that the loan was not admitted to that exchange until November 18, 1911,[4] after the commercial treaty negotiations had been completed to Germany's satisfaction on September 29, 1911. Therefore, at least the possibility exists that the federal government kept the loan from the Hamburg Exchange through the provisions of the Stock Exchange Law.

In point of method the case is interesting in that by an apparently informal advice the government was able to get the assistance of a major bank such as the Deutsche Bank and did not have to threaten excluding the loan from the exchange of Berlin.

Bulgarian Loan of 1914

In 1912 France planned to grant Bulgaria a loan of 180,000,000 francs at 4½ per cent on condition that Bulgaria refrain from augmenting her military establishment and further on the condition that Bulgaria follow the policies of the Entente[5] in her foreign relations. German banks seem to have had an interest in the loan, but only to a small degree. The German press was against the loan because it feared that German industries would not be considered sufficiently.[6] And there was fear of the security of the Bulgarian finances.

[1] H. Friedjung, *Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus*, p. 287.

[2] *Grosse Politik*, vol. XXVII, pp. 183, 486, 785.

[3] Disconto Gesellschaft, *Jubiläumsbericht*.

[4] *Statistik des deutschen Reichs*, vol. XXI, 1912.

[5] Radoslavov, *Bulgarien und die Weltkrise*, pp. 60-62; Siebert, *op. cit.*, pp. 155, 525.

[6] *Frankfurter Zeitung*, July 15, 1912.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the fall of 1913 a new ministry was in power in Bulgaria, one which was not favorable to French policies. The new government, in need of funds to defray the expenses of the Balkan War and to continue building railroads, tried to get a loan from the old creditors in France, but was unable to do so. Similarly, London refused.[1] Like Djavid Bey in 1911, it now turned to the Central Powers.

The approaches were made in Vienna to the Wiener Bankverein and Rothschild in September, 1913. Austria-Hungary realized that the ministry in power in Bulgaria was favorable to the Central Powers, and that it was antagonistic toward France and Russia. This seemed, therefore, a good chance to extend Austrian influence in the Balkans. Consequently, early in September, 1913, Count Berchtold, Foreign Minister of Austria, notified the Hungarian Minister of Finance, von Teleszky, that he considered the participation of the Austro-Hungarian banks as of political interest and importance to the Dual Monarchy. An agreement was reached between the banks and Bulgaria for a loan advance of 20 million francs[2] with proper consideration of the Austro-Hungarian industries.[3]

Austria, however, was unable to raise enough money for the entire loan. At the instance of the German minister to Sofia, the Disconto Gesellschaft (Berlin) was prevailed upon to open negotiations with Bulgaria.[4] By July 12, 1914, a group headed by Disconto declared its willingness to take over a loan on condition that the German government had no objection,[5] and if the security granted were sufficient. A few weeks later[6] the Disconto Gesellschaft notified the Bulgarian government that the German government had expressed its approval of the admission of this loan to the Berlin exchange, provided it were sufficiently secured to protect the interests of the German investors.

[1] Radoslavov, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Koelnische Zeitung*, July 17, 1914.

[4] Radoslavov, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

[5] *Berliner Boersen Courier*, April 1, 1914.

[6] *Vossische Zeitung*, April 20, 1914.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The importance of the loan to the international situation was shown in the part played by the French banks. The security of the Bulgarian ministry (Radoslavov-Genadiev) depended upon its success in the negotiation of this much-needed loan. France sponsored an opposition, and forbade French banks to take part in this loan in the hope that Radoslavov would fall, and that a new ministry, friendly to France, would then come to terms with the French banks[1] on the basis of the 1912 negotiations.

As one of the conditions of the security of the loan the Disconto Bank had asked for control of the tobacco export monopoly of Bulgaria in order to assure German cigarette manufacturers a steady supply of tobacco.[2] The Bulgarian government had been working on the subject of a government export monopoly for more than ten years, but the Bulgarian peasant was opposed to such a plan for he was sure that he could get more for his tobacco through speculation in the open market.[3] In this dissatisfaction of the peasants with the monopoly idea Tsar Ferdinand gradually came to share in an effort to become popular with the peasants.

What wonder then that the opposition party in Bulgaria decried the German loan which they already opposed because it was German, and which now included the odious monopoly? The storm became so great that the Finance Minister was forced to break off negotiations in Berlin, but the Disconto Bank determined to hold the money back until the monopoly was secured. In so doing the bank was conforming to the German government's chief wish, that the German industries be benefited, and to the particular wish of the German government in this case to support the ministry in power in Bulgaria.

France and Russia, having refused funds to the Radoslavov-Genadiev ministry, decided that they would have to do something to regain the favor of Bulgaria. When the monopoly question threatened to end the negotiations, France and Russia

[1] Radoslavov, *op. cit.*, p. 90 *et seq.*

[2] *Vossische Zeitung*, June 6, 1914.

[3] *Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

began dickering with the King of Bulgaria, promising him funds under better conditions, but demanding that the ministry be changed. Both governments demanded of their private banks that they provide funds immediately, and France constrained Russia to secure the participation of the Russian state bank. At the same time they carried on a concerted propaganda in Bulgaria against the German terms.[1]

The French and Russian governments were unsuccessful. The Disconto Gesellschaft granted an advance of 100,000,000 francs, with the condition that the same group of banks should be given first option on a final loan after the tobacco question had been settled. Through the aid of the German loan, Bulgaria was able to pay off two debts of 27,000,000 and 87,000,000 francs to Russia and France, respectively. After further negotiations the final loan succeeded (but without the tobacco monopoly) despite the continued French and Russian attempts to forestall it, even in the Sobranje.[2] The terms provided for extensive participation by German and Austro-Hungarian industries in railway and harbor projects.[3] The political importance of the loan in the days immediately preceding the war is apparent.[4]

From the standpoint of our immediate interest, the case seems to indicate a tendency toward voluntary coöperation of banks and government to secure ends recognized as beneficial to both.[5]

[1] For the story of this bit of international financial rivalry see Siebert, *Diplomatische Aktenstücke*, p. 631 *et seq.*, where the Russian documents are given.

[2] Radoslavov, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-101.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 90, and *Koelnische Zeitung*, July 18, 1914.

[4] Kautsky Documents (*Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch*) (1922), vol. I, p. 277, # 162; Paléologue, *Memoirs of an Ambassador*, vol. II, p. 53; *Bulgarian Orange Book* (1920), # 194 in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, March, 1928, p. 235.

[5] Two similar cases, on which the facts are not sufficiently known, should be mentioned: the threat of the German government to veto a loan to Serbia if the latter refused a contract for building materials to German firms (J. Viner, "Political Aspects of International Finance", *The Journal of Business*, April, 1928); and the active support given by the German minister to Rumania to a proposed loan of the Disconto Bank to Rumania. — *cf. Grosse Politik*, vol. XXXIX, # 15796 *et seq.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Conclusions

While there was apparently never any general proclamation issued by the German government such as the United States government issued in 1922, the German experience presents some conclusions which may help in our situation.

1. During the forty-five years under consideration there were only ten cases of intervention, and of these all but one case involved the securities of governments.

2. The German government found very early that it was inadvisable for the government to make any open and formal statements bearing on regulation because these tended to place the government in an embarrassing position at a later time and to create an impression in the minds of the investors that the government was examining the value of securities before permitting their listing on the exchange.

3. The experience of the German government in attempting to make foreign investments a weapon in international relations, showed that the effectiveness of this weapon was limited: (a) by the fact that German bankers could subscribe to forbidden loans on exchanges abroad, and (b) by the presence of would-be creditors in other countries.

4. In most instances the German government tried to hide the political reasons by alleging economic reasons for the intervention.

5. The history of German intervention gives us a picture of the gradual evolution in policy from a formal to an informal control. The causes for this change in policy were, on the one hand, the bad results of formal proclamations, and on the other hand, the increased effectiveness of control based on friendly relations with the banks. It was toward the end of the period under consideration that the bankers realized that compliance on their part to the governmental policy had a *quid pro quo* in diplomatic support by the government in other places.

WALTER H. C. LAVES

HAMILTON COLLEGE, CLINTON, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ERASMUS ON POLITICAL ETHICS:

The *Institutio Principis Christiani*

DURING the last decade many volumes have appeared that deal with the period of the Renaissance and Reformation. In these works Erasmus has claimed his place, and in them his politico-ethics have been discussed, but largely from a general historical viewpoint rather than with specific interest in his contribution to political theory. Prior to these recent contributions, Erasmus was almost entirely overlooked in this connection except by his biographers.[1] Especially in point is the fact that his most formal—though not necessarily the greatest or even most influential—treatise on politico-ethics has been the most neglected of all. I refer to the *Institutio Principis Christiani.*

Early in the year 1515 proposals had been made to Erasmus to join the court of Prince Charles[2] (the future Charles V), and his actual appointment and assumption of office probably took place at the end of that year or on the first day of January, 1516.[3] This particular treatise on "The Education of a Christian Prince" was prepared during this period and was intended from the first for the young prince (then only fifteen years old). The exact date of composition is somewhat doubtful, due to a conflict of evidence in the letters of Erasmus himself. He first mentions the treatise in a letter to Domenico Grimani[4] dated from London in the spring of 1515, where he tells us that he is busy with this little treatise which he intends for Prince Charles. And in a letter to Martin Dorp written

[1] Dunning in his *History of Political Theories* does not even mention Erasmus; and neither does Gumplowitz in the *Geschichte der Staatstheorien* (1926 ed.). Janet in his *Histoire de la science politique dans ses rapports avec la morale* gives a brief summary; as does Münch, *Gedanken über Fürstenerziehung aus alter und neuer Zeit,* pp. 53-63.

[2] Allen, *Erasmi Epistulae,* vol. II, Ep. 370, n. 18.

[3] *Ibid. Cf.* also Ep. 392, 15-18.

[4] *Ibid.,* Ep. 334, 170-72.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

toward the end of May we find practically the same news.[1] Hence it would seem that the treatise was begun prior to Erasmus' appointment as councilor at the court. However, in a letter (the *Catalogus Lucubrationum*) to John Botzheim, dated at Basel, January 30, 1523,[2] he tells us that he did not give the work to Prince Charles until after he had been appointed and was actually at the court. Therefore, he continued, the benefice was not in the nature of a "plum" that he had plucked, but rather the treatise was his means of returning the favor conferred upon him by the prince.[3] At all events, we know that the work was in the hands of the printer by May 12, 1516,[4] but on the first of June Erasmus "although very anxious to present it to the prince," had to leave Basel before its completion.[5] However, on June 17, John Froben, the Basel printer

[1] Allen, *op. cit.*, vol. II, Ep. 337, 88-89 and introd.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. I, Ep. 1, p. 19, 24-33; and p. 44, 2-6.

[3] In his letter to Henry VIII of England, dated at Antwerp on September 9, 1517, Erasmus says since he had become one of the councilors of the prince he should have as his prime object to make available the sources of all admonitions (*consilia*); and hence the *Institutio*. In the light of the letters to Grimani and Dorp, this is not incongruous with the Botzheim letter of six years later, for here Erasmus does not specifically state that he *wrote* the treatise after entering upon his duties. Allen would suggest (vol. II, Ep. 370, n. 18) that Erasmus was offered the position in May, and did not actually begin until January 1, 1516. In that case, the matter is probably settled, since Erasmus would consider himself one of the court once he had been named. *Cf.* also Bagdat, *La "Querela Pacis" d'Érasme*, pp. 2-12. Enthoven, "Uber die Institutio Principis Christiani des Erasmus" in *Neue Jahrb. für Klass. Alter.*, vol. XXIV, 1909, seems to have confused his information when he says, "Auf der Wunsch des burgundischen Kanzlers Joannes Silvagius und zum Dank für seine Ernennung . . . verfasste Erasmus . . . die Institutio. . . ." John le Sauvage requested Erasmus to undertake the matter contained in the *Querela Pacis* (Allen, vol. I, p. 19, 2): "Itaque iussu Ioannis Sylvagii scripsi Pacis Querelam". *Cf.* Bagdat, *op. cit.*, p. 7: "Cet ouvrage [l'Institutio] . . . avait été certainement demandé à Érasme par le Chancelier le Sauvage. Érasme a dû être, en tout cas, vivement encouragé à l'écrire". However, Allen, vol. II, Ep. 410, does not bear this out as stated; and Nichols, *Epistles of Erasmus*, vol. II, Ep. 389 and 397 makes no comment to that end.

[4] Allen, vol. II, Ep. 407, 5. *Bibliotheca Erasmiana, Répertoire de Oeuvres d'Érasme*, 1re Série, p. 111, shows two editions in 1515—one at Venice and one at Louvain.

[5] Allen, vol. II, Ep. 410, 3-5; *cf.* Ep. 416, 10-11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and friend of Erasmus, informed him that the *Institutio* was off the press.[1] The treatise is therefore contemporaneous with the more famous *Utopia* (1516) of Thomas More and Machiavelli's *Il Principe* (1513, first printed in 1532).

The number of editions called for in a few years would seem to speak for the ready reception of this book, and an acceptance that justified Thomas More's expectations of it. He wrote to Erasmus, "You have done well in writing on the 'Instruction of a Christian Prince'. How I wish Christian princes would follow good instructions. Everything is upset by their mad follies. I am very desirous of having this book, for I am sure that like everything else of yours, it will turn out perfect."[2] There were four editions from Froben in 1516; another at Louvain in that same year; and others by Froben again in 1518 and 1519.[3] There were also other editions in 1523 and in 1525. In all, there have been some forty editions of this work, of which eighteen complete editions and several translations were issued during the remaining twenty years of Erasmus' life.[4] Of the sixteen translations of the treatise, the latest is in English and issued in 1921.[5]

But we are not dependent upon numerical data alone for our knowledge of the reception and distribution of this work. Colet had it in England at once; and Erasmus himself sent a copy to Henry VIII in 1517.[6] That Budé knew of it in France in the year of its publication is clear.[7] In this connection it should be remembered that in this same year Budé wrote his

[1] Allen, vol. II, Ep. 419, 4-6. *Cf.* Nichols, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 249.

[2] Allen, vol. II, Ep. 423, 21-25. *Cf.* Ep. 421, 88-90 where Erasmus tells of the frankness with which he has treated all subjects.

[3] *Cf. ibid.*, vol. II, Ep. 393, introd.; and vol. III, Ep. 801, 17-20.

[4] Enthoven, *op. cit.*, p. 313. His information is based on *Bibliotheca Erasmiana,* Ire Série, p. 111 *et seq.* We should be careful not to estimate the size of old editions by the number of volumes in our modern editions.

[5] This is the first English version, and is a translation of the second half of the treatise, done by P. Corbett, in the *Grotius Society Publications for Students of International Relations,* No. 1.

[6] Allen, vol. III, Ep. 657, 46-68; *cf.* Ep. 658.

[7] *Ibid.*, vol. II, Ep. 421, 88-89.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

treatise *De L'Institution du Prince*, although it was not published until 1546, six years after his death. It has been suggested that Budé withheld its publication because he "did not wish his less impressive vernacular piece to come into critical comparison" with Erasmus' treatise.[1] On December 13, 1517, Count Friederich II of Bavaria laid down a course of study for his nephew, Prince Philip. In this he prescribed that the young man should read the *Institutio* or a comparable work for three hours every day.[2] In 1518 Erasmus reworked the treatise for presentation to Prince Ferdinand,[3] who seems (if we can believe Erasmus) to have kept it constantly with him.[4] Thomas Elyot, in *The Boke named the Governour*, written and published in 1531 and dedicated to the king, drew a great deal upon Erasmus. He especially recommends the use of this little treatise by the most excellent doctor Erasmus, saying that "there never was boke written in latine that in so lytle a portion contained of sentence, eloquence & vertuous exhortation a more compendious abundance."[5] In the middle of this same century Sebastian Cocceius at Schwäbische Hall employed the *Institutio* in the training of Prince Eberhard of Württemberg.[6] About this same time Catharine de'Medici had a French paraphrase made for the use of her sons. In 1584 William V of Bavaria, when prescribing in detail the studies for his sons Maximilian and Philip (but more especially in laying down the

[1] Woodward, *Education in the Age of the Renaissance*, p. 132. Enthoven, *op. cit.*, p. 314, refers to this as a positive statement.

[2] *Monumenta Germaniae Paedogogica*, vol. XIX, pp. 256-7: "Item nach dreyen Uren sol her Jorg seinen gnadn ein pros, als Erasmus Rotherdamium de Instituendo principe oder ainen andern auctorem, der seinen gnaden am dienstlichsten und nützlichsten ist, machen, dieselben seinen gnaden exponiren und verteutschen."

[3] Allen, vol. III, Ep. 853, 63–end.

[4] *Ibid.*, vol. III, Ep. 943, 23-24: "Is tamen, ut ipse mihi rettulit, libellum de principis instructione semper habet in manibus." *Cf.* Ep. 917; 970, 22-25; vol. IV, Ep. 1009, 45-51; and vol. V, Ep. 1323, 3-5. This appears to be the last mention of the work by Erasmus himself.

[5] 1880 edition, p. 95.

[6] *Mitteilung d. Geschichte f. deutsche Erziehungs- und Schulgeschichte*, vol. XV (1905), p. 109.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

instructions for their tutors) very probably had the principles of the *Institutio* consciously or unconsciously in mind.[1]

The last edition, except that of the *Opera Omnia* in 1703–06, was at Amsterdam in 1667; and the last translation for two centuries was that in Swedish in 1721. From that point on we have a break of tangible evidence until the present day.

What was the cause of the long neglect of the *Institutio*?[2] The treatise was didactic in its purpose, and would therefore have a limited appeal. The *Complaint of Peace*, written shortly after, has a much more general appeal; but especially is that true of the *Colloquies* and the *Praise of Folly*. Erasmus' letters, too, are full of important references and comments on contemporary affairs; and his *Adages* have always been popular. In these works, wedged in among extraneous matter, and disguised under jest or satire, is much that after proper sifting can be taken seriously.[3] The popular guise of these works probably played a large share in overshadowing the more formal *Institutio*.[4] Furthermore, it must be admitted that the *Institutio* is disappointing in one detail—it is full of platitudes, repetitions and miscellanies that at first seem only to detract. But we must not forget that Erasmus was writing for his own day, drew his comparisons from that same period, and reinforced his ideas by constant references to classical antiquity in true humanist fashion.[5]

Let us now look at the work in detail. Erasmus begins as follows.

[1] *Mon. Germ. Paed.*, vol. XIV, p. xlix, n. 5, where the editor especially comments on certain passages; and pp. 39-47.

[2] *Cf.* Bagdat, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81 and 96; and Preserved Smith, *Erasmus*, p. 196.

[3] Erasmus' influence was also exerted through his translations of Plutarch and Isocrates; and his own *Panegyric* to Philip, and *De Bello Turcico*.

[4] *Cf.* Enthoven, *op. cit.*, p. 314, who holds about the same idea. "Eine Erklärung dieser Tatsache dürfte nicht sowohl im Inhalt der Scrift, im Übermass der von Erasmus gestellten Forderungen als in ihrer wenig glücklichen Form zu suchen sein. . . . Anstatt einer übersichtlichen und logisch geordneten Darstellung meist nur eine lose Aneinanderreihung von Merksprüchen und Aphorismen."

[5] *Cf. ibid.*, p. 315, n. 1; and Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> When a prince is to be chosen by election, it is by no means appropriate to look to the images of his forefathers; to consider his physical appearance. . . . Seek a nature staid, in no way rash, and not so excitable that there is danger of his developing into a tyrant under the license of good fortune, and casting aside all regard for advisers and counsellors. Yet have a care that he be not so weak that he be turned now this way and now that, by whomsoever he meets. Consider also his experience and his age —not so severe as to be entirely out of sympathy with the lighter things nor so impetuous as to be carried away by flights of fancy.[1]

Erasmus then brings in the familiar figure of the ship of state, and points out that in its guidance, just as in actual navigation, the helmsman should be one eminently fitted; and the one idea that should motivate a prince in his official acts—the good of the state (*publica commoditas*)—should move the people in their selection of a prince.[2] This theme constantly recurs.

When the usual practice of hereditary rule prevails, then the hope of a good prince rests upon the choice of his tutor; for "nothing remains so deeply and tenaciously rooted as those things learned in the first years."[3] This tutor must not only instill in the young prince the basis of all moral principles but must also keep him away from undesirable associates who will corrupt or flatter him.[4] He must also be such a one that the young man will love him, and yet be obedient to all he prescribes.[5] This tutor should seek out the young prince's natural bents, and develop him along that line.[6] But any ideas or tastes incongruous with his future position should be carefully stamped out. "It is fruitless to attempt advice on the theory of government until you have freed the prince's mind from those most common and yet most truly false opinions of the *vulgus*."[7] This the tutor should never cease to have in mind,

[1] *Opera Omnia* (1540 edition), vol. V, p. 433. All succeeding references to the *Institutio* will be from the same edition; hence only the page number will be given. The paragraphs and sections are not numbered in this edition. The translations throughout the paper are my own.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 433.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 433.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 433.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 434.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 435.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 435.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

adapting his method to the years of his pupil, for there is no one who can not be brought around eventually. Part of this training should be accomplished by reference to simple analogies such as the social life of bees and ants.

The principles of Christian dogma should be inculcated from the first and kept continually in the fore. No one can be a real prince, we are told, who is not also a philosopher; and a philosopher and true Christian are one and the same in fact.[1] Especially does Erasmus stress the fact that adherence to Christian principles applies to prince and subject with equal force. And here we have the seeds of the ethical idea which continues throughout the treatise. Erasmus now engages in a long discussion of the "true good", the baseness of worldly wealth, the common ways of the populace, the aim of magnanimity on the part of the prince, the nature of nobility, the symbolism of the princely insignia,[2] the true meaning of Christianity, and concludes with the responsibilities of the prince, saying:

> You must take up your cross else Christ will have none of you. "What," you ask, "is my cross?" I will tell you. Follow the right, do violence to no one, plunder no one, sell no public offices, be corrupted by no bribes. To be sure your treasury will have far less in it than otherwise, but take no thought for that loss, if only you have acquired the interest from justice. While you are using every means and interest to benefit the commonwealth, your life is fraught with care; you rob your youth and nature of their rightful pleasures; you wear yourself down with long hours of toil. Forget that and enjoy the consciousness of right. . . . Do your private emotions as a man—reproachful anger, love for your wife, hatred of an enemy, or shame—urge you to do what is not right, and what is not to the welfare of the commonwealth? Let the thought of honor win. Let concern for the state completely cover your personal ambitions. . . . If you can not look out for the possessions of your subjects without danger to your own life, set the safety of the people before your very life! But while you are conducting yourself in this fashion

[1] *Opera Omnia*, vol. V, p. 437.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 437.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there will be plenty to call you a dolt and no prince at all! Hold fast to your cause—it is far better to be a just *man* than an unjust *prince*."[1]

The prince must not indulge himself, but remember that he is the model for his people, and that an evil he allows himself is made manifold among his subjects. "The common people are unruly by nature, and magistrates are easily corrupted through avarice or ambition. There is just one bulwark in this tide of evils—the unsullied character of the prince. If he too is overcome by foolish ideas and base desires, what last ray of hope is there for the commonwealth?"[2] This very naturally brings Erasmus to the comparison of a good and a bad prince, which comparison occupies six pages of the treatise.

The wicked prince he compares to various savage beasts, and points out their counterparts in the ancient empires. The tyrant he shows in contrast to a king, as one who conducts his rule only for his own advantage. "There is the same difference between a good prince and a tyrant as there is between a kindly father and a harsh master."[3] He further describes the wicked prince as

> a frightful, loathesome beast formed of a dragon, wolf, lion, viper, bear, and like monsters, with six hundred eyes all over it, teeth everywhere, fearful from all angles, with hooked claws, with never sated hunger, fattened on human vitals, reeking with human blood, never sleeping but always threatening the fortunes and lives of everyone, dangerous to every man, but especially the good, a sort of fatal scourge to the whole world, on which everyone who has the interests of the commonwealth at heart pours forth execrations and hate; which cannot be borne because of its monstrousness, and yet cannot be overthrown without great disaster because its maliciousness is hedged about with armed forces and wealth.[4]

After concluding this description with a series of references

[1] *Opera Omnia,* vol. V, pp. 438-39.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 440.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 441.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 441. *Cf.* Bagdat, *op. cit.,* p. 84: "Ce tableau du Tyran peut sembler de nos jours exagéré, il ne l'était nullement du temps d'Érasme."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the wicked rulers of biblical times, by way of contrast Erasmus begins his picture of the good prince also with quotations from the Bible. With these as his text, he further develops the idea of the unity of Christian ethics and ruling authority, and has recourse to the familiar figure of the state as one big family of which the prince should be the benign *paterfamilias*.[1] This brings him to a discussion of the best kind of state.

> Although there are many types of commonwealths, it is the consensus of nearly all wise thinking men, that the best form is monarchy. This is according to the example of God that the sum of all things be placed in one individual, but in such a way that following God's example, he surpasses all others in his wisdom and goodness, and wanting nothing, may desire only to help his state. But if conditions are otherwise, then it is the worst form of state. Whosoever would fight it then would be the best man. If a prince be found complete in all good qualities, then a pure and absolute monarchy is the thing. (If that could only be! I fear it is too great a thing even to hope for.) If an average prince—as affairs go now—is found, it will be better to have a limited monarchy checked and lessened by aristocracy and democracy. Then there is no chance for tyranny to creep in, but just as the elements in nature balance each other, so will the state hold together under similar control. If a prince has the interests of the commonwealth at heart his power will not be checked on this account, but rather aided. If his attitude is otherwise however, it is expedient that the commonwealth break and turn aside the violence of a single man.[2]

Erasmus suggests as a creed for the good prince: "All things have been placed in my trust. I must unceasingly strive to pass them on better than I received them."[3] This same idea occurs in various forms throughout the treatise.

After comparing the relation of the state with the prince to that of the body and the mind, Erasmus again has recourse to the divine. Here he sounds the note of his free-will controversy with Luther eight years later. He says: "God gave the

[1] *Opera Omnia*, vol. V, p. 444.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 445-46.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 446.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

angels and men free will so that He would not be ruling over bondsmen, and so that He might glorify and add further grandeur to His kingdom. And who, now, would swell with pride because he rules over men cowed down by fear like so many cattle?"[1] Erasmus then puts himself the question, "Are you not lessening the power and prerogatives of the prince by all this restraint?" His answer is directed to the imaginary interrogator.

> First, they are not really yours whom you oppress in slavery, for common agreement makes the prince. But they are really yours who yield you ready and willing obedience. Secondly, when you hold people bound to you by fear, you do not possess them even half. You have their physical bodies but their spirits are estranged from you. But when Christian love unites the people and their prince, then everything is yours that your position demands, for a good prince does not demand anything which service to his country does not call for. . . . According to these standards, the honor which is shown a tyrant is no honor at all, but either flattery or dissembling; and he does not get obedience but slavish compliance. . . . These things in their true form are possessed by the Christian prince. No one gets more honor than the man who does not exact it. To no one are men more willingly obedient than to him who does not seek such attention. To no one do they more willingly pour out their wealth than to him whom they know will expend it for the development of the commonwealth, and so will return it with interest.[2]

This is all summarized in the outline of the duties of the prince;[3] and pointed by an idea that is typical of Erasmus' principles. "All other men take great pains to get previous knowledge of the profession which they follow. How much more care should the prince take to get an early knowledge of the theory of government!"[4] In conclusion, he adds another idea, only too idealistic for his day. "As the painter gets pleasure from a picture beautifully executed, and the farmer,

[1] *Opera Omnia,* vol. V, p. 447.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 448.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 449.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 449.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the truck-gardener, the smith, all get pleasure from their work, what should bring more pleasure to the prince than the contemplation of his country improved and more prosperous as a result of his efforts?"[1]

Again and again Erasmus points out that the exalted position of the prince makes manifold demands upon his mind, his ability, his character and his honor, above those upon the common people. "In the case of a private citizen it is perhaps quite enough to have a good mind, since he is directed by the laws. . . . But in the case of the prince, it is of little help to have been endowed with a good mind . . . if wisdom is not also present to point the way to gain what is desired."[2] After further deliberation on the same theme, Erasmus comes to his second chapter, which deals with "The Avoiding of Flatterers."

Flattery is subtly presented to the prince in many ways,[3] and even the laws which give him great authority and imply his superiority to them come in this class.[4] Next follows a list of recommended readings, which include in the order named, the *Proverbs of Solomon*, *Ecclesiasticus*, the *Book of Wisdom*, and then the *Gospels*. These are to be followed by Plutarch's *Moralia*, supplemented by Seneca, "whose writings are wonderfully stimulating and excite one with enthusiasm for a life of moral integrity". The *Politics* of Aristotle and the *De Officiis* of Cicero should be read in excerpts. "But Plato is the most venerable source of these things," in Erasmus' opinion. Of the historians, for example Herodotus and Xenophon, Erasmus' recommendation is qualified, for they tell much which is not to be inculcated in the mind of the Christian prince.[5]

With the next section on "The Arts of Peace" we come to the more technical part of the treatise. Erasmus begins it thus: "Although the writers of antiquity divided the whole theory of government into two sections—war and peace—the first and most important objective is to instruct the prince how

[1] *Opera Omnia*, vol. V, p. 450.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 450.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 452-53.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 454.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 454-55.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to rule wisely during times of peace, in which he should strive his utmost to preclude any future need for war."[1] Under this heading come the love of a prince for his subjects, and the reciprocal faith and loyalty that it engenders. The prince should first know his own kingdom thoroughly by travel, and by the study of history and geography, so that he can understand its problems.

At this point Erasmus anticipates his later chapter on state marriages by saying that the prince should be one who was born and raised in his own country, "for the ties of birth and country, with a sort of common spirit of understanding, have a great deal to do with establishing a feeling of good will."[2] The prince should stay within the borders of his kingdom[3] (not wandering all over the world as Ulysses did),[4] governing his people with kindliness and clemency, keeping his household of the same tenor as himself. Erasmus advocates a policy of conservatism, saying that all innovation by its very nature is dangerous, and should be resorted to only if a great good is to be gained thereby.

The next point has a distinctly modern touch. "A prince who is about to assume control of the state must be advised at once that the main hope of a commonwealth lies in the proper education of its youth. . . . As a result of this scheme of things there will be no need of many laws or punishments, for the people will of their own free will follow the course of right."[5] If, however, the people should sometime prove untractable the prince should never cease his efforts to win them over gradually.

The next chapter deals with "Tributes and Taxes". Erasmus believes the old proverb that parsimony is a great source

[1] *Opera Omnia*, vol. V, p. 456.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 457.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 457. *Cf.* Enthoven, *op. cit.*, p. 325: "Wenn wir uns aber erinnern, dass Albrecht II. nie persönlich in den Reichslanden gewesen ist, dass Friederich III. 27 Jahre lang, von 1444 bis 1471, sich niemals im Reiche hat blicken lassen, so wird der Warnung des Erasmus ihre Berechtigung nicht abgesprochen werden können."

[4] *Opera Omnia*, vol. V, p. 467

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 459.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of revenue, and advises that all extravagant expenditures which serve the sensual pleasures of the prince and court should be curtailed, for—

> a prince should studiously devote his thought to the reduction of his demands on the people to a minimum. The most desirable way to increase the revenue is by cutting off the useless extravagances, to abolish the idle ministries, to avoid wars and long travels very like them [in their effects], to suppress graft among office holders, and to be more interested in the proper administration of the kingdom than in the expansion of its boundaries.[1]

Since some taxes will be necessary, the staples needed by the average man should be lightly taxed, while the burden should be borne by those who enjoy the luxuries of silks, spices and precious stones from the Orient. To this Erasmus appends a word on the coinage, and the stability which must be maintained in it.

Under the caption "Benefices of the Prince", we are first told that the staunch supporters of the state should be rewarded,[2] and that no things should be permitted to the court circle which are not deemed proper for the people as a whole. This is a sign of equity and justice. Erasmus believes that a prince's first duty is to his own people, but (following Plato) he advocates especial care and consideration of foreigners, for they are entirely dependent upon the good will of the ruler.

To the chapter "On Enacting and Amending Laws", Erasmus devotes his greatest attention.[3] "The best laws under the best prince make a state (*civitas*) or a kingdom most fortunate. The most felicitous condition exists where the prince is obeyed by everyone, and the prince himself obeys the laws, and the laws go back to the fundamental principle of equity and honesty, and have no other aim than the advancement of the commonwealth."[4] In framing the laws several things must be kept in mind. Laws should be just, fair, and directed to the common

[1] *Opera Omnia,* vol. V, p. 459.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 460.

[3] *Ibid.,* pp. 461-66.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 461.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

good with a corrective as well as a punitive purpose.[1] The main purpose of a prince is to *prevent* crime and misdeeds rather than to punish derelictions once committed. This aim is to be accomplished through an educational program accustoming the people by example and precept to the principles of right and wrong, and by administration of the existing laws through prudent and honorable officials.[2] Only as a last resort should the incorrigible be sacrificed by the law, and then only to save the remaining members of society.

In attacking the sources of offenses against society, Erasmus first strikes against idleness, through which most of the evil in every state is created.[3] The prince should therefore "always be on guard to keep the element of idlers among his courtiers down to the minimum, and either force them to be busy or else banish them from the country."[4] He would also include under his ban itinerant priests, street-peddlers, money-lenders, brokers, procurers, and those keepers and wardens of large estates that cater to the idle pleasures. He also believes that the monasteries and colleges are sources of discontent.

As remedies, Erasmus suggests a practical education for the sons of the idle rich and sumptuary laws enforcing frugality. He also advocates a severity of the law in proportion to the station of the offender, arguing that it is worse for an official to do wrong than for a commoner, and for a man of rank than for one of lowly place.[5]

Laws should not be promiscuously enacted, or once enacted, repeatedly changed and amended. However, if the exigency for which the law was created no longer exists, the law should be removed from the statute books.[6] Furthermore, the abuse of laws which have been established by long custom is not to be tolerated. By way of example Erasmus tells us that the customs laws, which were originally for the protection of the traveler and interstate merchant, are in his day entirely devoid of any idea of protection, although the tax still remains. The

[1] *Opera Omnia,* vol. V, p. 462.
[2] *Ibid.,* p. 462.
[3] *Ibid.,* p. 463.
[4] *Ibid.,* p. 463.
[5] *Ibid.,* p. 463.
[6] *Ibid.,* p. 464.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

laws should obviously be binding with equal force on everyone—a rule which is too often not observed.[1]

The prince should be very careful in dealing with a charge of *lèse majesté*, remembering that it is a mark of a weak character to take vengeance for personal criticisms.[2] That man "is really guilty of treason who diminishes that in which lies the true greatness of the prince; that is, his qualities of character, and the affairs of his people that are prospering through his wisdom."[3] The state (*res publica*) will be a state even if there be no prince; but there can be no prince without a state. Therefore, Erasmus concludes, "What is that which alone makes a prince if it is not the consent of his subjects?"[4]

After dealing with the diversified topics outlined above, Erasmus concludes as follows: that the laws should be as few as possible; that they be as just as possible; that they have a view to the welfare of the state; and that they be thoroughly familiar to the people.[5]

Under "Magistrates and their Functions" Erasmus clearly states that it is not enough merely to have appointed the magistrates, even granted that they were selected from the older men of reputable character, but the prince must see to it that they carry out their duties properly.[6] Here Erasmus ends by recurring again to the organic analogy.

> The parts of the mind are not all equal in importance; some control, others obey. The body only obeys. As the prince is the most important part of the commonwealth he ought to know most, and be farthest divorced from all crass passions. And closest to him will be the magistrates who obey in part, and rule in part, for they obey the prince and rule the common people. Therefore the prosperity of the commonwealth is closely associated with the honest creation of the magistrates. . . .[7]

This next chapter deals with "Treaties". In Erasmus' view, great abundance of treaties is an outward recognition of poor

[1] *Opera Omnia*, vol. V, p. 464.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 465.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 465.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 465.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 465-66.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 466.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 466.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

faith, for true faith, he says, will stand without a written agreement. He takes this opportunity to speak on his favorite theme of pacifism, saying: "A treaty is usually prepared to set an end to war, but at the present time an agreement that starts a war is called a treaty. These alliances are nothing but war measures; and wherever the situation looks best, there treaties are arranged."[1] Granted that a treaty has been made, then every effort should be made to keep it. Infringements of some small clauses are not to be seized upon as an excuse for declaring the whole instrument null and void.[2] Especially is faith to be kept with the neighboring states, "for if they are wrought up they can do a great deal of harm; while if they are friendly, they are a big help, and without mutual business relations a state cannot exist."[3] The prince should know and understand the characteristics of all peoples, and on the basis of this knowledge, as well as on a consideration of geographical location, he should enter upon treaties with other states. The friendship of some peoples is hardly more bearable than enmity, and others are widely separated by mountains, seas or plains.

"The Marriage Alliances of Princes" are all-important, Erasmus tells us. "For my part," he says, "I should think that it would be by far most beneficial to the commonwealth if the marriage alliances of princes were confined within the limits of their own kingdom, or if they had to go beyond their own boundaries, with just the nearest neighbors."[5] State marriages are more often arranged to suit the vanity of the ruling princes than for the good of the state. "The prince's wife should be selected from among all women for her integrity, modesty and wisdom . . . and be such a one as will bear him children worthy of their parents and the state (*patria*)". Continuing this last idea, Erasmus says that it is not probable that children born of mixed parentage will have unalloyed affection for their future kingdom, or that the people will fully accept them as their own.[6] As to the argument that peace is promoted by

[1] *Opera Omnia*, vol. V, p. 467.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 467.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 467.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 467-68.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 468.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 468.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these alliances, Erasmus answers that when the matter of succession arises, there is usually a war among the claimants and their respective houses, due to the long intermingling of ruling lines. His ethical sensibilities prompt him to bring in a question which is probably unique. How about the young girls themselves, who are sent off to far-away places to marry princes they have never seen—men different in language, manners and characteristics? He recognized the hopelessness of his position due to long-established custom, but "deemed it best to give his advice in case things turned out beyond his hopes."[1]

The responsibilities of the prince, as pointed out in "The Occupations of the Prince in Peace", are numerous, and based upon ethics.

> The prince who has been instructed in the teachings of Christ and in a protecting wisdom will consider nothing dearer than the prosperity of his people, whom he ought to love and care for equally as king and as part of one body. All his plans, all his interests, all his efforts should be turned to the one aim of ruling over the province entrusted to him in such a manner that when Christ makes the final reckoning, he will be approved; and that he leave a very honorable memory of himself among all his fellow men.[2]

The prince is to take part in public affairs, always conducting himself in such a manner that he does some good by his very presence. If the prince thinks that this is beneath his dignity, let him remember that even the greatest princes of antiquity did not scorn to take an active part in public administration. "A good *paterfamilias* is never at a loss for something to do in his own home. Is a prince without anything to occupy him in a vast domain?"[3] The prince should enact laws; amend poor ones; repeal evil ones; punish corrupt magistrates; lighten the burdens on the poor; rid the country of brigands; foster internal concord among the people. In addition, he should travel about his domain, beautify it by the erection of public buildings, help its economic and social conditions by the construc-

[1] *Opera Omnia,* vol. V, p. 468.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 469.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 469.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of bridges, churches, aqueducts, by draining swamps, digging canals, and scientifically directing the use of farm land.[1] His main object should not be the extension of his domain, but rather the betterment of it. If a prince will do these things for the progressive improvement of his state, he will at the same time be warding off the negative causes which reduce its welfare.

In the final chapter, "On Beginning War", Erasmus brings out formally his pacifistic ideas which show through all his works, and which he had already set forth in part twelve years before in the *Panegyric* to Philip. "Although a prince ought nowhere to be precipitate in his plans, there is no place for him to be more deliberate and circumspect than in the matter of going to war. Some evils come from one source, and others from another, but from war comes the shipwreck of all that is good, and from it likewise the sea of all calamities floods over everything."[2] Consequently, war should be used only as a last resort; and once engaged upon, should be concluded as swiftly as possible, with the least bloodshed and suffering to the people. The prince should consider beforehand the worries, the trials, the expense, and the after-effects—the increase of depravity, along with the sorrows and misfortunes of those left behind.[3] The prince should learn his lessons not at the expense of loss and disaster to his people, but by sage counsel with himself, and from the costly examples of others.

Erasmus' next argument is based on religious grounds. He says he will not attempt to decide whether war is ever justifiable, but will merely give some references. St. Augustine, St. Bernard and others of the church fathers believed that there were just occasions for war. But—what of the teachings of the Apostles and of Christ himself! They *never* sanction war, and is their authority inferior to that of the fathers?

In Erasmus' opinion, most wars are begun to defend some personal wrong to the prince.

[1] *Opera Omnia*, vol. V, p. 470.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 470.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 471.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> The Christian prince should first hold his own right under suspicion, and then if it is established without a doubt, he should carefully consider whether it should be maintained through catastrophies to the whole world. Those who are wise sometimes prefer to lose a thing rather than to gain it, because they realize it will be less costly.[1]

Erasmus seems to feel that real rights should be maintained, although care should be taken to see that a clear conception of them is arrived at. Then, "if a disagreement arises between princes, why not go to arbiters? There are plenty of bishops, abbots and learned men, reliable magistrates, by whose judgment the matter should better be settled than by such slaughter, spoliation, and calamity to the world."[2] After this suggestion of arbitration, Erasmus returns again to the ethico-religious argument, pointing out what a disgrace it is for Christian peoples to be fighting without end among themselves. As it is now, "every Angle hates the Gaul, and every Gaul the Angle for no other reason than that he is an Angle. The Scot, just

[1] *Opera Omnia,* vol. III, p. 472.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 472. *Cf.* Emerton, *Erasmus,* pp. 260-61; Smith, *op. cit.,* p. 198, n. 1; Bagdat, *op. cit.,* pp. 70 and 103, n. 1; and Enthoven, *op. cit.,* pp. 327-28. Although I have rigorously excluded all parallel references so far, this point is so unique that it merits an exception. For further suggestions of arbitration, see Allen, vol. II, Ep. 288, espec. 68-86 (March 14, 1514); *Bellum* (1540 edition), vol. II, p. 869, *sub fin.; Complaint of Peace* (First American Edition), pp. 48-49. The first suggestion of arbitration came from Pierre du Bois in 1305 (Langlois, *De Recuperatione Terrae Sanctae,* p. 81, chaps. 99 [lviii-lix], 100, 101; and [vii] 12). For a good discussion of this point see Gustav Schnürer, "Das Projekt eines internationalen Schiedsgerichts aus den Jahren 1307/8", *Historisch-politische Blätter,* 1908, pp. 279-284: "So viel Egoistisches und Träumerisches aber auch an dem Vorschlag des französischen Verfassers sein mag, er hat das Originelle an sich, dass hier zum ersten Male an ein ständiges Schiedsgericht zwischen den Staaten Europas gedacht worden ist"; and "Schiedsgerichte waren, wie Scholz [*Die Publizistik zur Zeit Philipps des Schönes und Bonifaz VIII,* pp. 375-443; espec. p. 396] schon bemerkte, damals zwischen einzeln Staaten nichts ungewöhnliches. . . ." Although du Bois antedates Erasmus by two centuries, Erasmus would still seem to be one of the earliest advocates of this "modern" idea. *Cf.* Preserved Smith, *Erasmus,* p. 199, on the originality of this idea. *Cf.* also Allen, vol. II, Ep. 505, and n. 19, for the peace conference at Cambrai in March, 1517. This was one of the incentives for the *Querela Pacis.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

because he is a Scot, hates the Briton; the Italian hates the German . . . and so on through the list. District hates district, city hates city. Why do these stupid names do more to divide us than the common name of Christ to unite us?"[1]

But, Erasmus says, he has elsewhere written extensively on the evils of war, and should not repeat himself here.[2] Therefore he will add just one thing more. Christian princes should cast aside all feigned pretexts and excuses, and earnestly work for the extinction of war which has so long persisted among Christians. "If, after common council, we carried out our common task, even those things which are purely personal to each one would be more prosperous. Now, even that for which alone we are fighting away, is lost."[3]

The concluding paragraph of the treatise is the plea to Prince Charles that he, at least, keep his kingdom free from all the sullying taints of war and tumult:

> I pray that Christ, who is all good and supreme, may continue to bless your worthy efforts. He gave you a kingdom untainted with blood. He would have it always so. He rejoices to be called the Prince of Peace. May you do the same, that by your goodness and your wisdom at last there may be a respite from this maddest of mad wars. The memory of the misfortunes we have passed through will also commend peace to us, and the calamities of earlier times will render twofold the favor of your kindness.[4]

Even from this short analysis, I am sure we shall conclude with Janet that the *Institutio* "*est un bon traité de morale; mais ce n'est pas un traité politique.*"[5] And in that very fact it is typical of Erasmus. The *Institutio* was written when Erasmus was fifty years old and the recognized intellectual leader of Europe. It represents his mature and richest thought. It

[1] *Opera Omnia*, vol. V, p. 473.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 473.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 473.
[4] *Ibid.*, vol. V, p. 473.
[5] *Op. cit.* (3d edition), vol. I, p. 105. This is borne out by Erasmus' prefatory letter to Charles (Allen, vol. II, Ep. 393). There is no evidence that Erasmus knew of Machiavelli's *Il Principe*, but his own treatise forms a perfect antithesis to it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

embodies his chief hopes for the Christian world—peace, harmony, true religion, education and prosperity. Various permutations of these same ideas are found in other places in Erasmus' works, but with very few exceptions[1] nothing is encountered, in respect to political philosophy, which is not included in the *Institutio*.

Having examined this treatise, what shall we conclude as to its origins — or better—its lineal ancestors? The *Institutio* bears upon its face the imprint of classical antiquity. From various references, we know that Erasmus was well acquainted with St. Augustine, St. Jerome, St. Thomas, and others of the church fathers. With Thomas More, his contemporary and close friend, there was unquestionably a close interchange of ideas and principles.[2] All these points are beyond question or doubt. But how much did Erasmus draw upon such writers as John of Salisbury in his *Polycraticus;* or Gilbert of Tournai, *Eruditio Regum et Principum*, written for Louis IX of France; or St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Regimine Principum;*[3] or Aegidius Romanus, *De Regimine Principum;* or Vincent of Beauvais, *De Morali Principis Institutione;* or Pierre du Bois? These writers all express ideas that are paralleled in the *Institutio*.[4]

[1] E. g., *Complaint of Peace*, p. 80, the true majesty of a prince is in his ability to avoid war; *Praise of Folly* (Bailey's trans., 1900 edition), pp. 34-35, the true basis of society consists of every one's being in his right place; *idem.*, pp. 68-70, the "back to nature" idea; and *Colloquies* (Bailey's trans., 1900 edition), vol. II, p. 257, the origin of law.

[2] *Cf.* Durand de Laur, *Érasme*, vol. II, pp. 470-484, for a comparison of Erasmus, More and Machiavelli.

[3] We must not forget that the title "Education of a Prince" does not always convey the same import. *Cf.* Triwunatz, *Guillaume Budé's De L'Institution du Prince*, pp. 34-36 and notes.

[4] If we rearrange the names included above by countries, and make some additions (ranging from the 12th to the 17th centuries) it will be helpful in understanding the wide diffusion of these ideas. The following list makes no claim to completeness. Many of the works contained in it I have examined at first hand, and others I know through descriptions in various sources. Those that are known to me only by title at the time of writing have been marked with an asterisk. In the dates given with each work, a = *ante;* p = *post;* c = *circa.*

ENGLAND: John of Salisbury (1159); Giraldus Cambrensis, *De principis instructione* (1217); John of Wales, **Breviloquum* (a. 1303); John Gower, *Con-*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From a consideration of these and similar works, it will appear

fessio amantis (c. 1390); Thomas Hoccleve, *De regimine principum* (1411-12); John Fortescue, *The Difference between an Absolute and a Limited Monarchy* (p. 1471); Edmonde Dudley, *The Tree of the Commonwealth* (1509-10); Thomas More, *Utopia* (1516); Thomas Elyot, *The Boke Named the Governour* (1531); Thomas Starkey, *The Dialogue* (1538); James I, Βασιλικὸν Δῶρον (1603).

FRANCE: Thomas Cantipratensis, *Bonum universale de apibus* (1258-61); Gilbert of Tournai, *Eruditio regum et principum* (1259); Jean de Launha (or de Limoges), **Somnium Pharaonis* (c. 1250); Vincent of Beauvais (a. 1264); Aegidius Romanus (c. 1285); Jacques de Cessoles, *De Moribus Hominum et Officiis Nobilium*, etc. (c. 1300); Jean d'Anneaux, **De regimine principum* (early 14th cent.); Pierre du Bois, *De recuperatione terrae sanctae* (1305-07); Anonymous, *De informatione principum* (a. 1314); Durand de Champagne, *Speculum dominarum* (c. 1371); Pierre Salemon, *Dialogues and Letters to Charles VI* (a. 1422); Philippe de Maisières, *Le songe du vieil pelerin* (1389); Louis XI (really by Pierre Chayanet of the court), **Rosier des guerres* (1461); Guillaume Budé, *De l'institution du prince* (1516); François Rabelais, *Gargantua* (1532); Innocent Gentillet, *Discours d'estat sur les moyens de gouverner et maintenir en bonne paix un royaume et un principauté contra Nicol. Machiavel* (a. 1576); Jean Bodin, **De institutione principis aut alius nobilioris ingenii* (a. 1596); Pelletier, **La leçon du prince: L'instruisant des vertus plus nécessaires à bien et heureusement gouverner ses peuples* (1608); Abràham de la Faye, **Miroir des actions vertueuses d'un jeune prince, représentées en forme de dialogues* (1613); Pierre Nicole, *De l'Éducation d'un prince* (1671); Anthony Varillas, *La pratique de l'Éducation des princes* (1684); Anonymous (in time of Louis XIV), *L'Art d'Élever un prince* (1688); de Fontenay, **Lettres sur l'Éducation des princes* (17th cent.); Louis XIV, *Letters to his grandson* (1700); François Fénelon, *Les aventures de Télémaque, fils d'Ulysse* (1700).

ITALY: Thomas Aquinas, *De regimine principum* (1265); Guillaume Perrault, *De regimine principum* (a. 1275); William of Prato, **De eruditione principum* (a. 1284); Bruneto Latini, *Tresor* (a. 1294); Dante, *De monarchia* (c. 1310); Marsilio of Padua, *Defensor pacis* (c. 1324); Leonardo Bruni, *De studiis et litteris*, for Battista de' Malatesti of Urbino (a. 1444); Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, **Letter to Sigismund of Tirol* (1443), and *De liberorum educatione*, for Ladislaus of Hungary (1449); Francesco Filefo, **De morali disciplina*, and *Letter to Giovan Sforza* (a. 1481); Baptista Saccus Platina, **Principis* Διατύπωσις (a. 1481); Francesco Patrizi, *De regni et regis institutione*, and *De institutione reipublicae* (a. 1494); Joannus Jovianus Pontanus, *De principe liber* (a. 1503); Bracciolini Poggio, **De officiis principis* (1504); Nicolo Machiavelli, *Il Principe* (1513); Augustino Nifo, **Libellus de his que ab optimis principibus agenda sunt* (1521); Balthasar Castiglione, *Il Cortegiano* (1528); Membrano Roseo da Fabriano, **La institutione del principe Christiano* (a translation of Guevara's work; in 1543); Faustus Longianus (Sebastian Fausto "Da Longiano"), **De instituendo principis filio, a decennio usque ad annos iudicii* (c. 1550); Hieronymus Cagnolus, **De recta principis institutione liber* (a. 1551); Albericus Gentilis, **Regales disputationes* (late 16th cent.); Roberto Bellarimo, *De officio*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that for several generations men in various countries had been

principis christiani (late 16th cent.); Francesco Piccolomini, **Breve discorso della instituzione di un principe* (a. 1604); Giovanni Botero, **Della riputazione del principe* (1601); Marcus Antonius Natta, **De doctrina principum* (early 16th cent.); Pierre Aldobrandini, **De perfecto principe apothegmata* (1608); Tomaso Tomasi, **The Learned Prince* (1643); Marco Aurelio Severino, *La filosophia overo il perche degli Scacchi* (a. 1656); Pietro Sforza Pallavicino, **An princeps debeat esse literatus* (a. 1667).

GERMANY: Engelbert of Volkersdorf, *De regimine principum* (a. 1327); Ingold, *Das goldene spiel* (late 15th cent.); Friederich Lant, **Kaiser Sigismunds Rath* (c. 1452); Jacob Wimpheling, *Agatharchia* (1498); Urbanus Regius, **Handbüchlein eines christlichen Fürstens* (1536); Georg Lauterbeck, **Regentenbuch aus vielen trepplichen alten und neuen Historien zusammen gezogen* (1537); Reinhard Lorich, *De institutione principum loci communes* (1538); Elizabeth von Braunschweig, *Eine Ordnung und Unterweisung zu künftiger und angehenden Regierung, u. s. w.*, for her son (1545); Wolfgang Sedelius, **Wie sich ein Christlicher Herr, so Landt und Leut zu regieren unter ihm hat, vor schedlicher Phantasey verhüten soll* (1547); Philip Melanchthon, **Institutio Joanni Friderici Ducis Pomeraniae* (a. 1560); Leonhardt Werner, **Furstlicher Frostspiegel* (1562); Anna Maria von Brandenburg, **Furstenspiegel* (?), for her son Albrecht Friederich (1563); Conrad Heresbach, *De educandis erudiendisque principum liberis*, etc. (1570); Julius von Braunschweig, instructions for his son (1579); Johann Lauterbach, **Princeps christianus* (1597); Bernard Nüssler, **Princeps litteratus* (1618); Sylvester Kundtmann, **Schola principum iuniorum* (1631); Maximilian of Bavaria, **Der Christliche Fürst oder Vätterliche Ermahnung*, etc. (1640); Heinrich zu Limpurg, **Thesaurus paternus* (1667); Athanasius Kircher, **Principis christiani archetypon politicum* (1672); Christian Thomasius, **Introductio in philosophiam aulicam* (1688); Gottfried Leibnitz, *Projet de l'éducation d'un prince* (1693).

SPAIN: Alvaro Pelyo, **Liber amplus . . . de perfecto et christiano regimine principum* (1334); Francisco Ximenes, *Regiment de princeps* (14th cent.); Antonio de Guevara, *Horologium principum* (1529); Sebastianus Foxius Marzillus, **De regni regisque institutione* (1566); Pedro de Rivandeiro, *Tratado de la religion y virtudes que debe tener el principe para gobernar y conservar sus estados* (late 16th cent.); Juan Mariana, *De rege et regis institutione* (1599); Diego de Saavedra, *Idea de un principe politico-christiano* (1640); Pedro Goncalez de Salcedo, **Nudricion real* (1671).

PORTUGAL: Jerome Osorio, *De regis institutione et disciplina* (a. 1580).

HUNGARY: Lippo Brandolini (while at the court of King Mathias), *De comparatione reipublicae et regni* (a. 1497); Michael (Vicar of St. Maria near Prague), **De regimine principum* (a. 1401).

BOHEMIA: John Dubrava, **De regiis praeceptis* (1520).

POLAND: Stanislaus Orichovius Roxolanus, **Fidelis subditus sive de institutione regia* (a. 1561); Laurentius Grimalius Goslicius, **De optimo senatore* (c. 1600).

SWITZERLAND: John Calvin, *Institutiones* (1536).

HOLLAND: Philip of Leyden, **De reipublicae cura et sorte principantis* (a. 1380).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thinking about the problem of government, more or less along the line which Erasmus followed. That this train of thought continued with increasing volume is well known.[1]

Shall we not say, then, that Erasmus, the true cosmopolite and citizen of the world of letters, did not follow any one source—or even a few—but rather that he took the general heritage of his predecessors as common property.[2] Out of the needs of his times, as seen through his highly developed sensibilities, he recreated these ideas and placed upon them the stamp of his own genius.[3]

LESTER K. BORN

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

BELGIUM: Humbert Leonhard, **De regimine principum* (a. 1490).

SWEDEN: Anonymous, **Kununga og höfdinga styrilse* (Regum principumque institutio), 1669.

The following I have not been able to classify as yet. Petrus Belluga Valentinus, **Speculum principum* (c. 1458); Thomas Rorarius, **Fursten-Spiegel* (1566); Sagittarius, * *προκείμενα bonorum ac pravorum principum* (1571); Joannis Galego de la Serna, **Optima regis educandi ratio* (1634).

Compare the early Irish literature on this general subject, discussed at length by R. M. Smith, "The Speculum Principum in Early Irish Literature", in *Speculum*, vol. II (1927), pp. 411-455; especially pp. 425, 436, 438-45.

[1] Compare such works as those of Campanella, Harrington, de Foigny, Vairasse, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, *et al.* I have already listed those works (from the 12th to the 17th century, inclusive) which are on the same theme as the *Institutio*, or most closely allied to it.

[2] This seems to me the obvious solution. The similarity of subject, and in some cases the similarity of method, must unavoidably produce striking comparisons.

[3] Compare the conclusions of Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 196; A. W. Ward, *Cambridge Modern History, The Renaissance*, vol. I, p. 461; and Murray, *Erasmus and Luther*, chap. i, especially pp. 1-2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE EMPEROR'S ATTEMPT TO REFORM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUMMER OF 1898

MANY progressive plans have originated in South China and so, too, did a significant reform movement which culminated in the summer of 1898. Two memorials advocating reform came out of the southern province of Kwang-tung at the time of the Japanese War. The first of these, with many signatures appended, was submitted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who knew of the Emperor's liberal tendencies.[1] After the apparent failure of this memorial to make an impression, Dr. Sun turned his efforts from constitutional to revolutionary reform. The second memorial, although it was presented as a protest against the ratification of the treaty of Shimonoseki, advocated the promulgation of a constitution. It bore a thousand signatures. Its author, K'ang Yu-wei, had won the title "The Modern Sage of China" as the author of a book on Peter the Great and another on the reforms in Japan. In the interest of reform he followed his memorial to Peking.

Reform societies were organized in many of the commercial cities. In Nanking the viceroy, Chang Chih-tung, became the president of "The Reform Association of China". The Emperor was ready to start reform and high officials were formally urged to present plans whereby the government could adjust itself to the conditions of the times and make the changes necessary for the recovery of the national honor.[2] Probably this degree was due to the influence of the Emperor's tutor,[3] Weng Tung-ho, who for his pains, just missed being cashiered by the Empress Dowager. She became alarmed and, fearing anti-Manchu propaganda, ordered the disbandment of the re-

[1] J. Cantlie and C. S. Jones, *Sun Yat Sen*, p. 56.

[2] K. I. Asakawa, *Constitutional History of China, 1895-1909*, p. 123.

[3] K'ang Yu-wei, "Reform of China", in *Contemporary Review* (London, Aug. 1899), vol. LXXVI, p. 189.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

form clubs.[1] Disappointed and discouraged at this turn of events, K'ang Yu-wei returned to Canton. But instead of abandoning the cause of constitutional reform he continued his efforts by writing leaflets on the subject and by delivering lectures.

Blighted in Peking, the progressive movement came out in print. The number of newspapers published in China increased in three years from nineteen to seventy. Some of these were the organs of reform societies. The Christian Literature Society published a book of *Essays for the Times* with two prefaces on the importance of Western science; one was written by Li Hung-chang and the other by the Marquis Tseng. Such books as Strong's *Our Country* and Bellamy's *Looking Backward* were translated into Chinese.[2] The fever for translating and reading foreign literature colored the background of the hundred days of reform. There came a memorial to the Throne suggesting that it should be the duty of Chinese diplomatic ministers abroad to collect for translation into Chinese the best literature of the nation to which each was accredited. Liberal China, lamenting the fate of the "Celestial Empire", caught a glimpse in these Western books of the way out of its national impotence. Reading in the translation of Mackenzie's history a graphic account of the achievements of modern science in the "wonderful century", a director of the China Merchant Steamship Company was so impressed that he bought a hundred copies and distributed them among the leading officials at Peking.[3]

By the spring of 1898 all the young Chinese officials were reformers and even the younger members of the Manchu nobility were infected. Most of the Manchus, however, were hostile to change for the reform societies looked menacing to their privileges and to Manchu rule. Their interests required that nothing should be disturbed. They were willing to ride on

[1] Gilbert Reid, "Reform in China", in *Forum* (New York, 1899), vol. XXVIII, p. 726.

[2] I. T. Headland, "Reform Movement in China", in *Outlook*, vol. LXV (1900), p. 494.

[3] Timothy Richards, *Forty-Five Years in China*, p. 223.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

until the dragon collapsed under them. Possibly that would not happen for a long time—not in the lifetime of some of the older Manchus.

The liberal officials at Peking usually had been those from the South. The regions around Canton and Shanghai, where contact with the foreigner had existed longer and where commerce had developed to greater extent, quite naturally produced men who were more in sympathy with Western methods. These Southern liberals had aroused antagonism among the reactionary Northerners at Peking. In the preceding twenty years two factions — the Northerners or Manchus and the Southerners or Chinese—had grown up among the officials at the capital. The former, enjoying the favor of the Empress Dowager, was called the "Old Mother Set." The Southern faction, led by Weng Tung-ho, former tutor of the Emperor, won the support of Kuang Hsü and was styled the "Small Lad's Set." This, incidentally, was the origin of the report that the Emperor was the enemy of the Manchus.[1] Each faction tried to strengthen its position by securing the appointment of its candidate when offices were to be filled. In international affairs the Northern Manchu faction favored Russia, while the Southerners advocated closer friendship with Japan. Li Hung-chang, with diminished influence, because of the blame heaped on him for the Japanese war, belonged to the Northern party but held himself aloof from factional differences.[2] He could scarcely be called a conservative, however, for, upon his return from a princely trip around the world, he advocated some reforms. Prince Kung, the veteran president of the Grand Council, was the only Manchu friendly to the liberal Chinese faction. His death on May 29, 1898, disturbed the equilibrium. Had he lived, he must certainly have moderated the reforms and conciliated the opposition. He might even have avoided the Boxer folly. Because of his death the merits of the reform movement were more obscured by this factional strife than they otherwise would have been.

[1] J. O. P. Bland and Backhouse, *China under the Empress Dowager*, p. 180.

[2] *Memoirs of Li Hung-chang*, pp. 134-138.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II.

When the seventeen-year-old Emperor Kuang Hsü was declared of age in 1889, the "Old Buddha", as the Empress Dowager, Tzu Hsi, was familiarly called, went into apparent retirement. She had no intention, however, of giving up any of the power to do what she chose whenever she wanted to take a hand. None of the Peking officials or even Tzu Hsi's eunuchs considered the Emperor as more than a puppet. Those who sought appointments went to her or, more commonly, to Li Lien-yin, her chief eunuch, who made himself rich by the sale of offices. The ceremony of returning thanks to the Emperor for important appointments was thought purely perfunctory, although on one occasion, at least, Kuang Hsü had dared to obstruct the nomination which came from the Summer Palace.[1]

While physically the Emperor was frail and sensitive, his intellectual ability was high according to the opinion of those who knew him best.[2] His activity in the reform movement gives glimpses of the man that might have been; his decrees show qualities of statesmanship which were lacking in the Empress Dowager, but they also reveal a most unfortunate lack of statecraft, the quality which she had in abundance. While the welfare of the people was his chief concern, it troubled her little; she was not interested in the elimination of corruption in politics if it did not affect her revenues.

The education and youthful interests of Kuang Hsü prepared his mind for the sympathetic reception of Western ideas. Indeed the wonders of Occidental knowledge were so mixed with his boyhood instruction in Chinese culture that his natural attitude toward Europeans was one of welcome interest. Weng Tung-ho, his tutor and friend from the time when His Majesty was but five years old, was the leader of the progressive faction in Peking. He procured translations of foreign books for the use of his pupil and he was responsible for the early beginning

[1] Bland and Backhouse, *Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking*, p. 432.

[2] Yung Wing, *My Life in China and America*, p. 240; Der Ling, *Two Years in the Forbidden City*, pp. 113, 373; *Japan Weekly Mail*, Aug. 6, 1898; Gilbert Reid, *loc. cit.*, p. 727.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the Emperor made on the study of the English language. European toys aroused the curiosity of the lad. By gifts from foreign representatives in Peking and from Chinese ministers who had been abroad, the palace received a collection of mechanical contrivances which included a telephone and a phonograph.[1] Two miniature railroads, large enough to carry passengers, were installed in the palace grounds.[2]

The young Emperor, however, had a literary rather than a mechanical mind and appreciated more the flood of Occidental books that, after 1895, came from the presses in increasing numbers. One of these books, a translation of Robert Mackenzie's *History of the Nineteenth Century*, which he read soon after the Japanese War,[3] could not fail to impress him. In the preface the translator, Timothy Richards, asked why it happened that wars, indemnities and humiliation had been thrust on China during the last sixty years. China had brought these on herself, he answered, by an attitude of opposition to the world. She could become one of the greatest nations of the world, Richards went on to say, by meeting the powers with good-will and friendship.

When in 1894, on her sixtieth birthday, the Empress Dowager was presented with a silver-bound New Testament by the Christian women of Peking, the Emperor sent to the American Bible Society for a Bible. It may have been this copy which was found with marginal notes in the Emperor's handwriting when the palace was occupied by the Boxer relief expedition.[4] He sent also for the back numbers of *The Review of the Times*, a periodical which had been published in Shanghai since 1889, and he ordered a copy of everything issued by the missionary presses.[5]

It was the humiliating defeat by Japan in 1895 that brought a determination to the "Lord of Ten Thousand Years" to be

[1] Arthur H. Smith, *China in Convulsion*, vol. I, p. 129.

[2] Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, p. 598.

[3] Timothy Richards, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

[4] J. W. Bashford, *China, an Interpretation*, p. 334; Headland, *loc. cit.*, p. 495.

[5] Arthur H. Smith, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 129; Judson Smith, "Awakening of China", in the *North American Review*, vol. CLXVIII, p. 233 (Feb. 1899).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lord of something more temporal—or less *temporal* and more tangible. The sham of ruling was bitter to him and he chafed under the system into which he had grown. Deeply wounded by the recent and increasing humiliation of China he sought to fulfil his duty as sovereign of the people "given in trust", as he later expressed it in one of the decrees, "by my illustrious Ancestors". The bungling and antiquated methods of government carried on in his name had caused China to "lose face" before the whole world. To one who in youthful enthusiasm had been carried away with the Utopian idea, the situation was intolerable. He was anxious, withal, to have foreigners think him "a man of character" and feared that he was considered "a boy and of no consequence—a mere figurehead". Nevertheless faithfully and carefully all the rites and ceremonies were observed on his regular visits to the Summer Palace five times each month. But there was friction between the titular ruler and the real monarch, Tzu Hsi.

A partial explanation of this state of mind may possibly be found in a memorial presented to the Throne as a result of the Japanese War. The censor, stung by the defeat, impeached Li Hung-chang and the Empress Dowager. The memorialist asked: "How can you possibly justify your position before your ancestors and to your subjects if you permit the Empress Dowager still to dictate to you or to interfere in the business of state?" He ended his rather long invective by asking the Emperor "to be so good as to behead me as a fitting punishment for this plain speaking".[1] For the "depths of audacity" and the "unbridled license of a madman's tongue" the censor was banished to the western frontier, ostensibly by the Emperor but really by the Empress Dowager who thought it prudent to act with restraint. As for the determination of His Majesty it seems that she considered it safe to humor him by permitting him to go through the motions of governing under the supervision of the veteran statesman, Prince Kung. At the same time the Old Buddha thought to elimate the source of the Emperor's progressive ideas by excusing Weng Tung-ho from further attendance to instruct His Majesty.

[1] Bland and Backhouse, *China under the Empress Dowager*, p. 174. Women were not, according to custom, to be permitted to interfere in matters of state.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The events of the next few years conspired to give him the chance to act on his own authority. In the first place the reform literature found justification in the "break-up of China" and then, when foreign affairs had never been in a worse predicament, the bewildered nation lost the steady hand of Prince Kung. Into the mental and political ferment the young sovereign cast himself with avidity and, with the consent which circumstances forced the Empress Dowager to give, he hustled to make over the great slow-moving empire. Promising that Chinese culture would not be neglected and that only those good points of Western civilization would be adopted which, as he explained in the first reform decree, "the needs of the times and the weakness of the Empire" required, he entered upon a series of sweeping changes. Reform decrees which ruthlessly struck deep wounds in "things Chinese" continued to be issued with astonishing rapidity during the hundred days that this increasingly rash course of action was sustained.

III.

A declaration of a reform policy, an exhortation to study Western learning, and a promise that a model university would be established at Peking, made up the first reform decree which appeared on June 11, 1898.[1] On the following day a second edict urged princes of Manchu blood to travel and to seek education in Europe. Almost a week before the promulgation of the first reform decree, there was a new spirit in the Imperial administration. A new revenue measure, the House and Opium Tax, was repealed a few days after it had been issued.

[1] For a translation of the first reform decree see Bland and Backhouse, *China Under the Empress Dowager*, p. 186. The chief decrees up to July 8 are to be found in English, translated from the *Peking Gazette*, in the *North China Herald*, a weekly paper published at Shanghai, Sept. 5, 12, 19 and 26. The rest of the decrees would have been translated, too, but the *coup d'état* came on Sept. 22, cancelling them. All the decrees for that year can be found in French, translated by Jerome Tobar and published in Shanghai in 1900 under the title *Koang-Siu et T'se Hi, Empereur de Chine et Impératrice-Douairière, Décrets Impériaux 1898*. There are here 92 decrees dated between June 10 and Sept. 20, including three that are merely nominations of an official. H. B. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, vol. III, p. 137, gives a list of the reforms undertaken.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The evil effect of the measure, the Emperor explained frankly, was not apparent until enforcement had begun.[1]

The "Old Buddha" was not being overruled; she had agreed not to object as long as the privileges of the Manchus were left whole. But, at the same time, we find her taking measures to insure control. Weng Tung-ho, the ex-tutor of His Sacred Majesty, was dismissed from the Grand Council and sent to his native province of Kiang-su in disgrace. No doubt the Empress Dowager thought that she had got rid of the source of the radical ideas in the mind of the Emperor. Three years before she had rebuked Weng for the same cause. Another decree required newly appointed officials of high rank to return thanks for their preferment at the Summer Palace as well as to the Emperor. A third move toward actual control, and the decisive one, was the appointment of Jung Lu to be Viceroy of the province of Chihli and so in command of China's only modern army. Tzu Hsi and he had been companions in youth. At the time of her first *coup d'état* in 1861 Jung Lu had been of indispensable aid.

These occurrences, it should be observed, took place within the fifteen days of mourning proclaimed at the death of Prince Kung. Probably they were caused by his withdrawal from the control of the affairs of state. The Emperor, who was now twenty-seven years old, was determined. "If I have no power", he is reported to have said, "I had better abdicate. I was made to rule ten years ago; I have secretly been longing all the time for an opportunity to act".[2] "My heart is filled with care and grief" we read in one of the Emperor's decrees. "Foreign powers surround our empire committing frequent acts of aggression. Unless we learn and adopt the sources of their strength our plight can not be remedied".[3]

In the spring of 1898 K'ang Yu-wei was again in Peking having been recommended to the Emperor for employment by Weng Tung-ho. The Emperor was much prejudiced in his

[1] Arthur H. Smith, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 131.

[2] Arthur H. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 146; Cantlie and Jones, *Sun Yat Sen*, p. 124; K'ang Yu-wei, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

[3] Bland and Backhouse, *China Under the Empress Dowager*, p. 199.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

favor because he thought that K'ang understood the reforms of Russia and of Japan since he had written books on these subjects. These works, together with a plan of governmental reform, had been submitted to the Throne in January, 1898.[1] K'ang's knowledge was, however, surprisingly superficial.[2] An Imperial audience was arranged for this "modern sage" on June fourteenth when the Emperor talked with him for two hours. His Majesty was still further impressed and from this time K'ang Yu-wei assumed the rôle of chief adviser to the "Son of Heaven". In this capacity he urged the employment of young men in the civil service. The old ministers, he said, were useless and incapable of reform because they had no acquaintance with Western methods. The Emperor protested that he was powerless to remove important officials, because of the Dowager.[3] Just how much K'ang Yu-wei saw the Emperor during the next two months is problematical—surely not more than a few times.

The reform tide was then at flood and swept on irresistibly. One of its greatest supporting currents now joined the stream. Viceroy Chang Chih-tung of Wuchang, who had already been mentioned as the President of the Reform Association in Nanking, wrote a most effective book in the interest of reform. In order to gauge properly his influence, the historian must take into account the record of this early Chinese captain of industry. He was one of the seasoned viceroys of the kingdom, a zealous patriot and a master scholar. In 1889 he had been transferred to Wuchang so that he might carry out the project of building a railroad from there to Peking. He introduced cotton mills, the telegraph, large-scale coal-mining, and, in 1890, founded the Hanyehping Iron and Steel Company, which is probably the most important industrial organization in China. With all this industrial and political success he was a great patron of the classics, having founded a library for poor scholars, and was an unusually devoted follower of Confucius.

[1] Arthur H. Smith, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 134-135. This plan is printed in the *Contemporary Review*, vol. LXXVI, pp. 191-5.

[2] *British Parliamentary Papers*, 1899, vol. CIX, no. 401, inclosure 2.

[3] London *Times*, Oct. 7, 1898.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One is reminded of the many-sided activity of Benjamin Franklin.

This progressive viceroy wrote, in faultless style, paying careful attention to the doctrine of the mean and conforming with other canons of Chinese literature, a treatise advocating the acceptance of Western knowledge. So pleasing was his presentation that the most exacting Chinese scholar could not be offended. China, he said, was in danger of perishing. Self-preservation demanded something more than the old inherited principles. In order to restore China's power and preserve her institutions it was plainly necessary to utilize Western knowledge. This book has been translated under the title *China's Only Hope*.[1] It is often called simply "Learn". The author furnished as an epitome of the twenty chapters a list of five things which, he said, must be learned. Learn, first, the shame of not being like Japan; secondly, the fear that we shall become as India, Korea, Egypt and Poland; thirdly, that if we do not change our customs we cannot utilize the modern implements of war; then, that the study of the old is not urgent but a knowledge of the methods of foreign governments is; and, finally, learn what is liberal, but when you see strange customs do not forget your parents, and let not much wisdom make you forget the holy sages.[2]

Throughout the book there is displayed fairness of judgment and an unusual understanding of European culture. China alone, he wrote, of all the nations, had, by resisting the changes of the last fifty years, proved herself irreclaimably stupid and not awake. He saw faults in the Occident too. Though the European governments might be strong, it was explained, the lower classes of the people were miserable, unhappy, and maliciously wronged. A government which ignores such social contrasts, or creates them, could never be an example for China to follow. The illustration used in this book to prove that the Christians were not entirely barbarian reflects light on Chinese customs:

[1] By S. I. Woodbridge (1900).

[2] *China's Only Hope*, pp. 22-25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> In the Mosaic Decalogue the duty of honoring one's parents is placed next to that of worshiping Heaven, and foreigners also put on mourning for deceased parents and wear black bands as the badge. Although they have no such things as ancestral halls and tablets of deceased relatives, in lieu of these they place the photographs of their dead parents on the tables in their houses and make offerings to them. And while they make no sacrifices at the tombs of their ancestors, they repair their graves and plant flowers upon them as an act of worship. It will be seen, then, that Western people also hold, in common with us, the relation of Father and Son.[1]

The reception which this abstract literary essay met was enthusiastic. It had a sale, without precedent in China, of a million copies. An Imperial edict issued on July 25 endorsed the book and the author was summoned to Peking. (Because of rebellion in the South, he did not arrive before the *coup d'état* which ended the reform.) Forty copies of the book were sent out by the Emperor to officials of the provinces.

During the hundred days of bustling reform thirty-eight rescripts were issued. Some were mere statements of policy or exhortations for the improvement of the administration or supplements to previous decrees. The changes ranged broadly over the departments of Chinese life. A decree for the protection of the Christian religion came early. There were educational, military and political innovations and important economic provisions which sought to promote the general prosperity of the people.

The educational reforms seem to have been considered the most important. The Imperial University of Peking, heralded at the outset, was not established until August, although a decree of July 4 named a progressive, Sun Chia-nai, as president. An American, Dr. W. A. P. Martin, a graduate of Indiana University who first went to China as a missionary in 1850, was made the head of the faculty and accorded noble rank. With the University of Peking as the model each province was ordered to establish a university which should teach both Euro-

[1] *China's Only Hope*, p. 45.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pean and Chinese subjects. Existing schools should introduce the new subjects. In every city a school board was to provide for the free education of the children. Each provisional governor had the further duty of establishing an agricultural school. For the extension of general education a system of government newspapers was planned to cover the whole nation. "Newspapers", wrote the Emperor, "are one of the most important factors in national education and progress."[1] These official gazettes were to be linked with a central organ at Shanghai. K'ang Yu-wei was appointed to go to Shanghai in charge of this work. Education would be further fostered by the creation of a translating bureau which should put the best of the world's literature within the reach of the Chinese. To provide for the reconstruction of the Chinese Navy it was decreed that naval colleges should be founded. For centuries the whole bureaucracy of the civil service had been selected by a literary essay examination. The abolition of this examination, which was now abruptly announced, could not fail to arouse opposition.

In addition to the educational measures already mentioned which had as their object the promotion of the prosperity of China, there were other and more direct economic measures. The officials throughout the land were admonished to promote the prosperity of merchants. The coöperation of all was enjoined for the establishment of a postal service. Provisions for the scientific study of tea and silk production under a new bureau of agriculture were embodied in still other decrees. Agricultural periodicals should be published in several sections of the country. A bureau of mines and railways was another creation. The roads in the vicinity of Peking and the streets of the capital did not, in the opinion of His Majesty, reflect credit on the nation. The officials concerned should have them repaved.

These educational and economic innovations, especially since so little was done to carry the Emperor's plans into effect, were not the cause of the formidable antagonism which the reform

[1] Bland and Backhouse, *China Under the Empress Dowager*, p. 204.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

movement aroused. It was the political changes which united the opposition. One of the greatest enemies of good government in China—even to a greater degree than obtains in politics elsewhere—is the prevalence of graft, the "squeeze" system. The practice was at this time somewhat justified by the fact that the salaries of public officials were far too low. On the other hand, who would have advocated an increase of the salaries of such plutocrats as those belonging to the mandarinate? The Emperor, nevertheless, commanded that monthly accounts of government receipts and expenditures for the whole empire should be rendered. These he proposed to publish. Furthermore, he would introduce the budget system in government expenditures. Government expenses would be reduced by the abolition of sinecure offices. Such an announcement for the great country of China, filled with officials without duties and ruled by a foreign dynasty, was astounding. Was the Emperor a Manchu or was he the enemy of Manchu rule?

The reform movement reached its climax at the end of August with the abolition of the first group of offices—those connected with the grain tax in provinces in which no grain was transported and the salt commissioners in provinces where salt was not produced.[1] One month's grace would be allowed. Before this time no one was willing to declare himself opposed to wise reform. Although a memorialist had denounced K'ang Yu-wei as an impractical dreamer who paraded an alleged knowledge of European science, he had been particular to state that the writer was not a foe to reform.[2] But after the first of September, when it seemed that the dynasty was headed for the rocks, the conservative party made plans. Somehow this "Lord of a Myriad Years" had to be stopped. Although excellent in principle, the policy of simplification of the administration by the immediate elimination of excess officials was abortive. But the Emperor, feeling that right was on his side, became quite careless of opposition. Abuses were every-

[1] *British Parliamentary Papers,* 1899, vol. CIX, no. 362.

[2] Bland and Backhouse, *China Under the Empress Dowager,* p. 190.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

where grossly apparent. Why compromise with error? Was it necessary to conciliate the bigoted and bungling parasites? With splendid—not to say reckless courage—he attempted to "*frapper à la fois tous les abus*".[1]

Heedless of prudence and caution, the decrees became more peremptory. Viceroys and governors were enjoined to "brush up their ideas and energy, and hasten with the duties laid upon them, and thereby avoid the anger We have in store for lazy and incompetent officials", and not to cast "dust in Our eyes, as the punishment We shall mete out for such an heinous offense will be speedy and retributive."[2] These officials, His Majesty declared, had been loaded with honors and ought to be grateful rather than obstructive. Irritated by ineffective response, he became more drastic. The six metropolitan departments of Peking were obsolete and therefore were abolished. On September 4 the Board of Rites was summarily dismissed for attempting to suppress a memorial because it was too radical;[3] as if, the Emperor complained, they feared that he had not the good sense to perceive that for himself. Three days later Li Hung-chang was added to the enemies of the movement when he was dismissed from the Grand Council. These were highly explosive moves.

To the cashiered mandarins there seemed to be but one way to turn. A body of injured Chinese and Manchus went to the Summer Palace to ask the "Old Buddha" to resume control. She listened to the plea without showing her own feelings. While she felt the responsibility to rescue the disinherited mandarinate from the wild acts of Kuang Hsü, such a grave undertaking was not to be lightly assumed. She was the more concerned because in 1875 upon the death of her son, the Emperor Tung Chih, she had dictated the irregular choice of this nephew for the Throne. In protest against his selection a

[1] H. Cordier, *Histoire générale de la Chine*, vol. IV, p. 215.

[2] Arthur H. Smith, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 144.

[3] These suggestions included the abolition of the queue; the acceptance of Western dress; the adoption of Christianity as a state religion; a national parliament; and a journey by the Empress Dowager and the Emperor to Japan. —Headland, *Court Life in China*, p. 143.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

censor had committed suicide leaving a memorial full of the expressions of his outraged feelings.[1] There had been two blemishes marring the selection. In the first place a successor to the late Emperor should not have been proclaimed until the birth of his posthumous child. A son would have displaced the "Old Buddha" by a new empress dowager. The objections on this score, however, were soon eliminated by the death of the queen before the child was born, helped out of the world, according to a persistent rumor, by her mother-in-law. The other defect was the fact that the new monarch was of the same generation as his cousin the late Emperor and so could never properly perform the ancestral rites at the tomb of the deceased monarch. But these considerations were no different than they had been for more than twenty years. Tzu Hsi worked by wits and not by witchcraft and would bide her time, for she was unpopular in the South where the reform was most favored. If K'ang Yu-wei was right she already had her plans quietly to put her assertive nephew aside at the army review which was scheduled to take place at Tientsin the next month.[2] This plan was the most feasible in view of the anti-Manchu sentiment in the South. The announcement of the army review had been urged upon the Emperor, it was said, by Jung Lu, the viceroy of Chihli, and as one of the reform decrees.[3] For the ceremonies the Emperor and Her Majesty would make their first journey on the railroad. The Emperor's situation may well be described by the Chinese proverb: the fish sports in the kettle but his life will not be long.

Kuang Hsü sensed the dangerous turn of affairs and sought frantically to save the reform. "I am distressed" he wrote to K'ang Yu-wei at the middle of the month.[4] It had been his sincere belief that without reform the empire could not be saved.

[1] Bland and Backhouse, *China Under the Empress Dowager,* pp. 142-147, giving text of the memorial. Such suicides were supposed to be most effective protests.

[2] K'ang Yu-wei, *loc. cit.*, p. 184.

[3] Bland and Backhouse, *China Under the Empress Dowager,* p. 196.

[4] For a translation of this letter written on Sept. 16, see London *Times,* Oct. 7, 1898.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Now he despaired of saving the reform. All the hustle and bustle to remake the nation had occurred within the palace where the decrees were drafted. According to the Chinese system, the Throne decreed and the viceroys and governors executed. The Throne had not been remiss. "If to do were as easy as to know what were good to do", is a wish one might make in China as well as in England—or Venice. Just a few days before the *coup d'état* the British Minister at Peking observed that there was scant evidence that any of the decrees was taking practical effect.[1] Their chief result had been to stir the people from the bewilderment caused by the things foreigners had done to China since the Japanese War, and to arouse a general feeling of apprehension regarding the policy of the Emperor—a feeling greatly accentuated among the mandarinate. The startled sinecurist who had bought the right to plunder the people, even though he was yet untouched, mistrusted what was to follow. The *Japan Weekly Mail* calculated that the abolition of the six boards in Peking had displaced five thousand officials.[2] Where was the axe to fall next?

The feeling of uncertainty which charged the political atmosphere is easy to understand. Viceroys and governors who had been told to "hasten with the duties laid upon them" rather temporized to avoid the risk of action. K'ang now suggested that all the difficulties would be eliminated if the Empress Dowager were imprisoned in her palace. In order to do this it would be necessary to dispose of Jung Lu and to gain the command of the Chihli army. In accepting this advice the Emperor made one of his mistakes. It was true that the storm was about to break, and one takes the nearest port in a storm, but his bark stranded before reaching shelter.

In spite of K'ang Yu-wei's advice to the contrary, Yuan Shih-kai was selected to be the Emperor's candidate in the attempt to command the Chihli troops. He was the logical one

[1] *British Parliamentary Papers,* 1899, vol. CIX, no. 371. *China.* This letter from Sir C. MacDonald is an excellent summary of the situation in Peking on Sept. 17, 1898, five days before the *coup d'état.*

[2] *Japan Weekly Mail,* Oct. 8, 1898.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to select because it had been under his supervision that these troops had been trained by modern methods of military science. There was no other army like it in China. Yuan was, therefore, on September 15, summoned to an audience with the Emperor.[1] Asked whether he would be loyal to the Throne if placed in command of a large body of troops, Yuan replied that he would endeavor to be worthy of Imperial favor. That was considered satisfactory and he received a commission directing him "to display all possible energy and zeal in the training of our troops."[2]

Through her eunuch spy system the Empress Dowager heard that K'ang had advised the Emperor to disregard her orders and be monarch in his own full right. She, therefore, ordered the Emperor to arrest him. On the contrary the Emperor wrote to him to "betake himself with all dispatch to Shanghai"; and further, "I am touched with your loyalty and fidelity. Take care of yourself."[3] In the meantime Tzu Hsi learned of the audience with Yuan and sent for him. Army reform, she told Yuan after reading his commission, was sensible enough, "but His Majesty is in too great a hurry and I suspect him of cherishing some deep design. You will await a further audience with him and then receive my instructions."

With this ominously tense situation between the Winter Palace in Peking and the Summer Palace outside of the city, the Emperor was baffled, impotent, thwarted by the "stagnation", the "palsied indifference", and the "petrified energies" of the officials. He appealed to the nation for popular support. His subjects, he affirmed, could depend on their prince. The right which high officials had to memorialize the Throne was extended and then made quite general. An order went out requiring that copies of the reform decrees were to be hung in public places throughout the nation. The uncultivated land belonging to military garrisons was to be thrown open to the people. In one of the last reform decrees the Emperor

[1] H. Cordier, *Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales,* vol. III, p. 407.

[2] Bland and Backhouse, *China Under the Empress Dowager,* p. 201.

[3] London *Times,* Oct. 7, 1898.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

states that the first object of good government should be the welfare of the people.[1]

The motives of Kuang Hsü had been noble during the whole campaign, but now he felt the pursuit of an unkind fate. In a panic of despair he struck wildly. Calling Yuan to a secret audience early on the morning of September 20, he gave him a commission to go to Tientsin and to execute Jung Lu and to bring ten thousand soldiers back with him. He was to place a military guard around the Summer Palace and then to report to the Emperor.[2] Yuan went to Tientsin on the first train. But the Emperor should not have expected Yuan to execute Jung Lu, for Yuan and Jung Lu were sworn brothers. Yuan told Jung Lu the plan which the Emperor had trusted him to carry out. Jung Lu went by special train to Peking and directly to Tzu Hsi. He returned to Tientsin that night. Two days later, after the guard at Peking had been replaced by dependable men and other military precautions had been taken, the Emperor was summoned by the "Old Buddha".[3] Upon his arrival at the Summer Palace the eunuchs took him to an island called the "Ocean Terrace" which is in the lake within the palace grounds. It is believed that his life was spared chiefly for the purpose of avoiding difficulties with the foreign diplomats. He was reported ill—as more than one ill-fated enemy of the "Old Buddha" had been, in times past. A week later the rumor circulated that the Emperor had committed suicide.[4] By insistent inquiries as to His Majesty's health the diplomats made it plain that the death of the Emperor would create an awkward situation. Accredited to His Majesty, they declared

[1] Decree of Sept. 13.

[2] Yuan gave to the *Times* reporter in 1911 a different story of his dealings with the Emperor in 1898 (McCormick, *Flowery Republic*, p. 359) but it does not fit well with some established facts.

[3] A cartoon appearing in *Punch* (Oct. 8, 1898, p. 158) pictured the Dowager with a reform decree in one hand and the ear of the boy emperor in the other, saying to the "Son of Heaven": "Reform indeed. I'll reform you. Go and stand in the corner till I tell you to come out."

[4] *British Parliamentary Papers*, 1899, vol. CIX, dispatch from China of Sept. 23, 1898, etc. *Japan Weekly Mail*, Oct. 1 and 8, 1898. *New York Times*, Oct. 14, 1898.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that they were authorized to deal with no other government. At length on October 18 the fog of mystery was lifted when a physician from the French legation was permitted to visit the royal prisoner.[1] For the next two years—until the Manchu court fled before the allied relief expedition of September, 1900—Kuang Hsü remained on that island in almost solitary neglect.[2]

An explanation came from the Throne. The Emperor had been ill for the past three months. Poor health and the present political difficulties had prompted His Majesty to implore the Empress Dowager, who at two previous crises had assumed the reigns of government with great success, "to advise me in government". "Moved by a deep regard for the welfare of the nation, Her Majesty has graciously consented."[3] Whereupon the defeasance of the reform program was proclaimed with elaborate explanations and the cashiered officials were restored to office. A further pronunciamento declared that:

> The Emperor has labored night and day with unweared diligence, but unexpectedly there appeared a manager of affairs, K'ang Yu-wei, a leader of false doctrines, a deceiver of the age, a slanderer of men, who led a crowd of low followers and took advantage of the attempt at reforms to impose his own rebellious schemes, covering up his conspiracy with secretly irregular conduct. Some days ago he gathered together his band to surround

[1] *British Parliamentary Papers,* 1899, vol. CIX, no. 363, MacDonald to Salisbury.

[2] The *Japan Weekly Mail,* Oct. 1st, 1898, declared that "if the sovereign who had the splendid courage to compose and issue such a decree" (that which began the reform) "has been done to death by the enemies of progress among his subjects, it will be a calamity not merely for China but for the world." An editorial in the *North China Herald* (Oct. 31, 1898, p. 801) under the title, "The Unfortunate Emperor", begins with this paragraph: "It is really a wonderful thing that a young Chinese Emperor, brought up as he has been by women in the most conservative city of the most conservative nation in the world, purposefully kept in as much ignorance as possible of the outside world, and not allowed, as far as the Empress Dowager's intentions went, to be much more than a puppet . . . . should suddenly show himself to be a patriot and a reformer."

[3] *British Parliamentary Papers,* 1899, vol. CIX, p. 292.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the I Ho Palace, to capture the Empress Dowager and also the Emperor, but he was discovered and his conspiracy broken.[1]

Seven of the leading reformers were executed. One of the seven,[2] a member of the Grand Council, Tan Sze-tong, refused to try to save himself, declaring that China needed men to die for the purpose of showing appreciation for what the Emperor had done.[3] Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, one of the proscribed, escaped to Japan and lived on to serve China in republican days.

K'ang Yu-wei was both careless and fortunate. Having remained in Peking until the morning of the twentieth, he left on the same train as Yuan. Although Jung Lu had had the Old Buddha's order to arrest him, he did not do so. K'ang took a British steamer for Shanghai. The British consul-general at Shanghai, in order to save K'ang's life, having learned of the decree for his death, met the ship before it reached port. K'ang was quite surprised to learn of his danger and gladly transferred to another British ship bound to Hong Kong.[4] He escaped but the graves of his ancestors were violated.

The reaction which followed the *coup d'état* in Peking was immediate. Anti-foreign demonstrations became so menacing that all the foreign delegations summoned military guards. They arrived to the great chagrin of the Tsung-li Yamen, the first week in October.[5]

The end of the drama of the *coup d'état* was delayed ten years—wistful years for Kuang Hsü. For a decade the suppressed monarch waited for the death of the Dowager to restore him to power when he could serve China anew. He lived taunted with his failure by his clever aunt who reproached him for ingratitude to her who had made him Em-

[1] Translated from the *Peking Gazette*, Sept. 29, 1898, *U. S. House Documents*, 55th Congress, 3rd Session, vol. I, p. 221.

[2] For the seventh see *British Parliamentary Papers*, 1899, vol. CIX, p. 291, and *New York Times*, Oct. 1 and 14, 1898.

[3] Paul Reinsch, *Intellectual and Political Currents in the Far East*, p. 142.

[4] *British Parliamentary Papers*, 1899, vol. CIX, no. 401, inclosure 2. This is a memorandum of the conversation with K'ang Yu-wei. J. O. P. Bland was the interpreter at this meeting.

[5] *Ibid.*, no. 350.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peror. Even the chief eunuch ridiculed him. At times, his anaemic physical condition having its influence too, he became dubious of the possibility of reform and the problem assumed the intricacy of a Chinese puzzle.[1] Under the circumstances it would have been surprising if he had not become despondent.

Did his crafty aunt arrange that he should not survive her? Gossip so affirms. There have been so many timely deaths among Tzu Hsi's rivals that it is hard to believe her to have been above such a deed. His frail constitution may have succumbed naturally. At any rate he ascended the dragon to be a guest on high on November 14, 1908, the day before the death of the Old Buddha. Just before his death he summoned his last strength to write a decree for the execution of Yuan Shih-kai for treason in 1898—the cause as he believed, of his decade of misery.[2]

IV.

Young China, humiliated by a régime clogged with eunuchs and encumbered with "squeezes", a régime resting on a pathetic presumption of superiority to all other peoples of the world, under the leadership of a sincere but amateur emperor, had made its utmost effort to retrieve the helpless position of the "Celestial Empire". Descending from the pinnacle of unrivaled supremacy, on which the Chinese confidently supposed their nation to be, to the position of a bungling and antiquated state surpassed by any Western nation, requires a considerable mental adjustment. It was not to be expected that the rational process would run smoothly in so many hundred million minds.

In the large the Emperor and his party had not failed; they had been eclipsed. Time was on their side. History, as it seems, hypnotized by events, fails to recognize alternatives in the past yet finds it easy to pick out the stupid mistakes which involved the "failure". The lack of military support seems to have been the greatest cause of the overthrow of the reform.

[1] Princess Der Sing (Mrs. Thaddeus C. White), *Two Years in the Forbidden City*, p. 374.

[2] Cordier, *Histoire générale de la Chine*, vol. IV, p. 263.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

That the Emperor was impatient and impractical was to have been expected, given his lifelong seclusion from the real world and given the environment which had presumed him a puppet. It is a marvel that he comprehended the real situation of his nation so clearly and addressed himself to repair that situation with remarkable intelligence and with the courage of religious conviction. The reform decrees were certainly the work of a greater than K'ang Yu-wei. Indeed the task of reforming the unreasonably conservative Chinese was, in the figure of one of their proverbs, like attacking a thousand tigers with ten men. But reformers have always been more or less short-sighted. They must attempt the impossible that failure may remove the impossibility. A successor can then effect the reform. The failure of Emperor Kuang Hsü was in this sense a successful failure. From the point of view of the present transitional epoch of Chinese history, the movement was eminently fruitful. The *coup d'état* affected only a few thousand contemporaries. It is difficult to see how China could have been urged along the road of change, in the past thirty years, faster than she has come. The Emperor with a flurry of innovation had permanently disparaged the Chinese classics and had given to the bulk of the Chinese—those not situated on the border fringe where the foreign traders came—the first inspiration of other things.

BORTON BUTCHER

UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MISSIONARIES AND POLITICS IN CHINA—THE TAIPING REBELLION

THE Taiping Rebellion, probably the most destructive civil war of modern times, was a gigantic protest against the weakness and conservatism of China's Manchu rulers, but it was more than that—it was a fanatical religious outburst, proclaiming Old Testament Christianity as its creed. The period dealt with in this paper is mainly from March 19, 1853, when the capture of Nanking gave the rebels world notoriety, to June 14, 1854, when the turning-point is indicated by the decision of Commissioner McLane—regarding his instructions that "should the revolutionary movement now in progress in China be successful, . . . you will, at your discretion, recognize the government *de facto*" [1]—that "it can no longer be doubted that intercourse cannot be established or maintained on terms of equality." [2]

Inasmuch as the Protestant missionaries—especially that picturesque American, Rev. Issachar J. Roberts—are often held responsible for this terrible rebellion, and in view of their alleged political influence in general, it has seemed advisable to make a study based on the original sources [3] to find out what

[1] *Sen. Exec. Doc. 22, 35-2,* p. 50.

[2] *Sen. Exec. Doc. 39, 36-1,* p. 3.

[3] The primary sources on which this study is based are the manuscript letters in the archives of the Baptist and Presbyterian Missions in New York and of the American Board in Boston. In addition, the *Annual Reports* of the nine missionary associations then in China have been used—namely, the American Board, Baptist, Southern Baptist, Seventh-Day Baptist, Methodist Episcopal, Methodist Episcopal South, Presbyterian, Protestant Episcopal, and the Medical Missionary Society. Other publications used are the *Missionary Herald,* Boston (American Board), *Missionary Magazine,* Boston (Baptist), *Southern Baptist Missionary Journal,* Richmond; *Christian Advocate and Journal* and the *Missionary Advocate,* New York (both Methodist Episcopal); *Foreign Missionary,* New York, and the *Home and Foreign Record,* Philadelphia (both Presbyterian); *Spirit of Missions* (Protestant Episcopal); and the Reports of the Medical Missionary Society, Canton (*Chinese Repository*), 1850-51, together

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

really were their thoughts and actions at this critical first stage, when the political fortunes of the Chinese Empire hung in the balance, and the Christian world was preparing to take the Taiping ruler into its arms.

American missionaries, who had been coming to China ever since 1830, numbered close to 100 at the zenith of Taipingdom. Beginning quietly at Macao and Canton, they had

with the *Minutes* of three Annual Meetings, 1854-56, Macao, 1857 (Harvard Library).

Works by missionaries of the period include R. S. Maclay, *Life Among the Chinese, etc.,* New York, 1861; W. A. P. Martin, *A Cycle of Cathay, etc.,* New York, 1896; I. J. Roberts, "Tae Ping Wang", in *Putnam's Magazine,* October, 1856; and Charles Taylor, *Five Years in China, etc.,* New York, 1860. On missionaries of the period there are L. S. Foster, *Fifty Years in China* (on T. P. Crawford), Nashville, 1909; and F. W. Williams, *Life and Letters of S. Wells Williams,* New York, 1889. Roman Catholic works are M. Huc, *The Chinese Empire,* London, 1859; and B. Wolferstan, *The Catholic Church in China,* London and St. Louis, 1909. For criticism of Missions see Walter Mann, *Christianity in China* (biased and inadequate); and Alexander Michie, *China and Christianity,* Boston, 1900.

The most useful contemporary accounts of the revolution are MM. Callery and Yvan, *History of the Insurrection in China,* London, 1856; E. G. Fishbourne, *Impressions of China, etc.,* London, 1855; R. J. Forrest, "Christianity of Hung Tsui Tsuen", in *Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society,* new series, vol. IV, December, 1867; "T. M. J.", the "Taeping Rebellion, etc.", in *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine,* vol. LII, January, 1865; Charles Macfarlane, *The Chinese Revolution, etc.,* London, 1853; T. T. Meadows, *The Chinese and Their Rebellions,* London, 1856; "Lin-le" (A. F. Lindley), *Ti-ping Tien-kwoh, etc.,* London, 1866; (W. Sargent), "The Chinese Rebellion", in *North American Review,* vol. LXXIX, July, 1854; and H. Vizetelly, *The Chinese Revolution,* London, 1853. Other miscellaneous works are: E. Cunningham, "Our Commercial and Political Relations with China", in *Hunt's Magazine,* vol. XXIII, September, 1855; *Memoirs of the Viceroy, Li Hung Chang,* London, 1913; *Chinese Repository,* Canton, 1850-51; and G. H. Preble, *Diary of a Cruise to China and Japan (1853-56)* (Massachusetts Historical Society).

The following U. S. Government publications are most valuable: *House Executive Document 123, 33 Cong., 1st Session* (Marshall correspondence); and *Senate Executive Documents 34, 33 Cong., 2nd Session* (Perry correspondence); *32, 34 Cong., 1st Session* (McLane on Neutrality); *22, 35 Cong., 1st Session* (McLane's visit to Nanking and Wuhu); and *39, 36 Cong., 1st Session* (McLane's instructions). The most valuable works for general reference are Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia, etc.,* New York, 1922, the best exposition of the American policy; and W. J. Hail, *Tseng Kuo-fan and the Tai Ping Rebellion, etc.,* New Haven, 1927, the most accurate account of the revolution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

spread to all five of the then "Treaty Ports" as well as Hong Kong in the eight years between the Treaty of Nanking and the genesis of the Taiping Rebellion. Of the nine missionary societies working in China as a whole, the American Board and the Presbyterian were the two largest; while Shanghai was in 1854 the most popular mission station, with over one-third of the whole number, representing six different missions.

I

Some ten years before the Taiping Rebellion was ever heard of, a man long resident in China and Singapore said these words: "Depend upon it, that, whether it be their object or not, the English and American missionaries will work out a political as well as a religious reformation. The leaven has been thrown in, no matter how, or with what intention, and China is now fermenting!"[1] That something was about to happen to China in the middle of the nineteenth century could hardly have escaped the attention of the missionaries, who were vastly more informed on conditions in China than the business or diplomatic groups. For example, Dr. E. C. Bridgman of the American Board, Shanghai, writes in 1851: "No doubt the empire has reached a ruinous condition, and revolutions may not be remote. The state groans under its own weight."[2] Rev. J. B. French (Presbyterian, Canton) reports the "rebellion in Kwangsi" (near Canton) as early as September 27, 1850;[3] and Rev. M. S. Culbertson (Presbyterian, Shanghai) admitting that "foreigners have been disposed to scout at the rebellion in Kwang-si leading to any serious result," says (January 14, 1853): "The state of political affairs seems to indicate that we are on the eve of a great revolution."[4] It should be noted, however, that at first little or nothing was known about the pseudo-Christian character of the rebels; though the *Chinese Repository* (edited by Bridgman and Dr. S. W. Wil-

[1] Macfarlane, *Chinese Revolution*, pp. 159-60.

[2] American Board, *Annual Report*, 1851, p. 124.

[3] Presb. Archives, Canton-Amoy, 1845-64, no. 234.

[4] *Ibid.*, Shanghai, 1850-55, no. 65 [misdated "1852"].

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

liams of the same mission) does say in July, 1851: "There is a very general impression in Canton and its vicinity, that they [the rebels] are somehow connected with foreigners and with Christianity."[1]

Before we can thoroughly understand how the missionary would be likely to react to the startling sudden possibility of a Christian Emperor guiding the destinies of the Chinese, we must endeavor to visualize their "mental preparation",—that is, how they felt about the state of China and the world in general at the time when the Taiping cataclysm was about to burst forth. In a man to whom religion was the paramount, almost the only, interest in life, an interpretation based literally on the Bible would naturally lead to beliefs and actions otherwise inexplicable.

A few illustrations will show the bearing of Biblical prophecies on this whole subject. Culbertson refers (August, 1853) to God's promise that "the heathen shall be given to the Son for his inheritance" and to "the indications, seen throughout world, that the set time for the accomplishment of this promise is drawing near."[2] Others applied the idea specifically to China; the *Missionary Advocate* says (April, 1851): "China is besieged at every accessible point; and her fall, as the only great empire of Paganism, will come more quickly than we think."[3] On September 16, 1852, Rev. Elihu Doty (Dutch Reformed, Amoy) speaks of the rumor as to the religion of the rebels, and the possibility that "the prophecy concerning the land of Sinim [may] be verified at no distant period."[4] Or as a Seventh-Day Baptist put it: "It can hardly be deemed an excess of enthusiasm to regard this as the beginning of those mighty movements, which are to shake the earth, and usher in the latter days of glory."[5] One of the most strikingly prophetic passages I have come across is the following from Mac-

[1] *Chinese Repository,* vol. XX (July, 1851), pp. 497-8.

[2] *Foreign Missionary,* vol. XII (Jan., 1854), p. 133.

[3] *Missionary Advocate,* vol. VII (April, 1851), p. 3.

[4] *Missionary Herald,* vol. XLIX (Mar., 1853), p. 65.

[5] Seventh-Day Baptist *Annual Report,* 1853, p. 15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lay's journal, as early as March 3, 1850, referring to the new Manchu Emperor: "Who knows the surprising changes which may mark his reign? Would it not be well for the whole Church to pray that the reign of this emperor may be marked in the world's history, as the era of Christianity's complete triumph in China."[1]

There was, so far as I can discover, no jarring note to mar the unanimity among the missionaries as to the fact that God was about to have a gigantic tussle with the Devil for the overlordship of China. It was only when it came to assigning the respective rôles in the contest that sharp differences of opinion became manifest.

II.

Two preliminary points must be borne in mind. First, there was not the division on national lines as between England and the United States that was often apparent in the revolution of 1926. This quotation from the *Missionary Advocate* would indicate the general feeling: "How important then that the English and American Protestant Churches march side by side with the commercial, military, naval and colonial enterprises of this wonderful Anglo-Saxon race?"[2] Nor was there much dispute between conservative or liberal, religious or secular, Protestant or Catholic, as to the ultimate success of the rebels. As Commodore Perry wrote to the Secretary of the Navy (December 24, 1853); "no one now doubts their ultimate success;"[3] the only notable exception seems to have been Governor Bonham of Hong Kong, for according to Rev. R. Q. Way (Presbyterian, Ningpo): "The Governor gives it as his opinion [May 11, 1853] that they will not succeed in their attempt to overthrow the present government, though some of the gentlemen in his party think otherwise."[4] With these two points out of the way, we are now ready to begin our discussion of the great divergences in American missionary opinion.

[1] *Christian Advocate*, vol. XXV (July 18, 1850), p. 113.

[2] *Missionary Advocate*, vol. VIII (Aug., 1852), p. 34.

[3] *Sen. Exec. Doc. 34, 33-2*, p. 81.

[4] Presb. Archives, Ningpo 1845-53, no. 248.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Surprising as it may seem, our compact mission group contained about every possible variety of opinion as regards the Taipings, even in this early period when they were carrying all before them. Their feelings about the rebels may be divided into four groups: (1) enthusiasm, (2) moderate sympathy, (3) opposition, leading to (4) pleas for intervention. Their motives were, I am convinced, not of a selfish nature, but based on the supposed effect on mission work and on the good of humanity as a whole. Those who are familiar with the differences of opinion in the 1926 revolution will see a striking similarity of groupings; contrary to the almost universal idea of historians, missionary opinion even at the glorious beginning of the Taiping Rebellion was anything but unanimous.

We can hardly blame the missionaries for the enthusiasm engendered by seeing, as they thought, the actual hand of God in human affairs, shown in a most unexpected way after a long and arduous period of expectancy. Rev. L. B. Peet (American Board, Foochow), for instance, notes in italics: "God has selected his instruments, and is about to defend the honor of his name, in the midst of this great people."[1] Rev. J. W. Wiley (Methodist, Foochow) writes, January 1, 1853: "God is developing in this great empire an argument for the divinity of his word—a mighty, an obvious, a tangible argument, on which the world may look, and before which the daring and metaphysical and mystical infidelity of modern times shall tremble and perish. . . . Satan will exert all his energies to defeat it."[2] This last thought also occurred to Mr. Peet, who, following the passage quoted above, states in italics: "There is danger that, through the craft of the great Adversary of souls . . . this revolution . . . may be delayed many years."[3] But the missionaries were not easily discouraged, as this passage by Rev. R. S. Maclay (Methodist, Foochow), in the Annual Report, November 1, 1852, goes to show. "The heathenism of China grows old and decrepit. What shall rise from

[1] *Missionary Herald,* vol. L (Feb., 1854), p. 59.

[2] *Christian Advocate,* vol. XXVIII (Apr. 21, 1853), p. 61.

[3] *Missionary Herald,* vol. L (Feb., 1854), p. 59.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the ruins of heathenism in China? There *may* arise a licentious liberalism or chilling atheism, which shall curse the world; but there may—thank God, we *know* there *shall* arise here a strong and genial Christianity."[1]

Humanitarian sympathy was a second motive for enthusiasm. Mr. Peet says, September 19, 1853: "The cause . . . in which these men are engaged, is the same as that in which Moses, and Martin Luther, and our Puritan ancestors engaged, and through the blessing of God on their efforts, gloriously triumphed."[2] Or as Maclay put it in his book, published in 1861: "China never before looked on such a Cromwellian chief, never listened to the heavy tread of such 'ironsides'. In no other land has Christianity ever had such a precursor, in no age has the Saviour ever had such a 'John the Baptist.'"[3]

Finally, there was a third motive, personal pride, as exhibited in a missionary who in this drama belongs in a class by himself—Rev. Issachar J. Roberts of Canton, formerly Southern Baptist but now independent, who in 1847 had instructed and almost baptized the future "Emperor." Imagine his satisfaction in being able to commence a magazine article with these words: "The chief leader in the present revolutionary movement in China is a personal acquaintance of the writer"—and to say a little later: "'Be not forgetful to entertain strangers,' says the Apostle, 'for thereby some have entertained angels unawares.' It was certainly unawares if we were entertaining an emperor in [Hung] Sow-Tsuen!"—and to note that the two months at Roberts's mission in Canton was all the religious instruction the "Christian Emperor" ever received personally from a foreign missionary.[4]

Roberts' extraordinary mimeographed *Circular Letter* of December 31, 1863[5] contains the following illuminating passages:

[1] *Missionary Advocate*, vol. IX (May, 1853), p. 11.

[2] *Amer. Board Archives*, Amoy-Foochow 1846-59, no. 348, p. 16.

[3] Maclay, *Life Among the Chinese*, p. 351.

[4] Roberts, *Putnam's Mag.*, vol. VIII (Oct., 1856), pp. 380, 383.

[5] Presb. Archives, Shanghai 1850-64, no. 87.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> Whoever may have been the direct instruments, it must be acknowledged that the power is of God and that he exercises that in answer to prayer. But the direct visible instruments—a native writer & colporteur, a religious tract, & *a foreign missionary* [italics mine]—were beautifully united and made efficient in this one instance, which promises results more than equivalent to all the money & missionary labor that have hitherto been expended by all nations & all denominations on China!! The Lord's name be praised! And this three fold instrumentality—Foreign Missionaries, Native Assistants, & Christian Books (*each indispensable*)—united will, ultimately, with the blessing of God, consumate [*sic*] the work. China will be revolutionized, Christianized, & a great multitude *saved* through these means.

On the visit of the H. M. S. *Hermes* Roberts notes parenthetically of the rebels, "they frequently spoke of *Lo How*-tsuen [his own Chinese name] who taught their master at Canton!" Finally, here is the peroration:

> The writer cheerfully confesses his solicitude for Tae ping Wang's success. This is not only *from personal friendship and as his teacher in Christianity* [italics mine again]: but on a wide and more general scale, because he believes it will be for the good of the nation, religiously, commercially, politically, & socially, and may the God of nations grant him success. Amen. I. J. R.

Most of the missionaries, of course, belonged to the class of more moderate sympathizers, and here again three motives may be especially mentioned. First there is the natural tendency to keep to the middle of the road. Rev. John Johnson (Baptist, Hong Kong), after referring to the two extremes, concludes, "I have no sympathy with either the wild enthusiasm of the one, or the stolid incredulity of the other";[1] and Doty writes (January 18, 1854) in similar vein: "We regard both of these views as extreme & erroneous."[2]

While missionaries were quick to note faults, especially doctrinal ones, in the Taipings, they did their best to explain and condone them. Rev. W. A. P. Martin (Presbyterian, Ningpo)

[1] Baptist Archives, Johnson to Peck, Oct. 10, 1853.

[2] Amer. Board Archives, Amoy-Foochow 1846-59, no. 11, p. 12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

says: "Some of these books contain gross errors, which is not so much to be wondered at as that they contain so much truth."[1] It was realized that many such faults came from a literal following of the Old Testament; as Dr. Charles Taylor (Southern Methodist, Shanghai) wrote, "the Old Testament is much more in favour than the new and hence, while the ten commandments are the established rule of life, polygamy is lawful and prevalent; and to destroy enemies is not only lawful, but a religious obligation."[2] The danger of this is pointed out by Rev. J. K. Wight (Presbyterian, Shanghai): "Shoals and quicksands however lie in their course & except kept by the grace of God they may turn out no better than Mormons or Mohammedans."[3] Such difficulties did not easily discourage the missionaries; Wight, for instance, wrote on May 7, 1853: "We cannot of course tell when and how the contest will end but our hope is in him who seems to have begūn it in order to overrule it for his glory & the triumph of his cause."[4]

A third factor influencing cautious sympathy was the probable effect of the insurrection on mission work. "There can however be but little doubt that the revolution will have an important bearing on the misery work", wrote the veteran Josiah Goddard (Baptist, Ningpo), March, 1853.[5] "In case they [the rebels] are beaten," said Rev. J. W. Quarterman (Presbyterian, Ningpo), "I fear the imperialists may suspect us of having originated the whole affair;"[6] while Rev. S. N. D. Martin of the same mission wrote, June 7, 1854: "Should the Revolution finally be defeated, it will almost inevitably involve the cause of missions and especially native christians in trouble";[7] and Rev. J. V. N. Talmage (American Board, Amoy), April 22, 1853: "We have reason to believe that the worship of God, & confession of the name of Jesus, will be associated

[1] *Foreign Missionary,* vol. XII (Jan., 1854), p. 159.

[2] *Christian Advocate,* vol. XXVIII (Sept. 22, 1853), p. 151.

[3] Presb. Archives, Shanghai 1850-64, no. 72 (June 1, 1853).

[4] *Ibid.,* no. 71.

[5] Baptist Archives, Goddard to Bright.

[6] Presb. Archives, Ningpo 1845-53, no. 249.

[7] *Ibid.,* Ningpo 1854-64, no. 16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with hatred to the government."[1] If on the other hand the Taipings should win, presumably just the opposite would be the case. Even the Roman Catholic Vicar-Apostolic of Kiangsi is quoted as saying: "If, as is now very probable, the insurgents prevail, we may perhaps expect some emancipation of our holy religion."[2] Another result is expected by W. A. P. Martin (June 28, 1853): "Some stupendous providence of this kind seems called for, to quicken the zeal of the people of God; and make them as eager to come and gather jewels for our Saviour's crown in the dark mines of China, as people of the world are to go to California and Australia for gold."[3]

It might be well to say a word about the Chinese Christians themselves; they were in an extremely difficult position, but were said to have remained neutral. "For this reason they have become equally suspected by both parties, and we fear will be hereafter equally exposed to punishment whichever side may be ultimately victorious," says Abbé Huc.[4] The Amoy Mission of the American Board especially felt this, for Doty wrote on April 20, 1854: "Many of the people have a strong impression that in some way or other there was a connection between the arrival of our native brethren in May last and the outbreak of the insurrection [in Amoy]. You will remember they were synchronous."[5]

When we come to consider the small group of missionaries who opposed the Taipings from the very beginning, we find as we might expect, personal recriminations with the members of the majority party. French explains the situation in a letter dated August 20, 1853. (It is interesting to note that Dr. J. D. Ball of the same station but a different mission—the American Board—had become French's father-in-law in the previous year.) "Dr. Ball and Dr. Happer have taken strong sides *against* the Insurgents, but they stand almost *alone*, among the

[1] Amer. Board Archives, Amoy-Foochow 1846-59, no. 10, p. 22.

[2] Vizetelly, *Chinese Revolution*, p. 133.

[3] Presb. Archives, Ningpo 1845-53, no. 251.

[4] Huc, *Chinese Empire*, p. xvi.

[5] Amer. Board Archives, Amoy-Foochow 1846-59, no. 52.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Missionaries in China, in taking the ground they do." Of that interesting character, Dr. A. P. Happer (Presbyterian, Canton), he goes on to say: "Dr. H. has even gone so far, in some of his letters published in the 'China Mail', as to *urge strongly*, the duty of Foreign *interference* to put down the present movement." In regard to which French's own comment is (October 25, 1853): "*Intervention* at the *throne of Grace*, is the only kind of intervention from Foreigners, that we desire." And finally, on January 8, 1854:

> I hope that the Churches at home will not form their opinion of the struggle wh. is now going on in China, from the letters of the *China correspondent* of the "Presbyterian" [Happer]. I think the Editors of the "Presb." are in *duty bound* to inform their readers, that the views of their correspondent, on this subject, *differ* "*in toto*" from those of *all* his brethren in China. Bro. H. has from the beginning taken a stand *against* the Insurgents; & he publishes with avidity everything wh. he hears, to the discredit of the Insurgents.[1]

How far is this criticism of Happer justified? Here is a quotation from the Doctor's letter to *The Presbyterian* dated July 16, 1853: "For myself, while I trust in God to overrule all for his own glory, I would expect more benefit to result to foreign intercourse, if the foreign powers would grant the sought-for aid to the Imperialists."[2] He felt the responsibility of his minority position, for he wrote on July 21:

> The advocates are expecting that a universal gush of sympathy will carry away the christians of Great Brittain [*sic*] and U. S. in favour of the rebellion owing to their religious creed. This is the reason why I feel more solicitude than might otherwise appear meet to have the religious community set right on this point.[3]

But that Happer's ideas went far beyond mere passive disapproval is shown conclusively by this postscript to his letter to the mission secretary on May 21, 1853:

[1] Presb. Archives, Canton-Amoy 1845-64, nos. 316, 321, 331.

[2] *The Presbyterian*, vol. XXIII (July 16, 1853), no. 29.

[3] Presb. Archives, Canton-Amoy, 1845-64, no. 315.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> Could you see President Pierce and recommend the appointment of a Com. to England to confer on a limited interference of England and U. S. . . . Years of bloodshed will intervene before peace is attained otherwise than by Foreign Interference. . . . The U. S. Squardon [*sic*] on the Japan Expedition and the exploration of N. E. coast and seas would be nearly sufficient to sittle [*sic*] the country if joined with the Imperialists. I would *prefer* that there should be no *allusion* to the contents of this in the mission letter from you.[1]

The motives of the Interventionists were of course humanitarian like those of the sympathizers; the only difference being that the former regarded the Taipings as Devils instead of Angels. It might further be noted that eventual intervention was not at all unexpected. Rev. H. V. Rankin (Presbyterian, Ning-po) wrote in his Journal as early as April 17, 1853: "It seems to be quite evident that this whole matter will eventually be terminated on one side or the other by foreign interference";[2] and Rev. E. W. Syle (Episcopal, Shanghai) at the close of the year, referring to the rescue of the Taotai of Shanghai by foreigners, says: "It remains to be seen whether, on the same plea, (and it is a good plea,) of *humanity*, foreigners will not be constrained to interfere on a larger scale."[3]

I think the above summary of "pre-*Susquehanna*" missionary opinion will justify Johnson's statement (Hong Kong, October 10, 1853) that "Indeed there is here every variety of opinion in reference to the Insurgents and what is to be expected from them";[4] or as our commissioner Humphrey Marshall so delightfully put it in regard to the visit of the *Hermes* to Nanking: "Sir George Bonham entertains one idea from his opportunities of observation; the captain of the Hermes entertains exactly an opposite view; while the secretary of his excellency believes in yet another, which he expresses freely."[5]

[1] *Ibid.*, no. 311.

[2] *Home and Foreign Record*, vol. IV (Oct., 1853), p. 306.

[3] *Spirit of Missions*, vol. XIX (Mar., 1854), p. 91.

[4] Baptist Archives, Johnson to Peck, Oct. 10, 1853.

[5] *House Exec. Doc. 123, 33-1*, p. 112.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As indicated above, the visit to Nanking of the U. S. S. *Susquehanna* marks a turning-point in our relations with the Taipings. In view of this fact, it is interesting to notice what effect this visit had on American missionary opinion. First as to Bridgman and Culbertson, who accompanied McLane on the expedition.

Dr. Bridgman published a report under thirteen headings in the *North China Herald* for July 22, 1854, prefaced by a statement that "to the missionary, and in view of the vast population of the empire, they [the rebels] have a thousand times more interest than words can express." He notes that their form of government is a politico-religious despotism claiming universal sovereignty; and that: "Their *religious creed*, though it may recognize, in some sort, all or most of the doctrines of the Bible, is, through ignorance or perverseness, or *both*, grievously marred with error."[1]

Mr. Culbertson also tried to see the bright side, noting that: "It is possible that they mean no more by calling him [the Taiping Wang] the 'brother of Jesus' than is meant by the expression 'son of heaven' applied to the emperors of China";[2] and again: "Especially are we thankful that the Insurgents, with all their errors, are publishing the Bible, and giving it out to their followers, without note or comment, as the pure word of God."[3] On the other hand, the following passage from his "Narrative" (June 5) is significant: "There are claims to universal supremacy, which will, if persisted in, prevent any foreign power from entering into treaty with them. . . . The spirit of fanaticism seems to be increasing with the success of their arms. . . . The above facts tend to increase the fears, rather than the hopes, which have been entertained with regard to the immediate effect of this revolutionary movement."[4] This missionary's actions apparently were consistent with his words, for Bishop W. J. Boone (Episcopal, Shanghai) tells us: "Mr. Culbertson was of the opinion that he [an officer at

[1] Fishbourne, *Impressions of China*, pp. 281-94, 343.

[2] *Sen. Exec. Doc. 22, 35-2*, p. 83.

[3] Presb. *Annual Report*, 1855, p. 73.

[4] *Home and Foreign Record*, vol. V (Nov., 1854), pp. 338, 340.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nanking] would insist upon his doing obeisance to Thaie-ping-wang; he therefore refused to await his return."[1] A month later Culbertson again expresses his disappointment: "The fanaticism displayed I am not much surprised at, though I *did* hope for better things."[2]

Besides those missionaries who, like Bridgman and Culbertson, modified their views, two other classes were apparent: those who refused to change their opinion, and those oppositionists who made the most of the opportunity to declare, "I told you so!" Of the former, two distinguished examples may be cited. W. A. P. Martin in 1856 addressed a series of open letters to Caleb Cushing in the United States,

> showing that in rapine and cruelty the Tai Pings only conformed to the historic type of Chinese revolutionary bodies; that in the principles they professed lay the germ of a new order of things, such as it would be vain to expect from a superannuated dynasty running in the grooves of precedent; but asking for them nothing more than the observance of a strict neutrality.[3]

Then of course there was Issachar J. Roberts, whose unfortunate exploits as the Taiping Foreign Minister from 1860 to 1862 cannot be dealt with here.

The greatest satisfaction from the visit was obviously obtained by the determined minority who for a couple of years had been looked down upon by their more optimistic colleagues. For as Happer had written on December 24, 1853: "I perceive that my view of the insurrection is very unpopular at home as it is his. [*sic.*]. . . . And when the unauthorized expectations that have been excited are found to be vain then there will be a collapse of feeling and too little interest be felt in China."[4] On August 3, 1854, he is able to say: "And I think you will now conclude that my opinions of the movement were not too unfavorable; and that there was no reason to fear

[1] *Spirit of Missions,* vol. XIX (Oct., 1854), p. 397.

[2] Presb. Archives, Shanghai 1850-64, no. 103 (July 14, 1854).

[3] Martin, *Cycle of Cathay,* p. 133.

[4] Presb. Archives, Canton-Amoy 1845-64, no. 328.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

my usefulness among the Chinese would be injured in consequence of my opinions in regard to the insurrection. To my mind, my worst forbodings have been more than realized."[1]

It is interesting to note that a number of missionaries now came forward who, though not belonging to the opposition group of pre-*Susquehanna* days, declared that such had all along been their real feeling. Johnson wrote on July 4: "The view which I at first and all along have presented to you is more than confirmed as new facts are brought to light. I have all along feared to express all I felt and feared as accounts so widely different were sent abroad and avidiously seized upon and believed."[2] Bishop Boone says (July 13): "Their tone was one of scorn for the *ignorance* of those with whom they were holding intercourse. This I always expected. . . ."[3] An interesting sidelight on the Bishop is shown in an article by a member of Russell and Company, published in September, 1855, which says:

> Of the English and American missionaries in China, the most intelligent have abandoned their belief, where entertained, in the sincerity of Tae-ping-wang, and we can especially instance the opinion of the Rt. Rev. Bishop Boon [*sic*], the head of the American Episcopal Mission, one of the most sagacious minds that have visited China, and certainly not surpassed in intelligence by any now there.[4]

Finally there is S. Wells Williams, who wrote in 1864: "I had no faith in this rebellion from the outset, as likely to form a means of promoting the truth, for there was no adequate cause for insuring such a result."[5]

[1] Presb. Archives, Canton-Amoy, 1845-64, no. 347.

[2] Baptist Archives, Hong Kong, July 4, 1854.

[3] *Spirit of Missions*, vol. XIX (Dec., 1854), p. 568.

[4] Cunningham, *Hunt's Mag.*, vol. XXIII (Sept., 1855), p. 279.

[5] F. W. Williams, *Life of S. W. Williams*, p. 356.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III.

"It has been a question of some importance to us," wrote Mr. Wight on June 1, 1853, "whether we ought not to try to make the insurgents a visit. . . . The great difficulty in going is in getting mixed up in a political controversy with which we should not like to have the truth stand or fall. At present however there is no reaching them except through the camp of the Imperialists."[1] Another obstacle was the Act of Congress of August 11, 1848, which enacted; "That murder and insurrection, or rebellion against the Chinese government, with intent to subvert the same, shall be capital offences, punishable with death";[2] and it was not until December 5, 1854, that McLane modified the law to make any participation in the struggle a "high misdemeanor," punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than three years.[3] A further danger was pointed out by the English writer Macfarlane in 1853:

> such attempts, however commendable in spirit, and however prudently set about, are clearly against rule, and therefore the Chinese authorities are entitled to complain. Indeed we are not sure that, as consorters with rebels, the offenders might not be dealt with irrespective of treaty stipulations making foreigners amenable to their own authorities.[4]

Despite all these dangers, three American missionaries had sufficient religious fervor to risk their lives in the attempt.

Dr. Charles Taylor gives a full account of his visit in his book *Five Years in China*, not published until 1860. Feeling that "it was exceedingly desirable that they should have the New Testament especially, from which to learn the doctrines of a pure and perfect Christianity," and although "they were closely besieged on land and blockaded on the river by the numerous forces of the imperialists, cutting off all communica-

[1] Presb. Archives, Shanghai, 1850-64, no. 72.

[2] *U. S. Statutes at Large*, vol. IX (1845-50), p. 278.

[3] *Sen. Exec. Doc. 32, 34-1*, pp. 1-4.

[4] Macfarlane, *Chinese Revolution*, pp. 155-6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion with them from without, I determined, however, to make the attempt to reach them." The first attempt was made in May, 1853, with a native assistant; they had passed the imperialist fleet in the dark. "We were hailed several times and threatened with being fired upon. I had enjoined perfect silence . . . and said, 'let them fire'—they are poor marksmen at best, for it is seldom they can hit an object in the daytime, and it is not likely they can hit us in this dark night!" But the boatman refused to go near the rebel stronghold of Chinkiang, so the attempt was a failure.

On his second attempt, Taylor left Shanghai on June 2, 1853, "taking a carpet-bag and another coarse bag, both filled with copies of the Gospels, and other tracts." This time he was more successful; a blockade of nearly a hundred war junks was run and, the boatman again proving timorous, Taylor proceeded with the carpet-bag on foot to Chinkiang, "against the earnest entreaties of my companions", and braving the resentment aroused in the garrison by the shelling they had received from the *Hermes* in April. The Doctor, however, was welcomed as "Yang shoong dee" (foreign brother), "a term of civility and affection never before applied to foreigners in China", and taken to the Commander. The fact that the rebels made offerings to the Trinity, Taylor wrote, "is proof positive that they had as yet no *knowledge* of the *New* Testament—a want which I supplied as far as practicable on that visit, with what effect time only can reveal." In fact, Taylor made three trips to and from his boat, two miles distant, to get tracts, and had to pass close by the Imperialist lines. The latter happening to launch an attack, the rebels naturally regarded Dr. Taylor as a spy. "*It is a marvel that they did not take my life* [italics mine]. They had promised me an escort to Nanking, but I knew this would not now be allowed, so to relieve them, I prepared to depart." The General had the carpet-bag filled with Taiping books and proclamations, wrote a friendly letter for Taylor to deliver to the "foreign brethren" at Shanghai, and provided a large escort. "We parted with many expressions of good feeling and urgent requests on their part, that I would soon visit them again."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hence the third visit:

> I was unwilling to leave the insurgents with the impression which they evidently entertained respecting myself, and therefore resolved to attempt removing it by still another visit. So on setting out the third time, I took the medicines and a small case of surgical instruments, which I had brought with me from Shanghai. [Medical aid was duly rendered.] Thus did I flatter myself with the hope of becoming partially, at least, reinstated in their good opinion.[1]

Dr. Taylor fails, however, to mention his subsequent tilt with Humphrey Marshall, the American Commissioner, who was anything but enthusiastic about the visit. Taylor had promised in the *North China Herald* of June 11 to publish an account of his trip next week.

> But in the next paper an announcement appeared from Dr. Taylor, that considerations arising from his relations as a citizen of the United States, render it advisable to withhold his narrative from publication. This is regarded by the editor of the Friend of of China [Hong Kong] as the result of an arbitrary interference of the American Commissioner, worthy of an Imperial autocrat. The North China Herald, notwithstanding this interdict, published an abstract of the history of Dr. Taylor's journey.[2]

Marshall, on his part, delivered himself of the following on June 21:

> It is very difficult to restrain the missionaries. I know personally of one of them having gone to Chinkianfoo, and having been entertained for two days as the guest of the military commandant of the insurgent forces. . . . [He] told me enough to have established his guilt, under the law of 1848, of a *capital offence* [italics mine] (of which, however, I believe he was at the time ignorant), were he put upon his trial for the crime. I directed the vice-consul to address him a letter cautioning him . . . to abstain from publishing as he proposed to do, an account of his adventure. . . . These men go out "*to preach the Gospel*," but

[1] Taylor, *Five Years in China,* pp. 329-360.

[2] *Boston Advertiser,* vol. LXXXII (Oct. 3, 1853), no. 80.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> their hearts are enlisted in the cause of the rebels; and in the case I have alluded to, the conduct of the party in giving advice as to military movements, and in supplying a pistol and spy-glass to the chief, and "in leaving an American musket in the camp," were acts of the most reprehensible character.[1]

Simultaneously, Marshall had another serious cause for worry in Rev. Issachar Roberts, who addressed him from Canton, May 30, a letter telling of the Taiping Emperor's invitation to "come and assist, that the Gospel may be made plain, baptism (immersion) may be received [Roberts being a Baptist], and the truth published." Roberts goes on to say:

> Now, having maturely considered this matter, and believing, from what I know of the case, that it would be difficult to occupy a more important or useful station, I feel inclined to go to him at the earliest practicable moment; therefore I beg leave to propose the following inquiries to you in your official capacity: 1. Would it be against the law of nations, or would I subject myself to the censure of our own laws, to go to him immediately, in the capacity of a minister of the Gospel, merely to preach to him and his followers the unsearchable riches of Christ? . . .

To which Marshall replied on June 20:

> I should consider your going to Nankin to preach to the followers of Tienteh as a violation of the neutrality the government of the United States desires to observe in the pending contest among the Chinese, of the law of 1848, and of the spirit of the treaty between the United States and China. . . . I will say that, in my opinion, the camp of the insurgents, and the moment when the sceptre of empire trembles in the balance, are neither fit place nor time for you or others—the citizens of a friendly power—to seize upon to display to the followers of Tienteh "the unsearchable riches of Christ."

And in a final burst of rhetoric Marshall declares that Roberts' life will lose its "lustre and perfume"

> whenever you blend with the surplice of the priest the robes of

[1] *House Exec. Doc. 123, 33-1,* pp. 183-4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the political reformer, and seek a proper theatre for your ministrations of the Gospel amidst the flaunting banners and glistening spears of men whose energies are centred upon the task of overthrowing the dynasty which rules their country.[1]

Roberts gives his side in his 1853 Circular, already referred to:

I felt constrained to go. How much this was like the Apostle's invitation—"Come over into Macedonia (Nanking) and help us!" Acts 16:9. Missionaries at Hong Kong and Shanghae wrote to me advising and persuading me to go; a merchant in Canton offered me a free passage to go; a society in England sent me $100 specially helping me to go; I was deeply impressed with the duty to go, and ultimately, after due and prayerful consideration and consultation, I *resolved*, the Lord helping me, that I would go!

So, having doubtless received Marshall's not altogether encouraging reply, and possibly reflecting on one's respective duties to God and to Caesar, Roberts proceeded to Shanghai, arriving July 30, and, so he says, went with Dr. Taylor to Chinkiang where they were impeded by the imperial fleet and had to return. "We have continued here ever since, having had no opportunity of proceeding to Nanking, and neither the will nor the pecuniary means to return!" His Baptist church at Canton had come to an end that summer.

This seemed to be an indication of providence that the pastor should leave and accept the higher call of usefulness at Nanking which had been offered him. This unpromising termination of his labors at Canton did not discourage nor leave him without hope that he had been instrumental during his sixteen years labor in China of saving a few souls at the south both native and foreign; but he hopes to be instrumental in the salvation of many more at the Capital: and hence he is now waiting with prayerful anxiety for an opportunity to proceed thither & enter upon his work with both hands. Never were our prospects for usefulness, with God's blessing, brighter. They almost dazzle![2]

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 185-8.

[2] Presb. Archives, Shanghai 1850-64, no. 87.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Roberts, however, did manage to get himself somewhat more involved in the rebellion in connection with the following episode: he arrived in Shanghai "accompanied by two young rebel princes, the son and nephew of the southern king [one of the Taiping leaders]. These youths had by some means been separated from the army as it marched northward, and were afterwards smuggled into Canton to be taken to Nankin in Mr Roberts's care." Both died before Roberts finally reached Nanking.[1]

The third of the early attempts to visit the rebels was that of W. A. P. Martin. "Feeling that missionaries should try to open communication with this interesting people," he says, "I obtained the consent of my brethren, that I should make the attempt."[2] But that this statement was something of an exaggeration is shown in a letter of June 7, 1853, from Dr. D. B. McCartee of the same mission, who had been out in China nine years as compared with Martin's three:

> Some of our brethren are very enthusiastic on the subject, and Brother W. Martin has already determined to go among them notwithstanding his ignorance of their language, but thinking he could easily acquire enough Mandarin in ten days. Brother Way, Brother Quarterman and myself strongly advised delay, at least until the brethren at Shanghai thought the attempt could be made with some hope of success.

McCartee summarizes his objections as follows:

> First, the doubtful practicability of accomplishing the object in view. The English Interpreter Meadows who speaks Mandarin fluently and was disguised as a Chinese and assisted by the Roman Catholics, was unable to evade the Imperial scouts & was sent back. Second. The difficulty of getting a trustworthy guide or guides—the danger in which those accompanying him would be involved, if detected, and the utter helplessness of one unacquainted with any but the Ningpo dialect if left alone among strangers who could not tell whether he like the Portuguese was

[1] Foster, *Fifty Years in China,* pp. 70, 81.

[2] Presb. Archives, Ningpo 1845-53, no. 259.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the Imperialist side or on that of the rebels. Third. Rebellion against the Emperor of China is *death* by the laws of the U. S. A. The success of the rebels is as yet doubtful. . . . Is it prudent to involve ourselves or implicate the cause of Missions in China in a *rebellion* against the lawful sovereign of the country? or for a brother to risk his own life in addition, when the issue is doubtful? Fourth. The people indeed profess Christianity, but no persecution it seems to me would justify an attempt to dethrone the Emperor, or to slaughter indiscriminately men, women and children who have never injured them. . . . Could we hold up their hands or justify them in these things? and would a man be welcome, who should seek to dissuade them? When the way *is* open to reach them without risking the cause, there are those of us who are ready and willing to risk life if necessary to try and do them good.[1]

Nothing daunted, Martin made the attempt, of which he gives a frank account in *A Cycle of Cathay*. "I too resolved to see for myself. . . . These preparations [to run the blockade] were made with the utmost secrecy, the American minister having forbidden his countrymen to hold communication with the rebels; and to elude the vigilance of the United States marshal, I put to sea from Woosung in a thunder-storm." Chinese soldiers took him for one of the foreign officers of the Imperialist fleet. "If they had taken the trouble to search, they might have found on my person a compromising document—nothing less, indeed, than a letter *tendering my services to the rebel chief* [italics mine]. No sooner were their backs turned than I promptly destroyed it." As the men refused to take him to the rebel outposts, he returned. Martin's conclusion, after the lapse of forty-three years, was: "My attempt was certainly foolhardy, and well it was that it failed."[2]

In his letters to his Board, Martin is of course more reserved, though he does say in regard to eluding the Imperialist soldiers that, "As they asked no questions, I did not feel bound to correct their mistake";—and half a year later:

[1] *Ibid.*, no. 260.

[2] Martin, *Cycle of Cathay*, pp. 129-31.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> the same feeling which inclined me to seek a foreign in preference to a home field, now impels me to look for a new sphere of labor. . . . Last summer . . . I made a trip up the Yangtze-kiang, with the hope of being able to labor six months or a year among the Insurgents. . . . If therefore the revolution should terminate favorably, I should be glad to have your permission to go and labor among those whom I then attempted to reach even at the risk of my life.[1]

It is interesting to notice the reaction of Martin's Home Board. The reply to McCartee's letter was

> We think it premature in the present state of the contest, for missionaries to visit the camp of the insurgents. . . . This cannot be done without the appearance of taking sides with them. . . . Strict neutrality on the part of the missionaries, both in appearance and reality, is the wisest course at present.

As to the later news of Martin's journey: "We read with much interest Mr. Martin's account of his attempted visit to the Insurgents, as they are called. We would have voted against his going, if we had been there, because of the risk in the present state of the contest."[2]

IV.

"It is not without some forebodings of danger to Protestant union", wrote the Bishop of Victoria (Hong Kong), "that I contemplate the wider opening of this Empire to Missions. The representatives of every sect will then probably hasten to the headquarters of the new dynasty."[3] That the Lord Bishop's apprehensions were not altogether unfounded will be seen in the following discussion of the relation of the Rebellion to five of the outstanding contemporary mission controversies.

First, there is the perennial "Term Question"—what Chinese term to use for God. It will be obvious that what expression the Taipings used in their religious publications would have a tremendous interest for missionaries, harrassed as they were

[1] Presb. Archives, Ningpo 1845-53, no. 259; 1854-64, no. 5.

[2] *Ibid.*, Ningpo Records, pp. 141, 145.

[3] *Missionary Register* (London), Mar. 1855, p. 123.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over this endless theological debate. Roberts reports about Hung that "For GOD he uses BOTH the terms [*shangti* and *shin*] which have been so much contended about. In this I think he is more than half right & hope he will persevere."[1] Two missionaries published special pamphlets on the new angle given to the subject by the rebellion.

Culbertson's essay, published in December, 1853, is entitled "Essays on the bearing of the publications of the Tai-Ping Dynasty Insurgents on the controversy respecting the proper term for translating the words *Elohim* and *Theos* in the Chinese version of the scriptures." His conclusion is as follows: "We think we have now clearly shown that, in the opinion of the insurgents, *Shin* is, and *Shangti* is not, the generic term for *god* in Chinese." As regards greater mission harmony he adds, "We think we see a preparation for such a consummation in the powerful umpire so unexpectedly and so wonderfully raised up in the persons of these Christianized reformers, whose writings we have been considering."[2] Mr. Peet, in his pamphlet published December 20, 1853, comes to the same conclusion, and adds:

> The compromise which I would now humbly submit, is simply this, that the different names in Chinese for the Divine Being advocated by each party, be accepted and adopted by both as they are defined, and employed in the publications of the T'hai-Ping Dynasty. . . . Such a compromise will open the way for the friends of the Bible cause . . . to come forward with more freedom with their "liberality" which "was ready" more than "a year ago", but they "lacked opportunity."[3]

Apparently the Taipings merely followed the usage of the pioneer Gutzlaff. Happer says, "I do not consider the example of the Leader of the insurrection at Nanking of any authority in regard to Shangti for he only continued to use what he found in the books"; but he adds, inconsistently

[1] Presb. Archives, Shanghai 1850-64, no. 87.

[2] *Foreign Missionary*, vol. XIII (Mar., 1855), p. 298.

[3] Amer. Board Archives, Amoy-Foochow 1846-59, no. 350.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enough: "But his usage of shin in the sense we use it shows that such a usage is consonant to the genius of the language."[1] Culbertson's hope that "this controversy, which has given rise to so much discussion, may now be considered as finally settled"[2] would therefore possibly have proved vain even if the rebellion had succeeded. As it was, we have this illuminating comment by McCartee, March 31, 1855:

> Brother Martin has I think got over his anxiety to use Shangte for God. He told me that if the Kwangse insurrection should not be successful, he would avoid the use of that term more carefully than even Teen Choo (the term used by the Romanists) as he thinks it would identify us with a fallen cause.[3]

A second mission controversy affected was that regarding immersion, as championed by the Baptists. As Culbertson put it (November 19, 1853): "By the way our Baptist friends have stolen a march upon us in reference to these men and will be likely to have considerable influence in forming the views of the leaders. It seems they practice baptism by immersion but do it frequently, each one baptizing himself after the first time."[4] In his Circular Letter Roberts says, emphasizing his remark with a rough sketch of a hand pointing to it: "I am very happy to be able to report that the word he uses for baptism—immerse—is the right word according to the judgment of Messrs. Gutzlaff, Goddard, and Roberts! I hope he will persevere in using it until the end."[5]

Dr. D. J. Macgowan of Ningpo, himself a Baptist, says of the Taiping rite: "But as they knew that sprinkling and immersion were both practised by Christian teachers at Canton they appear to hold merely that the latter is preferable, & that one may perform it on himself."[6] W. A. P. Martin later

[1] Presb. Archives, Canton-Amoy, 1845-64, no. 356.

[2] *Home and Foreign Record,* vol. IV (Nov., 1853), p. 340.

[3] Presb. Archives, Ningpo 1854-64, no. 52.

[4] *Ibid.,* Shanghai 1850-64, no. 83.

[5] *Ibid.,* no. 87.

[6] Baptist Archives, Macgowan (Feb., 1854?).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wrote, in discussing Roberts's subsequent precipitate flight from Nanking: "Did he give offense by seeking to induce them to adopt immersion and abandon the new mode of baptism which they had invented for themselves—viz., the washing of the bosom with a towel dipped in water, in token of cleansing the heart?"[1]

The Baptists themselves were split asunder over a third controversy—Sabbatarianism. The Baptist Mission in April, 1854, sent two native Christians to Nanking, but their two attempts both failed; the account adds that "This effort to place *Mr. Goddard's version* [Italics mine] of the New Testament in the hands of the insurgent chiefs proved, indeed, unsuccessful."[2] The point of this seems to be clear from the following earlier extract from the Seventh-Day Baptist Report for 1854; it says of Goddard's translation: "In 1 Cor. 15: 2, he has imitated most other Chinese translations, by rendering it, 'Every first day of the week, let each one investigate and store up, &c'; " and it objects to this translation of *Sabbatoon*.

The fact that the Taipings, literally following the Old Testament, kept the Sabbath, naturally aroused the enthusiasm of the Seventh-Day Baptists. As the latter expressed it:

> If this be so, the probability is, that guided by the simple language of the Fourth Commandment, which is plain enough to those whose minds are not already perverted by false teaching, the insurgents have become, in this respect too, an obedient people. . . . . Instead of abandoning their post, Bro. [Solomon] Carpenter and his teacher employed themselves in getting out a tract on the Sabbath question, designed especially for the Revolutionists, that they might be confirmed in their present practice of Sabbath-keeping.[3]

In 1853,—

> Brother Carpenter undertook, through their leader, to send a letter to the insurgents at Chung-keang [Chinkiang?], setting

[1] Martin, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-2.

[2] Baptist *Annual Report*, 1855, p. 99.

[3] Seventh-Day Baptist *Report*, 1853, pp. 15, 16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> forth our views of the Sabbath. He thinks that though he was assured that it should be sent, it never was. Nor has he, up to the last accounts, succeeded in sending it to them or seeing them in person. . . . They [the missionaries] have entertained the thought of making, if necessary, a perilous effort to reach the insurgent camp, that they might be able to resist any effort that might be made by others to turn them from the Sabbath.[1]

Further comment from the same source may be cited. "And when the 350,000,000 of China become Sabbatarians, what will become of the great knock-down majority argument, so much harped upon by the observers of the first day." And as regards the inevitable entrance into the controversy of our friend Issachar Roberts: "His very loose sentiments upon the Sabbath render him unfit for the work. It is hoped our missionaries will be on hand to counteract his anti-scriptural doctrines when he shall go."[2]

The three controversies so far discussed have been intra-Protestant ones; the fourth, on the value of distributing tracts and Bibles, involves the Roman Catholics. The Word of God, says Mr. Peet, is

> more to be relied upon in the present crisis, than all of the diplomacy, learning, professional skill, or mere human inventions which can be mustered on the broad field of the world. How then can we better contribute to hasten forward so glorious a consummation, than by uniting heart, and hand, with our Chinese "brethren" in giving to the entire nation the Word of God? In so doing, our onset, and our warfare, will be as simple as was the attack of Gideon and his men upon the hosts of Midian.[3]

Such an idea apparently stirred the British and Foreign Bible Society, for "it was resolved that the committee . . . are prepared to take upon themselves all the measures necessary for printing, with the least practicable delay, *One Million* copies of the Chinese New Testament."[4]

[1] Seventh-Day Baptist *Report*, 1854, pp. 9-10, 11.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 16.

[3] Amer. Board Archives, Amoy-Foochow, 1846-59, no. 350.

[4] *Missionary Advocate*, vol. IX (Dec., 1853), p. 66.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

That difficulties lay ahead was recognized even by the Protestants. Martin wrote: "As yet they are without competent instructors, and perhaps when they read the sacred volume, say with the Ethiopian, 'How can I understand except some man should guide me?'"[1] The Roman Catholics are of course much more severe; Wolferstan says: "There can be no doubt that the indiscriminate circulation of the Bible, aided by the 'inalienable right of private interpretation' thereof, is capable of producing the most disastrous material results. Of such a nature was the T'ai P'ing Rebellion."[2] Abbé Huc also has something to say on this subject. He states, perhaps erroneously,

> The Methodist [Protestant] ministers, who lie in ambush in all the five ports open to Europeans, having remarked that the prodigious quantity of Bibles furtively scattered along the shores of the Empire have not proved remarkably efficacious in working the conversion of the Chinese; have at last given up this harmless and useless system of Propagandism.

He further comments:

> The Chinese have also for a long time had at their command a precious collection of books of christian doctrine, composed by the ancient missionaries, and which, even in a purely literary point of view, are much esteemed in the Empire. These books are diffused in great numbers throughout all the provinces, and it is more probable that the Chinese innovators have drawn the ideas in question from these sources than from the Bibles prudently deposited by the Methodists on the seashore.[3]

Despite the Protestant division into partisans of sprinkling and partisans of immersion, and the subdivision of the latter into keepers of the Sabbath and keepers of Sunday, all presented a united front to the "Romanist peril"—the fifth pertinent controversy. Macgowan writes that "it is more than

[1] Presb. Archives, Ningpo 1845-53, no. 259.

[2] Wolferstan, *Catholic Church in China*, p. 105.

[3] Huc, *Chinese Empire*, pp. 511, xiv.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

possible priestly & diplomatic manoevring may eventually give the movement a direction Romeward";[1] and a typical mission report diplomatically touches on the subject: "If Protestant Christians do not occupy the ground, they may be sure that the great enemy of all religious light and progress will not be backward to do so."[2] MM. Callery and Yvan, representing such "enemy", to reciprocate with a delicate compliment, tell us that "a species of homily is circulated which is redolent of ultra-Methodism. It appears impossible to us that four kings laying their heads together—even four kings of China—could have produced anything so turgid and tiresome."[3]

V.

There is little direct evidence, so far as I have been able to discover, of missionary influence on the United States government's policy toward the Taipings. American public opinion, as might be expected, was vaguely sympathetic but ill-informed. At first there was little interest in China. Rankin complains, in his journal for April 1, 1853: "Home newspapers have not given sufficient prominence to the progress of the rebellion in China."[4] Soon, however, the interest became intense, as witness this passage quoted in the *Boston Advertiser* for June 27:

> It is well known that the last Congress placed the mission to China upon the highest grade known to our diplomacy. Since this action of Congress, new events have given to the mission a still more commanding character. There is at present no diplomatic station upon which the public eye, not only of our country but of all civilized nations, will be more intently fixed.[5]

The colossal ignorance of the American public was, then as now, a standing joke in China. Rev. William Dean (Baptist, Hong Kong) wrote—this was on February 20, 1851—"The

[1] Baptist Archives, Macgowan (Feb., 1854?).

[2] Amer. Board *Report,* 1853, pp. 124-5.

[3] Callery and Yvan, *Insurrection in China,* p. 212.

[4] *Home and Foreign Record,* vol. IV (Oct., 1853), p. 305.

[5] *Boston Daily Advertiser,* vol. LXXXI, no. 11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

public generally have such a relish for fable that facts are unacceptable, and the people have so often been entertained with extravagant and incorrect statements that sober expressions of truth are not listened to."[1] And a letter written on January 8, 1852, says: "*We* receive our most exciting Chinese intelligence *via* America or England. In regard then to these marvellous stories, receive them with a *stanch incredulity*."[2]

The government at Washington did not seem to be much better informed. The instructions to McLane (November 9, 1853) contain the words: "The revolution now in progress in that country [China] cannot fail to produce results of vast magnitude not only to China, but to the entire commercial world. The accounts do not furnish satisfactory information of its present condition, or enable us to conjecture, with any degree of certainty, what will be its result."[3] President Pierce's Message of December 5, 1853, has a similar passage: "The condition of China at this time renders it probable that some important changes will occur in that vast Empire which will lead to a more unrestricted intercourse with it."[4] As for the Commissioners on the spot, the only missionary influence seems to have been a negative one; we have seen that this was decidedly the case with Marshall, and may possibly have been true also of McLane, who was a Roman Catholic. So that it seems reasonable to conclude that the American missionaries in China, whose number was about double that of the English—the only other Protestant group of any size[5]—had no *direct* influence on either the American government or its Commissioners.

I shall conclude with a discussion of the opinion in which missionaries were held by outsiders. Humphrey Marshall is a good case to begin with. While in China he wrote (November 21, 1853) this delightful passage:

[1] Baptist Archives, Dean, Feb. 20, 1851.

[2] *Christian Advocate,* vol. XXVII (May 6, 1852), p. 74.

[3] *Sen. Exec. Doc. 39, 36-1,* p. 2.

[4] J. D. Richardson, *Messages of the Presidents,* vol. V, p. 210.

[5] S. W. Williams, *Missionary Advocate,* July, 1855.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> Certainly the cause of the rebellion seems now to be on the wane, and I shall not be surprised that they who have awakened the absurd conceptions of the Chinese rebellion which distinguish European and American publications on the subject, should, in their depression, under these palpable reverses, fall as far below just inferences from facts as heretofore their prurient enthusiasm has induced them to go beyond them. . . . I am convinced that Chinese writers and teachers not infrequently ascertain just such information as they perceive . . . will suit the taste of the party desiring information. The "news" so acquired, with all the extravagant deductions from it that zeal for the cause will naturally draw, is submitted to the western world, and by the time it has been polished with editorial varnish, and adjusted to suit the Christian predilections of Europe and America, the image is thrown back upon Asia.

And in regard to his aide, Dr. Peter Parker, the missionary-surgeon-diplomat (July 8, 1853): "He exhibits such enthusiasm for what he is pleased to call *the patriots of China*, as to make me apprehend that he may forget, in the sympathies of the missionary, the apathy necessary to a secretary of legation."[1] But if we are to take the view of Lieutenant Preble, Parker does not rightly belong in this study; for on November 18, 1853, he wrote: "The Doctor has cut the missionary, and seeks to shine as a diplomat. He has built himself a fine house, and is reputed to have increased his worldly wealth materially."[2] In view of Marshall's experiences with the missionaries, we can hardly blame him if his opinions are extreme!

As illustrating the Chinese Mandarin, the opinions of Li Hung Chang are interesting. He wrote in 1854 of the Taipings:

> They are rats of disease caught from the leprous missionaries of Canton, and they would run into all the holes of the centre and north and spread their vile malady. The lingering death should be applied to all those who have countenanced this foreign doctrine, or in any way aided the marauders.

[1] *House Exec. Doc. 123, 33-1*, pp. 309-10, 198.

[2] Preble's *Diary*, p. 81.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In 1865, at the continued success of the rebels:

> I hated the foreign religion more violently than all other scourges in the world; and I prayed and hoped that not alone would the Tai Pings be destroyed, but that earthquakes, eruptions of mountains, and terrible fevers would make the Christian nations without a man, a woman, or a child.

But fortunately for us he was able to write in 1870: "Tseng Kuo-fan, like myself, has changed his views exceedingly in the past five or six years, and is no longer a hater of the Christians."[1]

A grave charge against the judgment of the missionaries is contained in an article in *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine* for January, 1865, in regard to the Kan Wang, a rebel leader:

> His part in the drama seems to have been to worm himself into the confidence of the missionaries, and by deceiving them with regard to the quasi christianity, which the Taepings professed, to secure their influence in preventing "the actual operation of the foreign powers against their material progress." The service, which in this way, he rendered the rebel cause, appears to have been fully appreciated by the *Tien-wang*, and rewarded by an important office under his government. . . . Having displayed great skill in humbugging the foreigners, while connected with the [Christian] Union, he still continued to throw out to them the hope of extention of religion and the promotion of commercial interests, neither of which, he *very well knew*, would ever be realized.[2]

The following criticism by Lindley, an adventurer in the rebel service, is hardly justified in view of the facts summarized in an earlier part of this essay:

> Although vast sums of money are contributed in England, and expensive missions sent to people and countries that *will not profess;* how is it that *no attempt* has been made to help the millions at one time constituting the Ti-ping revolution, who not only *professed* Christianity as their principal object, but who

[1] *Memoirs of Li Hung Chang*, pp. 26, 31, 35.

[2] *Hunt's Mag.*, vol. LII (Jan., 1865), pp. 44-5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> fought, suffered, and died for it. . . . Whatever may have been the benefit of the missions hitherto, their wanton, cruel sacrifice of the greatest Christian movement this world has ever witnessed has dimmed their glory with a shadow all time cannot remove.[1]

On the other hand, there is the criticism of R. J. Forrest, which in view of the "humanitarian sympathy" discussed above, would seem equally unjustified: that the—

> missionaries might have been taught to despair of converting to any known or rational sect of the Christian faith one who was the uterine brother and equal of Christ, and to whom was confided by the Almighty personally the interpretation and establishment of the faith. . . . And it is very curious that a movement which in this our revolutionizing nineteenth century could most easily be defended on a dozen strong, almost unanswerable grounds, was defended only on its weakest and most ludicrous point, its grotesque Christianity!

Forrest goes on to tell the following story, which may or may not be symbolic of what the outsider thought of the missionary:

> To one American missionary he [Hung] sent a crown made of gilt pasteboard and a massive gold ring of considerable value. The recipient of these favours telling me the story said: "I at once sent back the paper crown to his majesty, saying that I lusted after a celestial and not a terrestrial crown, and quoted some texts bearing on the subject; but as I could recollect no text that had anything to say about celestial or terrestrial rings, I kept the bauble, and sold it at Shanghai for 70 taels [nearly $50]!"[2]

Inasmuch as the present study is only a brief chapter in the history of missionaries and politics, it is hardly possible to make broad generalizations on the subject. The following conclusion however may be ventured: missionaries inevitably become involved in local politics, especially in times of crisis where they see great moral issues; and in such a case their religious ardor

[1] "Lin-le", *Ti-ping Tien-kwoh*, pp. 285, 312.

[2] *Journ. N. Chi. Branch R. A. S.*, new ser., vol. IV (Dec., 1867), pp. 189, 196.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is likely to be such that nothing the local or their national government can do will effectively restrain them from attempting to carry out what they believe to be the Will of God.

The collapse of the Taiping Rebellion came when its Emperor destroyed himself by swallowing goldleaf; and over forty years more were to elapse before the effete Manchu Dynasty was finally overthrown and chaos subsequently reigned throughout the length and breadth of China. Once again the United States and China have been ringing with the clash of missionary opinions; again we have seen a "Christian Revolutionist" and a "Christian General." So it is now possible with thorough understanding to re-create from dusty mission records a host of living, earnest men—illustrating, albeit unconsciously, the time-honored interrelation of missionaries and politics.

JOHN B. LITTELL

WASHINGTON, D. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REVIEWS

L'Aventure italienne; légendes et réalités. By SILVIO TRENTIN. Paris, Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1928.—332 pp.

Italy and Fascismo. By LUIGI STURZO. Translated by Barbara Barclay Carter. New York, Harcourt Brace and Company, 1927.—ix, 305 pp. $3.75.

The Fascist Dictatorship in Italy, Vol. I. By GAETANO SALVEMINI. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1927.—319 pp. $3.00.

Fascism. By GIUSEPPE PREZZOLINI. Translated by Kathleen Macmillan. New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1927.—xiii, 201 pp. $2.50.

International Economic and Political Problems of the Day and Some Aspects of Fascism. By TOMMASO TITTONI. Translated by Baron Bernardo Quaranta di San Severino. London, Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent and Company, 1926. — xii, 290 pp. 10s., 6d.

The American public has been nurtured so exclusively upon the legendary aspects of Mussolini, through a generally sympathetic press, that only the selected speeches of H. E. the Hon. Tommaso Tittoni will have a familiar ring to their ears among all these critical expositions of Fascism. Naturally the same thing can not be said of an audience of scholars, to whom the works of Don Sturzo, of Professors Salvemini and Trentin, may be more palatable. The somewhat innocuous collection of the writings and addresses of Signor Tittoni on subjects as widely different as a memorial address on Stendahl, the defense of Fascism and the author's contributions to Italy's foreign policy, finds a sponsor in the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain, who acknowledges the dedication in an autograph letter redolent of the best Oxford Union manner. The volume itself is interesting only as a collection of rather miscellaneous documents, and for the incidental light that it sheds upon a change of heart in a man who could say in an earlier speech: "Political gossip, although it can temporarily cloud the clear vision

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of events, is dispersed by the waves of truth and light which in free states flow from free parliamentary debates," to eulogies of the Fascist system of complete repression. In fairness one ought to note that Signor Tittoni sometimes permits himself a critical attitude toward Fascist economic policies, based upon a wide acquaintance with foreign economic literature and a sound economic analysis. In May, 1925, he boldly opposed saddling Italy with foreign loans of a permanent nature, a policy which Mussolini has recently renounced only after "retiring" Count Volpi, a most successful negotiator of these loans, particularly from American sources. As speeches, these addresses are models of eloquence and of erudite allusion, in the Italian manner.

The other works under consideration are more formidable commentaries upon the nature and working of the Fascist régime. That of Signor Prezzolini is at once the most impartial and the most elementary. For Americans who have no knowledge of the background against which it is written its gossipy exposition of Fascist personalities and ideas may have a deceptive clarity. Its judgments generally seem to be conscientiously objective, in discipleship to Pareto, but so undocumented or so bady documented as to be worth only what the author's reputation makes them—and that is not to be taken too seriously, particularly on political questions. In order to bring the work up through 1926 the translator, Miss Macmillan, has added in a tone quite in keeping with that of the author, a very judiciously written, if sketchy, final chapter estimating the strength and weakness of Fascism, at home and abroad.

The works of Salvemini and of Don Sturzo are of a far more important order, not only because they come from the two most important *émigré* antagonists of Fascism who have escaped to an asylum in England, and not only because of the remarkable literary and scholarly gifts of the two men, but because they join to the intimate knowledge of events of two protagonists in the struggle against Fascism a quite unusual power of discriminating analysis, more objective, at least in the work of Don Sturzo, than one could have hoped from an exiled enemy of the régime.

Salvemini's book is an indictment, often savagely ironical in spite of its restraint, of the myths of the Fascist salvation of Italy from Bolshevism and economic and political chaos, but most of all of the Fascist "heroism" which applied the most savage coercive measures not only to a badly led proletariat but to "intellectuals" who dared to expose and oppose the Black Shirts publicly. The list of out-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rages and brutal cruelties is a formidable one, documented with the historian's thoroughness. The climax of the charges is the implication of Mussolini as at least an accomplice after the fact in shielding the murderers of Matteotti although Professor Salvemini presses the charges much farther. It is a book that bases its case largely on the moral question, with a promise to expose what is termed Fascist economic trickery and failure in another volume.

To the American reader the impact of this book may be less violent than Professor Salvemini has a right to hope, in spite of upsetting any preconceived ideas of the "silent and bloodless" character of the Fascist revolution. Not even a demonstration of Fascism's essential instability of program, or its puppet character will help. In the latter respect Professor Salvemini, unlike W. Bolitho and other hostile critics of Fascism, seems to feel that the strings were pulled in the 1921 phase, which was crucial, because of Mussolini's abandoning the proletariat for the bourgeoisie, by military men rather than by bankers and industrialists, and with the benevolent connivance of Giolitti and Bonomi. But all this imposing documentation of Fascist violence will hardly shock a public opinion in which a low idea of Italian popular restraint has been sedulously cultivated. In the second place, the justification by "results" as reported by tourists and investment bankers is much more important to public opinion generally than the question of origins and methods. The economic indictment of Fascism which is only foreshadowed in this volume, if it is successful, will cause a more profound sensation in America than any recital of outrages and arbitrary lawlessness on the part of those who have conquered the powers of the state in Italy. The latter are too easily represented as a necessary reaction against anarchy and Bolshevism to be exploded at a blast.

Don Luigi Sturzo, organizer and leader of the Catholic democratic Popolari Party, which conquered nearly one hundred seats in the Chamber in the first elections after its foundation in 1919, has written what is still the most temperate and able analysis of the Fascist conquest of power that has yet appeared in English, focussed largely on the part played by the Popolari. This priest and champion of the peasantry and workers and secretary of the radically democratic Popolari Party did far more in the turbulent years of 1919 and 1920 than did Mussolini (who really made advances to the workers who occupied the factories with a view to an alliance) to kill any possibility of a Bolshevist Italy. Finding the papacy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

after the War more than ever willing to lift its ban on the political activity of the Church in Italian politics to at least the degree of permitting the organization of the almost wholly Roman Catholic *Partito Popolare* as a bulwark against Socialist political domination, Don Sturzo backed Wilsonian principles and a decentralized, democratic state, in which the rights of the classes and Communes should be defended by means of proportional representation. The leaderless peasantry flocked to his lead as to a shepherd's. Proportional representation forms one of the corner-stones of Don Sturzo's faith. In common with Salvemini, he denies that it had any part (such as is attributed to it by many critics) in bringing about the parliamentary impasse which admittedly weakened every ministry, including the final Facta Cabinet that had to watch impotently the Fascist March on Rome. Both Salvemini and Don Sturzo see in P. R. the agency through which a remnant of liberalism was saved in the trying post-war years. They possibly overlook the fact that even a Socialist majority party in power would have been sobered by responsibility to the degree of carrying on a responsible government. Don Sturzo regards the passage of Mussolini's curious Electoral Reform Bill under which a Fascist minority gained two-thirds of the Chamber as the final blow to parliamentary liberties, and one which made possible the subsequent "most Fascist laws" which practically put Italy under a state of martial law, entailing the suppression of the whole machinery of civil liberty.

Don Sturzo's book is noteworthy for its historical perspective, for its appeal for a liberalization of the attitude of the papacy, and for its clear grasp of the position of Italy in the whole context of its European setting. As a loyal Catholic, despite his tacit repudiation at the hands of the Church, he approves the element of religious education introduced by Gentile, and the early program of liberty for the schools. The subsequent Fascist regimentation and suppression of the Catholic young people's societies, however, showed the unreality of the Catholic advantage thus gained. He declares that there was never any connection between the Church and the Popolari, yet he seems to admit that Mussolini's acceptance of religious instruction must have been the final concession which turned the papacy against the active participation of the clergy in politics and which consequently tolled the knell of the Popolari. It is evidently a little painful to Don Sturzo to be accused of having dictated the policy of the party's one hundred deputies. He shows that, in spite of his own repugnance to any collaboration with Giolitti, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Popolari had supported that oldest and shrewdest of the manipulators of ministries. How great a part Don Sturzo had in the final "veto on Giolitti" in 1922, which forced the weak compromise on the Facta ministry, it would be hard to tell. Probably, in any event, Giolitti would have waited as supinely for events to shape themselves as did his lieutenant, Facta.

Don Sturzo prepares the way for a better understanding of subsequent events by showing how Fascism liquidated the unfortunate crisis of the banks which had resulted in the failures of the Ansaldo and of the Banca di Sconto and the crisis of the Banco di Roma. By the formation of the Consortium of Industrial Securities that took over the deficit of about six milliards, the Treasury intervened through the banks of issue (the Banca d'Italia, Banco di Napoli, and Banco di Sicilia) thus practically expanding the negotiable circulation for trade purposes by that sum, under a tax-free arrangement and guarantee by the Treasury. Naturally industrialists and bankers applauded, and the share-holders of the Banco di Roma were able to sell their shares at a high premium. One is reminded of Hamilton.

The chief value of Signor Trentin's contribution is in the extensive documentation, rare among works either opposing or favoring Fascism, with which he supports his attack upon the economic system imposed by Mussolini upon Italy. The charge that Italy has been, to a very large degree, "colonialized" by huge foreign borrowings, both public and private, is supported by a detailed analysis. The stabilization of the lira at a figure dictated by a desire for prestige rather than on a sound economic basis comes in for examination. His conclusion is that not only have the Fascist "reforms" not improved on an economic situation which was being well handled (contrary to the usual legends) by the parliamentary governments up to 1922, but that actually Fascism has overstrained the economic mechanism of Italy by a debt-service item far beyond its powers and by a protectionist program for an artificially stimulated heavy industry. In short, while the Minister of Education is forming the minds of Italian youth in the most chauvinistic moulds, the Fascist masters of Italy have bound future generations to an economic servitude of the most humiliating type. The picture is doubtless overdrawn, but it is worth considering as an offset to the usual uncritical eulogies of Fascist finance.

W. Y. ELLIOTT

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Prohibition: Its Industrial and Economic Aspects. By HERMAN FELDMAN. New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1927.—xv, 415 pp. $2.00.

It is to be regretted that this excellent book has received so little attention. To those who are seeking the facts on this controversial subject, Professor Feldman's volume may be recommended as one of the most careful and unbiased surveys of the Prohibition question which has yet appeared.

Professor Feldman's first conclusion contradicts the prevailing impression that America was growing more temperate before national Prohibition. He quotes the official figures of the *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, which give the consumption per capita for 1900-04, 1905-09 and 1910-14 as follows: distilled spirits, 1.36, 1.43 and 1.46 gallons; wine, .47, .57 and .60 gallons; beer, 16.94, 19.46 and 20.38 gallons, respectively. The periods here covered were before the great wave of state prohibition was felt. In addition to the obvious explanation that "dry" cities and states are moistened by neighboring "wet" cities, he attributes the growth in drinking to the great increase in immigration, which increased the proportion of adults, especially from countries where drinking was habitual. During the same period "consumption of liquor in England, Germany and France was either declining or increasing less rapidly."

The author finds a great increase in the consumption of milk and soft drinks since Prohibition. As to tea and coffee, "the per capita consumption of tea since prohibition has decreased, while the per capita consumption of coffee was slightly higher in 1921-1925 than at any other period." The great increase in ice-cream consumption is partly attributable to Prohibition. Official reports and surveys show that drug addiction, so frequently asserted to have increased alarmingly, has tended to decline under Prohibition.

Garnishments have decreased greatly since Prohibition. Workmen now neither squander their earnings in the saloons nor avoid so doing by having their wives draw their pay envelopes for them. The saloon as the "poor man's club" has been replaced by the movies, graphophones, radios and "flivvers".

Like all other economists, so far as I can learn, irrespective of their approval or disapproval of Prohibition as a whole, Professor Feldman finds it a factor in American prosperity. He quotes, as typical of employers generally, a statement by a New York builder to the effect that the sums spent for illicit liquor are only a small

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fraction of what would be spent under the saloon system. The burden of poverty has been eased, installment buying of necessities and comforts has been greatly increased, and workers have become more dependable under Prohibition.

Professor Feldman reminds his readers that Prohibition was enforced by certain private companies on a growing scale from the middle of the last century. Many hundreds of firms strictly forbade their employees the use of intoxicants, either entirely or when on duty or in certain occupations. The railroad companies were among the first and most drastic prohibitionists. In all industries restrictions are growing more widespread and more severe. Industrial prohibition shows no signs of relaxation, whatever may be the attitude of the captains of industry personally toward the Volstead Act and the 18th Amendment.

Discharges for drunkenness have greatly decreased, and the employer who asserts that conditions are worse is quite exceptional. The traditional "Blue Monday" of industry, which made a virtual five-day week long before Mr. Ford discovered it, has disappeared. Lost time from overindulgence is greatly lessened. The weight of testimony credits to Prohibition the decrease in industrial accidents formerly due to liquor.

More regular work, greater mental alertness, fewer accidents have contributed in large degree to the increased productivity of American industry. Mr. Hoover has attributed to Prohibition an increase of upwards of ten per cent in the efficiency of American labor. My own estimate in *Prohibition at its Worst* was a minimum of five per cent. Professor Feldman, while not arguing for a lower or a higher minimum, asserts that experiments on a much larger scale and under much more rigorous control must be made before trustworthy conclusions can be reached as to the effects of drinking upon individual efficiency in industry. While admitting the justice of much of Professor Feldman's criticisms, I may point out that he has himself made a slip by making me say that "prohibition has increased the workers' output in this country by at least ten per cent"—double my estimate, or guess.

Professor Feldman conservatively and consistently refrains from putting his own conclusions into figures, but he shows emphatically that there has been a marked improvement. He quotes Professor Carver of Harvard, who asserts that Prohibition has promoted a healthy mobility of labor upward from overcrowded, low-paid occupations into better-paid ones. The testimony of Mrs. Bruêre

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

supports the evidence showing the beneficial effects of Prohibition upon workers.

The most interesting part of Professor Feldman's book to me is chapter xix, "Has Prohibition Increased Auto Accidents?" The opponents of Prohibition have exulted over the fact that drunken drivers, according to the records, have increased out of all proportion to the increase in the number of automobiles. The crudities, fallacies and falseness in the figures given out by Mr. Stanley Shirk of the Moderation League under the guise of "statistics" are shown up. Doubling the traffic density quadruples the chances of accident instead of merely doubling them. Closed cars have increased from 10 per cent of all manufactured in 1919 to fully 72 per cent in 1926. Consequently, driving in bad weather on slippery, dangerous roads has increased in corresponding ratio. Much of the increase in automobile accidents is apparent only and must be attributed to better records. Under all these circumstances it would seem fairer to study the *relative* importance of drunkenness as compared with other causes of accidents. Total fatal auto accidents for 1914-1919 were .0024 per car, while for 1920-1926 the ratio was .0011, less than half that of the pre-prohibition period. Despite the greater mileage and higher speeds today, the greater wet weather driving and the enormously greater number of other cars passed and correspondingly increased chances for accidents, it requires 1000 cars to kill a person today while only 500 cars per fatality was the average in pre-Prohibition days. If we could get reliable statistics of fatalities per mile driven, the showing would be even more favorable.

This improvement might be wholly due to better brakes, better traffic regulations, and safety work. But, according to the tables, it came suddenly with Prohibition in 1920 both in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, the only two states for which Professor Feldman found such statistics, and it stands to reason that lessened opportunity to get liquor had some effect. Contrary to accepted notions, auto accidents due to the intoxication of the driver are of minor importance, being only 1 per cent of all such accidents in New York State and 2.7 per cent in Massachusetts, although in 7 per cent of fatal auto accidents in Massachusetts liquor was a factor.

As to crime, Professor Feldman says, sardonically, "In pre-prohibition days it was customary to lay much of the blame for crime on drink. Today the situation seems reversed, and many people heap the blame on prohibition." He cites the Census Report which attri-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

butes the decrease in "gainful offenses against property" to the greater gains offered by bootlegging and illicit drug selling because of prohibitory legislation. The implication is that no new criminals have been created, but that criminals have transferred to these new fields.

He concludes, "It is significant that not a single person seemed to have a kind word for the saloon. Even those with the most pronounced 'wet' sentiments seem glad it is gone."

IRVING FISHER

YALE UNIVERSITY

The Reserve Banks and the Money Market. By W. RANDOLPH BURGESS. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1927.—xxi, 328 pp. $3.00.

Here is a simply-written and readable monograph, presented, it would seem, in a semi-official way. The author is titular assistant to the chairman of a Reserve bank, and his book is endorsed by the governor of that bank who vouches for its accuracy and instructiveness, adding that it "constitutes an important contribution to economic science". The volume, moreover, is not an individual production, but "had its earliest beginnings in a series of brief articles . . . prepared jointly by Pierre Jay, Shepard Morgan" and the writer, so that it represented a composite judgment. Then, too, the publishers, following the prevalent American custom of guarding the reader against errors of judgment, have secured a series of expressions from authorities who describe it in terms of strongest approval. Professor O. M. W. Sprague says it is "indispensable", ex-Secretary Baker thinks it should be read by "everybody" and President Traylor finds it "lucid" enough for even the "ordinary high-school boy" to "follow intelligently". Such a work plainly calls for more than ordinary, or casual, scrutiny.

Mr. Burgess divides the book into sixteen chapters. Of these, i-vi inclusive are a semi-historical, semi-descriptive survey of the Reserve system. Chapters xv and xvi are interpretative and analytical (dealing with "Interest Rates" and the "Weekly Statement"). The remaining eight chapters, vii-xiv inclusive, are the real content and *raison d'être* of the publication; for there is little in the other half of the volume that cannot be found to good advantage in various accessible places. These chapters deal essentially with conditions in the New York money market and factors ancillary thereto.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The book indeed might well be called "The Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Local Money Market". This limitation is recognized by the Introduction, where is found the statement that investment and money-market operations "must" be conducted "harmoniously", and that "necessarily" the largest volume of these transactions is executed in New York, hence the choice of the volume "in devoting itself so largely to money market relationships", though these are deemed "central to any understanding of the influence of the reserve system upon credit and currency".

This, then, is the scope of Mr. Burgess's work. It is not, in any true sense, an account of the "Reserve Banks", as the title indicates. It is a defense and explanation of the conduct of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, especially within recent years — an *apologia pro vita sua.* It is based fundamentally upon the thought that there has been need for the development of a special technique not thought of when the act itself was framed, not capable of practice elsewhere by other Reserve banks, but essentially a New York philosophy built upon realities. The writer of the Introduction frankly finds that the "early controversies" are "receding into history", while instead "there has arisen" discussion as to the "effects of Federal Reserve action upon credit conditions". Such discussion, however, is the main staple of the publications of the Reserve Board since their beginning in 1915, and of every serious writer on American banking.

Passing over the introductory account of Reserve organization contained in the first few chapters of the volume, already referred to, the reader's attention is first strongly drawn to chapter vii on "The New York Money Market". There it appears that that market is "the center toward which the idle money of all sections gravitates to find employment." Such "employment" is of three kinds —"deposit with banks", investment in "short-term securities", and loans "in the stock exchange money market". Later Mr. Burgess describes "four principal markets" which "make up the money market", and includes thereunder the "bill market", the "government security market", the "commercial paper market" and the "stock exchange money market"; but he clearly sees the inconsistency between the threefold and the fourfold grouping. In this money market, however, although funds have come from "all over the country", the importance "does not lie in its size", but rather in the "liquidity" it shows. Loans can be called, and "money" obtained there at any time, and on "a few hours' notice".

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New York banks hold not only their own funds, but those of other banks, and they supply from these the needs of the market in its various ramifications. When supply of funds runs short, they borrow at the Reserve Bank; when funds are abundant, they deposit. In this way, an "organic connection" is established between the Reserve Bank and the New York market.

Now, of course, what is thus so glibly set forth as ideal practice is just the reverse of safe banking or of the situation for which the Reserve Act intended to provide and is widely different from that which exists abroad. England, for example, as Mr. Burgess himself admits, has no "market" built up about the Bank of England with margin loans playing the chief part and affording the chief "employment" for the "spare funds" of the country, nor is there any central banking country (except our own) where such is the case. The money market (stock market) cannot, contrary to Mr. Burgess's statement, be relied upon to furnish cash at a few hours' notice if there happens to be pressure for funds anywhere. Mr. Burgess, in short, uncritically accepts the present variant of the old vicious "central-reserve city" system which has been developed in New York since the war, treats it as if it were normal or new, and proceeds to analyze and idealize it. Under the old system, outside banks sent "spare" funds to New York for "employment". They went into stocks as they do today; and the only difference lies in the stabilizing influence of the Reserve bank. Actual discussion of central bank problems viewed from the money-market standpoint must run along wholly different lines based upon general experience; genuine Reserve bank discussion must deal with the practical aspects of such problems in the setting of American conditions.

The author furnishes little analysis or recognition of any duty in the matter. The Reserve bank is, according to him, largely helpless in any such problem as real credit control or direction of funds into proper channels. "It is . . . impossible", says Mr. Burgess in chapter xi, "for a Reserve bank to dictate how its credit shall be put to employment". It cannot, for example, restrict loans on the stock exchange. This statement is soberly made, in spite of all that has gone before as regards care in choice of paper, discriminating selection of persons with whom to trade, etc. It is made in apparent ignorance of the careful scrutiny of the loans of discounting and accepting banks maintained by most central (and many Federal) Reserve banks, in their effort to select the best names in which to deal.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What duty, if any, then, have Reserve banks? Mr. Burgess remarks that their credit function is "quantitative" not qualitative. That function is to find out when there is too little or too much credit outstanding and correct the excess or deficiency. This apparently it may ascertain by any or all of several criteria, the purpose being merely to make sure that every "legitimate" need will be met, but that there will be no expansion beyond this "legitimate" need. One such criterion is furnished by the rate currently charged for money, another by the "way" in which credit is being used, a third by the movement of prices—for "economic theory for many years has recognized a close relationship between the gold supply and commodity prices". And yet, Mr. Burgess finds a "paradox", which troubles him in this connection! Sometimes, as after 1922, prices do not move in this "way"! Sometimes it looks as if the "excess" credit "tended" to get clogged in one branch of the price system as in "wages, or securities, or real estate". Sometimes there are singular distortions of money rates—sometimes, in short, the chosen criteria fail to "work" at all. What then?

Why, then, the whole "quantitative" matter calls for "judgment". And that judgment is supplied by men of the very highest class—the Board of Directors (and Governor) of the Reserve bank. Such authorities are often troubled because it frequently appears that "seldom do all of these guides to policy point in the same direction", and so sheer "judgment" has to come in to decide—e. g., whether the stock market is being overfed or not. They are often worried, too, by "international conditions"—too much gold flowing out or in—and on such occasions must provide a "cushion" of credit to "break the impact". Mr. Burgess is positive of the efficacy of the plan for he mentions it in several places (e. g., pp. 249 and 212). How he can be sure that such a "cushion" will be used for its intended purpose when he has already told us that a Reserve bank can never know or dictate how the volume of credit supplied by it shall be used (p. 68), is far from being made clear. Nevertheless, the whole operation is easy to understand. There is "nothing complex or mysterious" about the gold and credit policy (p. 249), "nothing mysterious or remarkable" about discount rates and reserves (p. 154). Reserve banks can do almost anything they choose —"offset" or neutralize gold movements, supply "cushions of credit" to break the impact of movements of funds, stabilize "prosperity" (p. 270) and even "reduce" the "swing of the business cycle" (p. 295). But they cannot control the "qualitative" direction or use of credit or curtail dangerous speculation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Of the many points at which serious question must be raised with Mr. Burgess as to fact or inference, space permits no account. Suffice it to say that the book is an advocate's brief in defense of policies which should have unbiased examination. Banks in the Reserve system have from time to time circulated hundreds of thousands of copies of similar *ad captandum* pamphlets. Now they furnish a "contribution to economic science", designed to defend the present practices and methods which have put our bank reserves back into the stock market and have largely brought the effects of our central banking system to nothing—as witness the experience of the past year. Those who devote themselves to the development of "economic science" should study the work of Mr. Burgess and the words of the Governor of the Reserve Bank of New York with care and should make their own analyses and draw their own conclusions.

H. PARKER WILLIS

Tammany Hall. By M. R. WERNER. New York, Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1928.—xxi, 586 pp. $5.00.

"Boss" Tweed. By DENIS T. LYNCH. New York, Boni and Liveright, 1927.—433 pp. $4.00.

Al Smith's Tammany Hall. By WILLIAM H. ALLEN. New York, Institute for Public Service, 1928.—viii, 334 pp. $2.50.

Tammany Hall of today has so much to answer for that it seems a shame to call upon it to answer for the sins of its fathers. The appearance of these three books in this election year speaks for itself. The country is enormously interested in the mighty organization that has dominated New York City for more than a century and more than once assumed a national significance. Quite aside from the temporal circumstance of their appearance all three have much soundness. Perhaps it does credit not only to three authors but to the public as well that they possess this soundness. All three show careful thought and deliberate research. The first two might be called historical. They are quite in the old tradition that thinks of Tammany in terms of Tweed, though he died more than fifty-five years ago. Lynch's *Tweed* is an absorbing story simply yet vividly told. The author has a curious penchant for extended excursions into the many by-paths which he finds along his way. Whole chapters are devoted to the careers of Jay Gould, J. J. Astor, Madame Restell, and other worthies, or such incidents as the reception of Lincoln in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New York, and the draft riots, most of which are not shown to have much bearing upon the story of Tweed. The author explains this as putting Tweed in his setting, but one suspects he was intrigued by these figures and events for their own sakes. In the Tweed narrative proper there is very little that is particularly new except a hunch on the author's part that Samuel F. Tilden was more of a rascal than he is able to prove. Lynch is confident that Tilden worked hand in glove with Tweed until he guessed the impending downfall, and leaped to the opposite side when he saw a chance to step upon Tweed's pudgy carcass to the governorship.

Tilden scarcely figures in the Werner version. The author of *Barnum* and *Brigham Young* has undertaken a big task when he attempts his biography of Tammany Hall. He has done an ample and vivid job. Though one cannot regard much of the material on which the author relies to give his story life and color as verifiable fact, he has quite absorbed the true quality of this remarkable organization so that his anecdotes have the ring of truth. What the author collects from prosy testimony and investigations is interestingly retold, if not new. The author has gone back a century to get a head start so that he has very little breath left for his message about Murphy. The smooth, delightful, polished style of the first two-thirds of the volume gives way to a jerky, panting style at the end. Though in the main the story is strictly chronological, there are occasional attempts to generalize about the system. There is only an occasional glimpse of the system and its tie-up with business in the community. The narrative through Kelly is definitive. The Croker and Murphy chapters will have to be redone.

For those who would know of Tammany today, Allen's is the book. Werner ends in 1924. There are but two mentions of Al Smith in his whole book. Allen carried his story to August 13th, two days before its publication. Al Smith's name whether relevant or not is on almost every page. Nevertheless the book is temperate in tone, if indignant. It is really an elaborate, well supported indictment of the multifarious administrative shortcomings of the Walker régime. The first half of it brings the story of Tammany from 1900 to 1925. The remainder deals with " Jimmy's " amazing three years. Though the author concedes that Tammanyism has not infected Albany under Smith he manages to place a good deal more of the local story at the Governor's doorstep than has generally been accepted. The Smith adherents appear to admit his early subservience to Tammany and that organization's present need for housecleaning but insist (and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rightly) that he is no longer dominated by it and that, if anything, he has produced a regeneration of it. Allen's fact-filled analysis makes this new Tammany appear a ghastly joke. But while he is annoyed at the Governor's failure to show more responsibility for his former bedfellows he virtually concedes that he is no longer dominated by them. If this be true—and informed observers have little difficulty on agreeing that it is—then all three volumes despite their individual merit were without place though not without significance in the recent campaign.

JOSEPH MCGOLDRICK

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Survey of International Affairs: 1925. Volume I. *The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement.* By ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. New York, Oxford University Press, 1927.—xvi, 611 pp. $8.50. Volume II. By C. A. MACARTNEY and others. New York, Oxford University Press, 1928.—vi, 457 pp. $8.50.

In this age of "outlines", the Royal Institute of International Affairs of London is doing a serviceable and admirably performed piece of work in publishing, as the *sequelae* to H. V. M. Temperley's *History of the Peace Conference*, a review and guide, the *Survey of International Affairs*, under the general authorship of Professor Arnold J. Toynbee, whose historical scholarship is remarkably adapted to this labor of chronicler and interpreter of international diplomacy and politics year by year. The latest *Survey*, that for 1925, has, for good reasons, been expanded into two volumes, the first part being devoted entirely to the affairs of the Islamic World from 1920 onward, omitted from the conspectus of earlier volumes, and the second part being devoted to a general review of international affairs in Europe, the Far East, and the Americas in 1925. Occasional footnote references and bibliography, appendices containing texts of important documents, and maps, add to the utility of the books, and make the two volumes, like their predecessors, indispensable and authoritative reference works for all students of contemporary international relations.

The first volume is written almost entirely by Professor Toynbee, and is an able exposition of events in the Islamic world from 1920 to 1926. Recent epochal changes in Turkey, the varied history of the Near Eastern mandated territories, the rôle of oil in politics, boundary and frontier problems, the uprisings and restlessness in North Africa, are dealt with in detail. It is to be expected that a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

later *Survey*, dealing more fully with recent Indian affairs will give adequate space to Moslem India. Professor Toynbee has been criticized for his adoption of a sometimes perplexing system of transliteration from Arabic or Turkish into English, with a resulting distortion of familiar names, like that of Servet, the former Egyptian premier, which becomes Tharwat Pasha; but this is a matter for experts, and Professor Toynbee, himself an expert, has weighty support for his system of transliteration. There is confusion, too, in the characterization of Iraq as a "mandate." It is true that Britain was given a mandate over Iraq by the Council of Ambassadors, a relationship subsequently endorsed by the League of Nations. But it is also true, as Professor Toynbee carefully points out, that technically no mandatory agreement was ever adopted between Great Britain and Iraq, the draft instrument of 1920 having been replaced by a treaty of alliance in 1922, a protocol in 1923, and subsidiary agreements in 1924, all of which were embraced in a new treaty between Great Britain and Iraq signed in January, 1926. Thus Iraq refuses to admit that it is a "mandate" of Great Britain; but Professor Toynbee himself elsewhere, either intentionally, with a loose meaning, or inadvertently, calls it a mandate; and the world in general concurs with him in considering the relationship in fact on the same footing as that of Palestine.

The main characteristics of the world of Islam in recent years, as the fine interpretative introduction suggests, have been the increasing emancipation of oriental states from the control and influence of the Western Powers, and, paradoxically, the adoption of Western methods in economic organization, in military technique, in political institutions, and in the spiritual "culture" of the West —but an adoption by deliberate choice instead of by coercion. This double tendency has been the result of the European conception of nationalism and self-determination, permeating the Islamic world, slowly and belatedly, via the Balkans, years after it had produced its dragon's teeth of political eruptions in Europe itself. When the West was feeling the recoil of its own over-developed system, and was trying to discover a way out of the disruptive effects of nationalism, the nations of the Near East were just beginning to feel the accentuated influence of those same eighteenth and nineteenth-century ideas of nationalism. In consequence there ensued wars between Greece and Turkey, Iraq and Arabia, Syria and France, Morocco and Spain; unrest in Persia, Egypt, India and elsewhere; disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Islam, with the collapse of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the authority of the Caliphate, has followed the course of Christianity in ceasing to be a unifying religio-political force.

The second volume of the *Survey* has been delegated to the authorship of Mr. C. A. Macartney, Miss V. M. Boulter, and other competent but anonymous specialists. The field covered comprises the work of the League of Nations in each of its non-political or "humanitarian" activities; Europe, including problems of international waterways, minorities and exchanges of populations, and disarmament and security negotiations; the Far East, including the Chinese unrest and politico-economic problems prior to 1926, Manchurian railways, the Boxer indemnity agreements, tariff problems, the impact of Western "armed control" (i. e. intervention) upon Chinese temperament and politics, and a special section devoted to the first conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations; the American continent, including the international relations of the United States, the liquor conventions consequent to the adoption of Prohibition, the situation in Mexico, the efforts of the Central American Republics toward closer coöperation, and boundary disputes between Latin-American republics. An appendix includes the texts in full of the Locarno Pact and its annexes, and the text of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917. Probably the most important section in the second volume is that dealing with security and disarmament; for here is given a masterly treatment of the origins of the Locarno Pact and an analysis leading to the conclusion:

> With the signature of the Pact of Locarno it could not be said with finality that the problem of European Security had been completely solved. The possibility of a European war had been made more remote, but it had not been eliminated. Further, the questions of Arbitration and Disarmament, arising out of that of Security, had by no means yet been explored to their utmost limits. Much remained to be done; but it was generally agreed that the Pact of Locarno provided a practical answer at least to that main problem of the Rhineland frontier which had so long been a cause of strife, and a secure basis upon which the European statesmen of the future might erect, as opportunity occurred, a more comprehensive edifice.

Some seventy or more compact pages give the history of this important agreement and provide the student of contemporary European diplomacy with a satisfactory background for the subsequent efforts toward security, disarmament, conciliation and peace which M. Briand and Mr. Kellogg have crystallized in the multilateral pact.

WASHINGTON, D. C. KENNETH P. KIRKWOOD

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Principes de Science des Finances. By FRANCESCO NITTI. Translated from the Italian by Stefan Freund. Paris, Marcel Giard, 1928.—Two vols. xix, 439 pp.; 470 pp. 100 fr.

Despite all attempts to erect public finance into a science, that discipline still consists largely of practical suggestions and moral advice to financiers, together with some study of the results of their actions. Among works of that sort the present treatise deserves high place. Written by a well-known and liberal scholar-statesman, it embodies the results of a lifetime of study and many years of experience in all the most important posts of the Italian Cabinet, including the premiership itself. Since its original appearance in 1903, the work has gone through five Italian editions and various translations. The present French version, bringing the work down to date, is not unnaturally colored by the anti-Fascist aversion of its distinguished author, at present an exile in Paris.

The most striking characteristic of the book is unquestionably its intense realism. The state mysticism of many German writers and the capitalistic mysticism of many Americans are alike gratefully absent. Political and practical realities bristle from every page. Protection costs money; yet during the past fifty years no great country has industrialized itself without protection. There are good reasons for opposing the extension of the industrial activity of the state, yet the faults of public administration it shares in no small part with large-scale private business; at the same time the blind reliance of modern democracy on the state is completely irrational. All taxes commit great injustices; the problem is not to avoid injustice, but to be as just as we can.

Signor Nitti is an unterrified liberal. Constitutionalism and orderly finance go together; dictatorship has no serious finance. Public finance grows out of the social system, and so cannot fundamentally change it; yet taxation is a vigorous instrument of social reform, despite its primarily fiscal purpose. "You cannot deny what is so, or refuse to give facts the importance they have."

The treatise follows the conventional arrangement, and every part of it is richly illustrated with the actual results of European financial experience. Its value to the student consists largely in its wealth of such material, whose usefulness is cut in half by the lack of an index. Unfortunately, the work discloses no corresponding familiarity with American conditions, despite the author's admiration for us. One notes with pained surprise, for example, "the immense

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gifts of the Goulds, Vanderbilts, Carnegies and others to the universities", "MacSay's" *Populist Movement,* "the English economist Fisher", the complete failure of prohibition (*"un échec complet et immense"*), and the "insignificant examples of the progressive income tax" in this country, though the federal tax is elsewhere described (vol. I, pp. 231, 260, 333, 365 and 395 respectively).

Denying any possibility of proving a process of *étatisation progressive*, Signor Nitti yet shows with a mass of statistical detail the absolute and relative growth of public expenditures since the middle of the nineteenth century, and the continued overwhelming preponderance of military charges, despite the growth of other governmental functions. Yet society, as opposed to the state, never spent less on interior and exterior defense than at present. On the revenue side, there is no necessary tendency, as some writers maintain, to a progressive lessening of the fiscal domain. It is more likely to increase. In these days of Muscle Shoals and Boulder Dam, Americans might well ponder Nitti's pages on public revenue from water power.

Taxation is really making the best of a bad business. What with wars and useless canals, to quote Professor Cannan, and now the expanding functions of central and local governments, you must get the money somehow. The best taxes are those which yield the biggest returns and stir up the least dissatisfaction. Hence the repeated declaration that indirect taxes (all taxes on consumption and on exchange or transmission of property, including the succession tax) constitute and will continue to constitute the base of the modern budget because of their great productivity. It is no special credit to rich states that their indirect taxes fall on comforts and luxuries rather than necessities; each state gets its revenue where it can. Here speaks the realistic, not the sentimental democrat, the deficit-facing European, not the surplus-disposing American financier. All you can do is to use direct taxation to redress, in so far, the injustices of indirect, and you may likewise use progression to supplement the unavoidable proportionality or regressiveness of indirect taxes. But even the income tax, while a useful corrective to other taxes, yet offers no hope of becoming *the* tax of the future. States need too much money.

In all this valuable hard-headed treatment of taxation there is little of theoretical nicety. Those of us who believe that most of the genuine science of finance consists in the investigation of incidence are bound to be dissatisfied with the scanty seven pages formally

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

devoted to that topic, together with the largely unfulfilled promise of further study in connection with particular taxes.

Public debts receive interesting, suggestive and sound treatment. Their history, says Signor Nitti, is essentially political, and the judgment of it evades the economist and financier. Yet the statesman in our author enables him to declare foreign loans, if not always disastrous, yet by their nature unfavorable, while the history of international finance in all the Orient is "a terrible series of crimes, intrigues, outrages and wars". On the basis simply of our operations during 1905-11, we are declared to have imposed "the most scandalous form of arrangement" on Santo Domingo, and to have taken away the autonomy of Nicaragua and Honduras. One wonders what Signor Nitti would think of our improved post-war technique of Central and South American finance, with its customs liens, railroad and bank mortgages, Yankee tax-receivers and financial advisers, and all the rest. Yes, he is right; the finance of loans to weak countries is largely politics, good business—and glass houses.

HENRY RAYMOND MUSSEY

WELLESLEY COLLEGE

The White Man's Dilemma. By NATHANIAL PEFFER. New York, John Day Company, 1927.—ix, 312 pp. $2.50.

The sub-title of this book is, "Climax of the Age of Imperialism." The dilemma concerning imperialism is: if the white man attempts to remain in the Orient and other "backward" regions where his presence is obnoxious, he is certain—probably sooner than later—to be forcibly ejected; and if, in order to avoid that contingency, the white man voluntarily withdraws, he runs the danger of losing control over raw materials the supply of which has become essential to the functioning of his industrialized society.

Mr. Peffer is convinced that the less objectionable alternative is for the white nationalities to withdraw gracefully—before it is too late. This should be done at whatever considerable immediate sacrifice there may be. Like other recent writers on the Orient, the author envisages the probability of armed combat on a gigantic scale. But unlike certain others, he does not advocate as a preventive the construction of immense navies, air fleets and other paraphernalia of "preparedness." One reason for Mr. Peffer's opposition to such measures is that he is quite skeptical of the benefits of imperialism to the general public of the nation which embarks on an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

imperialistic policy. In addition, even though it be assumed that imperialism does bring about widely diffused economic benefits, this writer questions whether these benefits are worth the long-run price in armamants and war-time losses which "preparedness" inevitably brings in its train. Moreover, one gathers that for ethical reasons Mr. Peffer objects to Western unwillingness to allow "backward" peoples to experiment, in their own way, with Western ideals of nationalism and democracy.

Consequently, both ethical and economic considerations should cause us (the author sees no reason for making an exception in the case of the United States) to withdraw from the East, Near-East and Africa—in fact, from all the regions where oil, rubber and other opportunities for concessionaires supply a magnetic attraction.

Although wisdom would cause Western peoples to withdraw on the best terms possible, Mr. Peffer sees no reason for believing that rationality is a decisive influence in motivating international policy. Self-interest, it is true, induced business groups of the Western nations to obtain a stake in the "retarded" sections of the earth. But the Westerners' initial strong-arm methods, together with their subsequent social arrogance and flouting of long-cherished traditions, have exemplified anything but the far-seeing wisdom which was imperative if investments and commercial relations were to be maintained on a permanently profitable basis. All of the nationalities of the Occident have not been equally guilty of rubbing the "backward" races the wrong way. The English and Americans, Mr. Peffer thinks, have been the worst offenders. More intensive economic exploitation has been practiced by the French and Dutch, but representatives of these nationalities do not maintain the same system of social taboos against the natives as do Americans and Englishmen. Marriage, for example, between a Dutchman or a Frenchman and a native woman will not cause the husband to be ostracised by his own nationality; but such ostracism would occur on the part of Americans and Englishmen towards one of their group who acted similarly. This difference among Western nationalities does not apply only to marriage—it is also true of eating in a public dining room and even of conversing on the street. As a result, although the tide of discontent is rising in all places where the white man rules or has special privileges, up to the present the most acute manifestations have not received expression toward the Dutch and the French. In the East the British are looked upon as the worst

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

offenders—in spite of their being better administrators than other European nationalities and having, on the whole, extracted for themselves a smaller share of the natives' income. This psychology of the Oriental supplies ground for the belief that he is no more "rational" than are his unwelcome guests from the West.

Thus, Mr. Peffer indicates, although the lure of markets and of raw materials constituted the original attraction which drew the white man to the East, the present dilemma which confronts him has come about through the essentially emotional, irrational characteristics of human beings. He writes (p. 251): "taking the long view, . . . there is no practical possibility of a compromise. Ideally there is, and if this were merely an intellectual exercise a happy solution could be found. If there were ten real statesmen at the helm of governments in the principal countries of Europe and in the United States, if among the financial and industrial potentates of those countries there were ten men who could see beyond the year's balance sheet, then there might be a compromise." But he thinks "this is begging the question: a counsel of perfection" and doubts "whether such a compromise would not be a postponement rather than a solution."

Possibly the author is correct: time will supply the answer. But the reader is led to be curious whether Mr. Peffer is quite as pessimistic as he would have us believe—whether his plain talk, cynicism about the white man's motives and methods, and his prophecies of ultimate disaster are not designed to reach some of the statesmen and the bankers of the kind he professes to assume is non-existent. And if their emotion rather than their reason is appealed to, Mr. Peffer would doubtless regard such an outcome as more promising than otherwise.

It remains to point out that the book, in addition to its persuasive frankness and easy-flowing style, has other virtues. There are vivid sketches of the most conspicuous emissaries of the white man in the Orient: the missionary, the diplomat and the business man. The typical representatives of these groups do not favorably impress Mr. Peffer, although the missionary receives somewhat more gentle treatment than the others. The comparison between American and British business men is also revealing.

LYLE W. COOPER

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lord Grey and the World War. By HERMANN LUTZ. Translated from the German by E. W. Dickes. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1928.—346 pp. $5.00.

England's Holy War. By IRENE COOPER WILLIS. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1928.—xx, 398 pp. $4.00.

The first of these volumes is a translation, with some additions drawn from recently published material, of a book which appeared in German last year. The American edition is presented as an account of "the part played by England and Sir Edward Grey in the pre-war diplomacy and in the crisis of June—August, 1914." As a matter of fact, the author devotes less attention to discussing Sir Edward Grey's foreign policy than to criticizing Lord Grey's *Twenty-five Years*. At times, indeed, we seem to be reading a gigantic book review. Moreover, the parts of *Twenty-five Years* which Herr Lutz singles out for his heaviest attacks are not so much those bearing specifically on Grey's own actions as those which present too unfavorable a view of German foreign policy. Indeed, in the chapter on the crisis of 1914, which comprises one-third of the total, we have simply a discussion of the "war-guilt" problem, with comparatively slight attention either to Grey's writings or to his diplomacy.

While it may be open to question whether a book of this character should have been written at all, there is no doubt that in many respects the task of the author has been performed with thoroughness and success. The inaccuracies and the evasions which are to be found in Lord Grey's charming volumes are ruthlessly exposed, and much valuable and novel information on the origins of the War is set forth. Herr Lutz displays, indeed, remarkable familiarity with "war-guilt" literature, including the most recent books and documents, as is indicated by the extensive bibliographies and the fifty-four pages of footnotes, many of which are marvels of erudition and industry.

The "apparatus" of scholarship, however, should not be mistaken for the thing itself. While demonstrating Lord Grey's unfairness to Germany, Herr Lutz presents a story of pre-war diplomacy that is quite as unhistorical, for that country is made to appear as practically free from any large share in the responsibility for the Great War. This is accomplished chiefly by the omission of some relevant facts, by the over-emphasis of others, and by the bold statement and repetition of unproved and unprovable assertions. Thus the un-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wary reader is likely to be badly misled by Herr Lutz's accounts of such matters as the origin of the Franco-German war of 1870-1871, German policy during the Boer War, the Moroccan crisis of 1911, the character and aims of the Franco-Russian alliance and the competition in armaments before the Great War. In discussing the crisis of 1914, he tries to show that Germany alone was "determined on peace" from July 29 to 31, he presents in its most extreme form the dogma "Russian general mobilization meant war", and he asserts that France "sixteen hours before Germany's declaration of war on Russia, officially announced her determination on war" (p. 287). His book, however, is not so tendencious as some that have appeared. He rejects—at least in its more extreme form—the theory of the Franco-Russian "war-plot" of 1912, and shows that Germany was in every sense responsible for the Austrian attack on Serbia.

Almost the only important topic in the history of Grey's foreign policy which is treated with a degree of fulness commensurate with the scope of the volume, is that of British obligations to France prior to the war. The aim throughout the discussion is to prove that Grey's "free hand" was an illusion, and most of the material which tends to show that the British government had bound itself to support France in the event of war with Germany is presented skilfully and fully. The author leaves out of account, however, the fact that not only had Grey, both in public and private announcements, repeatedly referred to the various agreements and arrangements between the governments as not involving an obligation on the part of Great Britain to support France, but that the French and Russian governments in private communications with each other had accepted this view of the matter.

Moreover, Herr Lutz fails to recognize the importance of the fact that during the crisis of 1914, when both Russia and France were endeavoring to bring the greatest possible pressure to bear on Great Britain in order to obtain a promise of her support, the argument of British obligations—which would clearly have been the most powerful if it had had any valid basis—seems never to have been seriously maintained. This argument was advanced, indeed, by M. Paul Cambon on August 1, but in spite of Herr Lutz's efforts to prove the contrary, there would appear to be little doubt that it was dropped after Sir Edward Grey's emphatic denial of the existence of any such obligations. Moreover, when Herr Lutz attempts to show that Great Britain was "committed" to the war by the naval guarantee to France of August 2, which was necessitated by the naval dispositions

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agreed on in the pre-war Anglo-French "conversations," he completely ignores some important documentary evidence which tends to weaken if not absolutely destroy his argument.

In discussing other aspects of Grey's policy, Herr Lutz pays scant attention to Grey's efforts to maintain peace by mediation and international joint action during the crises of 1912-1913 and of 1914. The charge, so frequently reiterated, that Grey "encouraged" Russia to mobilize in 1914, is supported only by the most cruel torturing of the documentary evidence. It is, moreover, asserted without satisfactory proof that Grey "quite unmistakably aroused in the Russians" on July 25 the hope of British support (p. 245) and that by July 30 Russia was assured of such support (pp. 275-276).

A good deal of attention is devoted by the author to Grey's peculiar personality. While his good intentions are not denied, he is accused of insularity, of unimaginativeness and of weakness. As evidence that he lacked true statesmanship, the opinions of Mr. Bernard Shaw, Mr. W. S. Blunt, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Sir Roger Casement, and others are cited. But Grey's most serious defects in Herr Lutz's opinion, were his "appalling prejudice" against Germany, his "absolutely morbid mistrust," and his "abysmal suspicion" of that country. For Grey, like Woodrow Wilson, had the misfortune to belong to the race of Anglo-Saxons, who, unlike other peoples, it would appear, possess the faculty "of overlooking their own faults and shortcomings while preserving a sharp eye for the faults and shortcomings of others" (p. 49).

Miss Cooper Willis's book, in the main, is a reprint of three brochures separately published in 1918, 1919 and 1920, and now appearing as Parts I, II and III, respectively, of the present volume. The first half of Part I deals with contemporary newspaper opinion on the question of British intervention in the European war. The arguments for intervention given in such journals as *The Times, The Daily Mail, The Morning Post, The Spectator* and *The Daily Telegraph* are presented chiefly by means of voluminous quotations from editorial articles. This gives a fair idea of the campaign for intervention as conducted by some of the Conservative and "independent" newspapers. But the other currents of opinion are represented almost exclusively by lengthy extracts from *The Manchester Guardian,* which occupy as much space as all those from other newspapers put together. This seems highly unsatisfactory. *The Manchester Guardian,* it is true, expressed the views of an important group of Liberals who were violently opposed to the entrance of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Great Britain into the war. But this group had other and possibly no less important organs, such as *The Daily News* and *The Nation*, of whose utterances Miss Cooper Willis tells us little. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the group in question is to be regarded as constituting the majority of the Liberal Party. As a matter of fact, Miss Cooper Willis's method completely obscures the fact that besides the "interventionist" and the "neutralist" newspapers, there were a large number, chiefly Liberal, but including Conservative, Irish Nationalist and Independent journals as well, which, prior to August 4, 1914, urged that the Government should maintain a policy of "watchful waiting," i. e. that it should not take any immediate action in the direction of intervention, but should be prepared to take such action in case British interests and obligations, such as those toward Belgium, should, through the development of events, become involved.

The author proceeds to show in the second half of Part I and in Part II, how the "Liberals," i. e. those whose views were expressed by *The Manchester Guardian, The Daily News* and *The Nation,* were able, after the war began, to modify their pre-war pacifism, chiefly through the fabrication, by such writers as Mr. H. G. Wells, Mr. Massingham and Mr. A. G. Gardiner, of the "myth of the Holy War," i. e. the theory that the war should be waged, and indeed in the main was being waged, by the Allies for certain "idealistic" aims beyond and above the mere object of beating and injuring the enemy. In this way the "Liberals" were able with clear consciences not only to support the war, but to endorse for the most part the vast program of conquest and destruction adopted by the Allies with the object of remaking the map of Europe and "liberating" its oppressed peoples. The "Liberals" opposed, it is true, some of the Allied policies which seemed inconsistent with their principles, but their opposition in the main proved totally futile. Yet upon the destruction of Tsarism through the Russian Revolution, and the entrance of the United States with a program of war-aims ostensibly so similar to their own, their faith in the "Holy War" was confirmed and revivified.

In Part III, which deals with the period of the peace settlement, comparatively little attention is paid to "Liberal" journalistic opinion, but the greater part of the space is given to accounts of some of the more discreditable actions of the victorious Powers during the period in question. This, it may be surmised, is intended to show the failure of the "idealistic" program. But much that is intro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

duced is of little significance in this connection. Moreover, some of the most lamentable failures of the "Liberals" and their allies are not clearly shown. On the other hand it is not recognized that a fairly large part of their program was actually carried into effect.

The style of the book is generally vigorous, clear and interesting. The inconsistencies, tergiversations and evasions resorted to by the "Liberals" in the effort to reconcile their pre-war doctrines with the gospel of the "Holy War" are exposed by the author with a pungent irony, which at times, however, degenerates into a flippant, malicious, and occasionally supercilious ridicule little in keeping with the tragic significance of the issues discussed.

F. R. FLOURNOY

ST. STEPHEN'S COLLEGE
ANNANDALE-ON-HUDSON, N. Y.

Tests of a Foreign Government Bond. By ERNEST MINOR PATTERSON. New York, Payson and Clarke, Ltd., 1928.—224 pp. $2.50.

Irrespective of whether or not American bankers and investors have acted wisely in advancing huge sums to borrowing governments, states, municipalities and corporations, the fact remains that we *have* within a relatively short time managed to send abroad in one form or another no less than $14,500,000,000. We have fared rather well so far, especially with respect to our foreign loans which were sold after the war. Difficulties have arisen with respect to only two loans publicly sold in this market within the past ten years. Of these loans, one was a Brazilian State loan of $5,000,000, on which payments have recently been resumed, the other being a Central-European corporation issue of $4,000,000 which was repaid on the basis of 45 cents on the dollar. The question may well be asked as to whether we, the most powerful lending nation in the world, will be immune from the losses incurred by other creditor countries, losses incident upon default on and repudiation of contractual obligations on the part of borrowers. To guard against governmental default is well-nigh impossible. Irrespective of how well secured a foreign loan may be at the time of flotation, it is, in the final analysis, only a promise to pay, and the lender confidently expects the borrowing government to "keep faith". Occasionally, however, the situation obtaining in the borrowing country is sufficiently unsatisfactory to make default practically inevitable. It is here where a prognosis is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

much more significant than a diagnosis, and decidedly more important than an epignosis. Dr. Patterson's contribution to the study of government finance is, in the opinion of the reviewer, of particular value, offering as it does concrete suggestions of how to appraise a foreign loan intelligently "ere it is too late". The purpose and aim of Dr. Patterson's work are perhaps best explained by Mr. Bayard F. Pope, President of Stone and Webster and Blodget, one of America's leading banking houses closely identified with foreign financing. Says Mr. Pope: "The author brings to this study a broad knowledge of the economic and financial factors of foreign countries. On this basis, he develops certain specific tests for judging the credit of foreign nations. . . . These tests . . . . should prove most helpful to the growing number of American holders of foreign securities and to the many thousands of investors here who have lacked a sufficient knowledge of such securities to risk an investment therein." Mr. Pope would have done better if he had recommended the study not so much "to the foreign issuers of securities seeking an American market" as to the American banker seeking a foreign loan for placement in this market. Experience shows that more foreign loans would have been successful had *our* bankers exercised greater care in the underwriting of them, particularly because it appears that Americans are more eager to lend than foreigners are to borrow.

Dr. Patterson adduces ten tests of a foreign government bond which, the author guardedly states, "should be applied with discrimination." This decalogue, if we may so term it, constitutes the bulk of the work, which seems sufficient reason to present it *in toto:* (1) The borrowing country and its people should have a long record of good faith toward their creditors. (2) The general economic status of the borrowing country should be one of continuing and healthily expanding prosperity. (3) The budget of the borrowing country should be clearly and definitely in balance and a sinking fund should be provided. (4) The debt charges on the unproductive debt of the government should be no more than from 10 per cent to 30 per cent of the national income. (5) On balance the borrowing country's international payments should be favorable, or at least potentially favorable. (6) Funds secured from the bond issue should be used productively. (7) The government of the borrowing country should be stable and the political trend should not be extremely reactionary nor strongly radical. (8) The bonds should be promises to pay in gold (or its equivalent). (9) The bonds should be completely tax-free in the issuing country. (10) The first

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the above nine tests is fundamental and several of the others are nearly as important. If there is any serious weakness among them, the loan should be protected by special security.

The marked soundness of Professor Patterson's suggestions is indisputable. However, this reviewer fears that very few, if any, foreign loans measure up to the above tests. In other words, what reasons can there be for a nation to borrow if it has a perfect record, if it is prosperous, has a balanced budget, a favorable balance of international payments, stable political conditions, etc.?

In the opinion of the reviewer, the investor should inquire not into the past fiscal record of a borrowing government but, if defaults ever occurred, into the circumstances under which payments were suspended. Financial history bears ample testimony to the assertion that the bankers are very often as much responsible for a default as the borrower.

The second test is so sound as to require no comment, although we are not likely to receive many applications for loans from countries whose "general economic status . . . . should be one of continuing and healthily expanding prosperity."

A balanced budget is of necessity essential. A country should, just as much as an individual, learn to live within its means. Failure, however, to balance a budget — except if such failure should be of a chronic nature — need not necessarily render the country in question a doubtful risk. A budgetary deficit is often effected by capital expenditures which, in time, however, become revenue-producing.

Professor Patterson's suggestions that charges on "unproductive" debts should not absorb more than 10% to 30% of the national income is well taken. However, statistics pertaining to national income, irrespective of how carefully and conscientiously prepared, are guesswork at best. The author doubtless appreciates this fact which may account for the rather liberal margin he allows.

The fifth test is in the reviewer's opinion by far the most salient. A favorable balance of international payments, or a commercial equilibrium, determines more than anything else the quality of a foreign government bond. If we had means of accurately ascertaining a country's balance of payments, it would hardly be necessary to apply other tests.

The author's suggestion to employ productively proceeds from the sale of bonds is thoroughly sound, but it is admittedly difficult to define accurately the terms "productive" and "unproductive". A

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

loan contracted for the purpose of waging war may, if the war is successful, resulting in the acquisition of rich territory, turn out to be far more productive than a loan secured for the purpose of financing a railroad which may prove a failure. The reviewer does not unqualifiedly subscribe to the policy of dictating to a government how to use the funds obtained from loan flotations.

The remaining tests are well worth studying and should prove decidedly helpful to the underwriter of, as well as the investor in, foreign loans.

A detailed discussion of the above-mentioned ten tests is followed by an equally detailed discussion of their application. In view of the controversy which arose recently in connection with the status of German commercial obligations, as compared with reparations payments, Professor Patterson includes in his study a very enlightening chapter on "Germany as a Credit Risk". The study also contains similar discussions on France, Italy, Belgium, Canada, Brazil and Argentina. With regard to Dr. Patterson's discussion of Brazil, we miss references to the partial default of the Santa Catharina loan sold in the United States and in complete default until recently, and also to the defaulted bonds of the Port of Para Company, an American concern whose securities are largely held abroad. A word or two might perhaps have been said about the irregular payments on the State of Ceara bonds sold in the American market. We might have welcomed Dr. Patterson's views on certain other countries which have borrowed in our market, and whose position as debtor nations is perhaps not so well known as that of the countries with respect to which we have the benefit of the author's views. The reviewer, however, realizes that to present a discussion on all foreign borrowers, as thoroughly as Dr. Patterson has executed this study, would require considerably more time and space. We look forward to additional works from the author's pen which will supplement and perhaps complete a most valuable and helpful beginning.

MAX WINKLER

NEW YORK CITY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOK NOTES

The search for social origins is vain or fruitful according to the manner in which we pose our question. It is vain to ask: when, as an historical fact, did the state first emerge? All our exploration confirms the evolutionary hypothesis that it never had a beginning in this sense, that instead it grew distinct, became defined, out of social elements which existed from the first, which were involved in the very meaning of society. The problem is to trace in early social stages the rudiments of the state, the more inchoate political factors which emerged into the state as we can define it to-day. To this problem Dr. Robert H. Lowie brings distinct illumination in the little book before us, *The Origin of the State* (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1927; iv, 117 pp. $1.50). He has made a valuable contribution in revealing, with nice discrimination and apt illustration, the continuity of the social process. At the outset he qualifies the doctrine of Oppenheimer that the state begins with the domination of a class, being in origin and by nature an exploitative system. This is a partial and oversimplified explanation of the facts. Economic exploitation is in many cases not the outstanding factor even in the formation of primitive class divisions. "The German sociologist", Dr. Lowie maintains, "injects into the primitive atmosphere, charged with emotional values, the rationalism born of our industrial age". And he offers some very suggestive evidences in support of his contention. The real problem, then, is to show the significance of the political elements present in the social life of the more primitive peoples. A state, as we understand it, has a territorial character. Dr. Lowie makes a good point in his discrimination of the territorial unity implicit in the kinship groups of early societies. A state has an authoritative character, sovereignty in some sense of the term. Dr. Lowie points out that the germs of sovereignty are present in lowly and seemingly anarchic groups. Kinship may be the dominant, the consciously apprehended bond of unity, but the control of certain relations between kin and kin within the same group reveals the influence of the other bond, that of locality. Again, "the universal recognition of some deeds as crimes—though the definition of the offenses may vary from tribe to tribe—is a decisive proof of the omnipresence of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the state". The general thesis of political continuity from primitive people to modern state—which does not however imply a unilinear evolution—is clearly and cogently set forth. On one point Dr. Lowie has modified his former views. He had formerly attributed to the various associations, such as initiation groups, which are found among primitive peoples an important rôle in the development of the state. He now concludes, in the light of fuller evidence, that "associations are not inherently either centralizing or disruptive agencies".—R. M. MacIver.

It is curious that so few successful politicians seem troubled by any contradiction between the ideals they assert in their speeches and the logically if not morally indefensible compromises they must make in actually governing a nation. Oscar W. Underwood, for thirty years one of the leaders of the Democratic party in House and Senate, has, however, written a book, *Drifting Sands of Party Politics* (New York, The Century Company, 1928; viii, 422 pp. $3.50) in which he undertakes "by way of apology for the compromises I was at times forced to accept" to point out how, during his thirty years in Congress, "the Nation has drifted away from the ideals of the great men that founded our republic". Writing for the general public, he begins with ten chapters reviewing the principles of government and the history of the government of the thirteen colonies and of the United States prior to his entrance into Congress. Jefferson's remark that "the government that governs least governs best" is his text. The specialist will note many hasty generalizations, such as the remark "The Mexican War was popular in our country", but those who enjoyed Mr. Bowers' recent keynote address at Houston will find Mr. Underwood pithy and pungent. The remaining three-quarters of the book are given over to a penetrating and candid review of the chief questions that came before Congress during Mr. Underwood's service there. His discussion of the tariff, in ten chapters, is noteworthy for the fairness and intelligence with which he discusses controversies in which he often bore a leading part. Yet he leaves the reader in no doubt as to where he stands on this question. We have by the abuse of the protective tariff "surrendered the heritage of our Revolutionary fathers that great fortunes might be assembled out of the earnings of the men and women of America", he concludes. He is equally explicit about prohibition, "an intolerable interference with the private life of the citizen". On the Federal Reserve Act he wavers a little. It is against his belief in states' rights and private initiative,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

yet it has through the twelve regional banks made it possible to "decentralize the concentrated bank control in New York." He denounces the Espionage Act as a needless and indefensible repetition of the error of the Alien and Sedition Laws of John Adams' administration. He disapproves of the numerous bureaus and commissions which Congress has set up independent of the control of the people. Mr. Underwood's ideas are, of course, not advanced as original contributions to political theory. They are, for the wide public to which this book is addressed, something more comprehensible and more useful than any abstract speculation: a courageous and clear, if one-sided, statement of principles and policies — most of them of present-day concern.—PENFIELD ROBERTS.

"The Eighteenth Amendment is a morbid excrescence upon our Constitution. . . . It is eating at the very vitals of our public life. We must not rest satisfied until we have cut this cancerous growth out of our body politic whether it takes five years, ten years or fifty years." This is *The A. B. C. of Prohibition* (New York, Harcourt Brace and Company, 1927; v, 150 pp. $1.50). Through one hundred and fifty pages Mr. Fabian Franklin maintains this thesis. It is a highly emotional plea for personal liberty by one who apparently thinks the country is going rapidly to the bow-wows. For anyone who is seeking light on this perplexing question there is little to choose between the highly imaginative and fantastic figures of the Anti-Saloon League and the delirious diatribes of Fabian Franklin. In either case and from both sides he will get lots of heat but precious little light. There is no excuse for this book. Mr. Franklin said everything he has to say in his first book, *What Prohibition Has Done to America*, and that was little enough. I have no quarrel with Mr. Franklin or the Anti-Saloon League as propagandists but when they hurl their junk at me in the guise of scientific, reasoned and impartial studies, I must protest. This book, however, is not even good propaganda since it is very doubtful that anyone not already convinced will be other than irritated or disgusted by it. "A fanatic", says George Santayana, "is one who redoubles his efforts after having forgotten his aim." Unfortunately the ranks of both wets and drys are filled with such people. Mr. Franklin and his school forget that Prohibition is an effort to deal with a vexatious social problem; the drys forget that its aim is sobriety, not suicide, and that the Volstead Law is not the be-all and the end-all of statesmanship. I am not at all sure that Prohibition is the proper solution —each day my doubts grow—nor am I sure that Quebec or Sweden

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has the true and only way. But of one thing I am quite certain, we can never hope to arrive at a sensible settlement so long as we allow our indignation to play hob with our intelligence. — PETER H. ODEGARD.

Professor William Kirk Woolery in *The Relations of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, 1783-1793* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1927; ix, 128 pp. $1.00) has rendered a real service by his careful study of the part played by Thomas Jefferson in the moulding of the foreign policy of the United States in the formative years. No one of the founders was so conspicuously identified with that work. This has been too little appreciated, partly because Jefferson's controversy-breeding political philosophy has overshadowed his work as Minister to France and Secretary of State, and partly because it has been maliciously misrepresented by partisan historians. It was inevitable that as our diplomatic representative in Paris, and later as the head of the department dealing with foreign affairs here, that he should have been a determining factor in the enunciation of a distinctly American policy. He had the advantage of working virgin soil. The success of the Revolution left us without international standing, without treaties or commercial agreements. Professor Woolery traces minutely all of Jefferson's activities from the moment he reached Paris to his retirement from the office of Secretary of State, and sets forth from original sources the motives and effects. His part in the negotiation of the Treaty of 1785, his plan for dealing with the Algerian pirates, which bears a startling resemblance to the League of Nations, his contribution to the Consular Convention, his prescience and policy regarding our rights to Mississippi River navigation culminating in the Pinckney Treaty which "bears his stamp in practically every detail"—are all set forth authoritatively from the records and with a readability in style which differentiates this work from so many other monographs. In nothing has Jefferson been so belittled and misrepresented historically as in the treatment of his career in the State Department and here Professor Woolery does him complete justice. In the controversy with Hammond, the British Minister, over the British Treaty, Jefferson's perfect mastery over his adversary is made clear; and it is noteworthy that like Professor Bemis in his excellent work on the Jay Treaty, Professor Woolery finds that Hamilton was one of Hammond's advisers. In dealing with the long-drawn-out controversies growing out of the French Revolution and the resulting war with England, the author does not minimize Jefferson's mis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

calculation of Genet's character, but shows that in the end the Neutrality Proclamation was in accord with Jefferson's ideas. We have here a compact, thoroughly documented and convincing study, without sacrificing an entertaining narrative to brevity of treatment, and justice is done to Jefferson's influence in the creation of that which has come to be known as the American foreign policy.—CLAUDE G. BOWERS.

A little volume entitled *State Security and the League of Nations* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1927; x, 346 pp. $2.75) contains the best treatment of which the reviewer has knowledge of what may be regarded as the most fundamental problems of international organization. In it Dr. Bruce Williams discusses the problems of obligatory international jurisdiction and international enforcement in connection with the content and force of international law, disarmament, national security and the preservation of peace. He reviews the pre-League situation, the steps taken in the Covenant, in the Protocol of 1924, and in the Locarno treaties, looking to the substitution of enforced international authority for national discretion in the definition and satisfaction of national rights. He does so in a thorough and masterful manner. The book is written in a beautifully smooth, dignified and exact style. The conclusions drawn are drastic and forceful; it would be unfair to Dr. Williams to supply them to possible readers in advance. Upon the problems with which it deals the book is, in the judgment of the present reviewer, as fine and as effective a presentation and analysis as we are likely to have for years to come. It was said at the beginning of this review that these problems may be regarded as the ultimate problems of organized international life. Dr. Williams implies that they are logically to be so regarded; the reviewer has taken the same position elsewhere. He has recently begun to wonder whether this is sound, as a problem in pure theory, and whether we are justified in devoting as much attention to these problems as we do. If the circumstances of national and international life are such as to render organized international enforcement impossible for as far as we can see into the future, is not the logically ultimate problem for us that of the extent to which international peace and welfare can be secured through voluntary international action? We need not, perhaps, succumb entirely to the intellectual discouragement which emanates from a review of the defeat of the cause of international enforcement at the hands of Tory Britain and Do-Nothing America. If the desire of the nations for peace and beneficial international

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

administration be sufficiently strong, may these results not be obtained, as they are being obtained today, by organized voluntary international action wherein the nations will actually do those things which—for reasons that are quite cogent until compared with the need for peace and international administration themselves, namely the costs of these benefits and the traditions of national independence of another era—they refuse to bind themselves in advance to do and refuse to permit themselves to be compelled to do?—PITMAN B. POTTER.

Even in the title of his new book, *The Essentials of International Public Law and Organization* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1927; xxii, 784 pp. $4.75), Professor Amos S. Hershey has taken account of the developments in theory and practice in the field of international law and relations since 1912, when *Essentials of International Public Law* was published. In the text, and even more fully in the voluminous notes, account is taken of the great changes in the field during the last fifteen years. The influence of the League of Nations is evident throughout the new material, and in chapter xiii the author includes a brief description of the League and its organs. The reviewer agrees that the League is "no mere alliance" but doubts the conclusion that it is "essentially a confederacy of states" (p. 528) under the author's own definition of a confederacy as having "organs and functions of its own, especially for the conduct of foreign affairs" (p. 180). Nor would the examples of confederacies in Section 101 of the edition of 1912—the United States under the Articles of Confederation, the Germanic Confederation of 1815-1866, etc.—be comparable to the League. The student who desires to go further than the necessarily brief statements of the text will find in the notes abundant indication of places in which to begin his search.—JOSEPH P. CHAMBERLAIN.

To issue in book form ten magazine articles and occasional addresses on current events, covering a period of more than a decade in spite of its too modest title—*Ten Years of War and Peace* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1927; 276 pp. $3.00)—would have sent most men to a labor of anxious revision. The late Professor Archibald Cary Coolidge, with that frankness and impersonality that was so characteristic of him, preferred to reprint them as they stood without amendment. Hence the papers are not only historical essays, they are also historical documents; they show exactly what the author thought of French Africa before the war; of nationalism, during the war when Germany was still considered

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at least a possible victor; of the break-up of Austria-Hungary, at the end of the war; of American foreign policy, during various years of the Harding and Coolidge administrations. Even if Professor Coolidge had chosen to revise his judgments the task would not have been great; like all thoughtful historians he was a remarkably good prophet, for he who best knows the past can best estimate its influence on the future. These essays, scattered and fugitive though they are, will wear well; their modest sagacity will preserve thm from the usual fate of journalistic comment. These meaty verdicts are always well phrased. Every now and then the author lets drop a casual phrase which is better than new; it makes us realize clearly something we have often thought of in a vague and cloudy fashion. For instance, take the passing reference (p. 9) to "Lenin, who with his strange cynical frankness seems to take a positive delight in pointing out the errors which he and his have committed", a perfect thumbnail sketch of the dictator of Russia at the height of his power. Or again, "The paying of conscience money has been a curious characteristic of the foreign policy of America" (p. 49), a phrase which sums up the purchases of territory from defeated Mexico and Spain, the return of Boxer indemnities to China, the money balm for the wounded feelings of Colombia. A weakness of Pan-Americanism is pointed out: "it rarely includes the largest of American countries, the Dominion of Canada. This appears even more absurd than leaving England out of Europe" (p. 192). The general attitude of these essays is that of a conservative internationalism. No encouragement is given to grandiose schemes of political realignment such as Pan-America or Pan-Europe (in the sense of a close political or customs union), but the small tasks handled for the Powers by the League and the Court of International Justice are favorably appraised. "To Soviet Russia the League may be an embodiment of the evil bourgeois spirit, to the United States it may be an association of foreign idealists who wish to meddle in our business . . . but to much of Europe it represents the one hope of the future against the recurrence of the disasters which have brought her to the verge of ruin" (p. 126). The proofreader has let some errors pass his sentry post. President "Diza" of Mexico (p. 51) and Prince "Metternicht" of Austria (p. 247) are equally unknown to historians.—PRESTON SLOSSON.

Senator Robert L. Owen has written a book entitled *The Russian Imperial Conspiracy* (New York, Albert and Charles Boni, 1927; x, 212 pp. $2.00) which forms part of the rapidly growing amount

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of "revisionist" literature which has appeared in this country and in Europe in recent years concerning the responsibility for the catastrophe which befell the world in 1914. Ever since the disclosures which were made by the opening of the Russian, German and Austrian archives, historical scholars and others, not only in Germany but in the Allied countries and the United States as well, have insisted that Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, which declared that the German Government was exclusively responsbile for the war, could no longer be maintained and should be modified. These critics are of two kinds. The first group includes dispassionate historical scholars who have no thesis to prove but who are simply attempting to search out the truth. Typical of these is Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson whose volume entitled *International Anarchy*, is one of the keenest analyses of the causes of the Great War which has as yet appeared. A second group apparently starts with the assumption that it is necessary to acquit Germany of all responsibility for the War in order to right the wrong which was done by the Treaty of Versailles. Prominent in this latter group is Professor Harry Elmer Barnes. Senator Owen's volume falls distinctly in the second group. Not only does he accept without question some of the sweeping statements of Professor Barnes but he adds others of his own even more uncritical. In his opening paragraph the author indicates his approach to an extremely complicated problem. He asserts that "The most gigantic conspiracy of all time in its consequences was the intrigue of the Russian Imperialists, who deliberately and intentionally brought on the World War in 1914." Further on he proclaims with pontifical assurance that "The official proof is overwhelming that the Germans did not will the World War; that the Austrians did not will the World War; that the leaders of Serbia, of Russia and a very, very few French leaders, controlling nevertheless French Foreign Affairs, did will the World War." Finally he has no doubt that: "The moral responsibility was on Sazonoff, Nicholas II, Grand Duke Nicholas and Raymond Poincaré. Their guilt is now thoroughly established, and no well informed man has any right whatever to deny it." The survey which is given of the historical background of the War shows no evidence that the author has even an elementary knowledge of the intricate international situation which existed in Europe in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. He makes much of the fact that secret diplomacy prevailed in Great Britain and France but does not indicate that this was equally true of Germany and Austria. He stresses

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the sinister character of the Triple Entente and does not point out the obvious fact that the Triple Alliance, headed by Germany, was in existence twenty-five years before the Entente was formed and that the former was no more innocent than the latter. He accepts without question the very dubious conclusion reached by Professor Barnes that Germany did not know the contents of the Austrian Ultimatum before it was sent to Serbia. In short Senator Owen has written a badly organized and not very convincing piece of propaganda. It is the opinion of the reviewer that little is to be gained either for historical accuracy or international good-will by substituting for the unsound thesis of exclusive German responsibility for the war contained in the Versailles Treaty the equally untenable thesis of complete German innocence. As Dickinson convincingly shows, the responsibility for the calamity is to be found in the international anarchy which prevailed in Europe at the opening of the twentieth century.—NELSON P. MEAD.

In a book entitled *Bismarck, Andrássy and their Successors* (Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1927; vii, 463 pp. $6.00), by Count Julius Andrássy, son of the statesman named in the title and himself the last Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the reader expects to find an intimate comparative study of the personalities and systems of the directors of foreign policy of the Central Empires. This expectation is measurably fulfilled in the first chapter, on Bismarck and Andrássy. Thereafter, the book takes on increasingly the character of a mediocre diplomatic history of the period 1871-1905, based on *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette.* A few sketches, as of William II and Bülow, are interspersed, but Austro-Hungarian policy and its directors nearly disappear from the picture. The treatment follows the orthodox lines of a defense of German policy against the charge of deliberate direction towards war, coupled with criticism of its failure to reach an understanding with England. The grasp of developments, fairly sure in the first chapter, becomes less and less certain towards the close. In addition to the author's estimates of personalities and events, he offers some reflections on the general principles of statecraft. He compares Bismarck's concern purely for his country's interest with Wilsonian international idealism to the advantage of the former. "To-day also," he writes, "I see the highest and most salutary service for humanity at large in the apparently narrower sphere of service for one's own people" (p. 63). Yet he admits in another place that nations attempting to follow

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bismarck's guidance do not "always take the course that is best for themselves" (p. 266). This leaves his political philosophy dependent on the wisdom and skill of statesmen, and one may be pardoned for preferring, given equal abilities, those of broader vision.—J. V. FULLER.

In a vigorous document under the caption, *What Is Mutualism?* (New York, Vanguard Press, 1927; ix, 238 pp. $0.50) Mr. Clarence L. Swartz, "in collaboration with the Mutualist Associates" has defined "Mutualism" as follows: "A social system based on equal freedom, reciprocity, and the sovereignty of the individual over himself, his affairs and his products; realized through individual initiative, free contract, coöperation, competition and voluntary association for defense against the invasive and for the protection of life, liberty and property of the non-invasive." At the semi-annual meeting of the Academy of Political Science (April 11, 1928) I presumed to entitle an after-dinner address, "Mutualism", without any intention of advocating the particular social system proposed by the Mutualist Associates. Having thus explained any possible bias, I venture to suggest that Mutualism might be more usefully defined as a principle of social philosophy than as a social system. This principle may reveal itself in the scheme of coöperation explained by Mr. Swartz—and likewise in many other programs, such as that of the apocryphal Aristides Midas, whom I quoted extensively in the address just mentioned. A lover of free speech is inclined to protest when a noble word is kidnapped by a band of doctrinaires and held for ransom. If "Mutualism" is the "social system" defined in this book, then one may not call himself a mutualist unless he agrees—(1) that property in land should be limited to occupancy and use; (2) that interest should be absorbed by "mutual banking", which will furnish capital at cost; (3) that patents, trade marks and copyrights should be abolished; (4) that public school systems should be destroyed; and that many other equally drastic reforms should be brought about—largely through "passive resistance" to obnoxious laws. There was once a gentle word, "socialism", which indicated a predominant interest in others rather than in oneself. It was captured and reduced to servitude. Now no one can be a socialist without subscribing to some set program for the political regeneration of mankind, which perversely insists on living and thinking individually. Some individuals (like myself) are deeply impressed with the interdependence of all persons, more or less, and particularly with the interdependence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of all citizens of a State. So we begin to talk of mutual interests, seeking to preserve individual freedom as an object while recognizing the necessity of coöperative activity as a means. We seek to spread the philosophy of mutualism. Then along comes a group of enthusiasts inspired with the deadly earnestness of those who feel assured that they have found the one road to freedom. They lay down new laws to imprison our minds—even while seeking to set free our hands. From Martin Luther to Woodrow Wilson the positive protestant has written in the spirit of, "I can no other"—which should be translated, "I ken no other." One may be wholly sympathetic with the philosophy of mutualism but deeply skeptical of this social system, which is entitled "Mutualism". Must one acknowledge the authority of the gospel of mutualism as revealed by Mr. Swartz and his apostolic collaborators? Probably the answer is, yes. Words can be readily put in bondage by organized effort. If so, my advice to social philosophers who are unwilling to be "socialists", or "anarchists", and find they cannot be unmitigated "individualists", and who have thought that they might be "mutualists", is — read *What Is Mutualism?* — and weep! — DONALD R. RICHBERG.

One's skepticism regarding the value of *Sociology*, by Ram Gopal and G. R. Josyer (Bangalore City, The Bangalore Press, 1926; xvi, 298 pp. $0.75) is aroused by the first sentences of the authors' "Introduction," as follows: "We need hardly apologize for placing this book in the hands of the public. It throws a flood of light on the origin, development and decay of societies." As we read we discover that the authors have read widely but not intensively. They quote Ingersoll, Ruskin and Carlyle, they are familiar with Lester F. Ward and Norman Angell, but they know little of the great body of anthropological and sociological literature of the last quarter-century. One is not surprised to find, then, that the book is a boiled down and simplified edition of Spencer's *Principles of Sociology*. The parallel is striking. After some discussion of the law of causation and a definition of sociology, there are chapters on "original external factors," "original internal factors", primitive ideas, society and its systems of organs, domestic, ceremonial, political, religious, professional and industrial institutions. The authors have caught the significance of science for human welfare and have written a work that may be highly useful in their own country.—F. H. HANKINS.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED